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 1 
Introduction 
Élise Féron, Marko Juutinen, Jyrki Käkönen, and Karim Maïche 
 
This book is the final product of a research project funded by the Kone Founda-
tion, called Regional Challenges to Multilateralism (2017-2020). The main ob-
jective of the project has been to examine the relations between emerging powers, 
new regional and intra-regional initiatives, and multilateral governance institu-
tions. The gradual decline of the US leadership, the consequences of the 2008 
financial crash and the ongoing global transformations and power shifts have been 
interpreted in multiple ways, and continue to be hot topics within International 
Relations scholarship, peace and conflict studies, as well as governance literature. 
The Regional Challenges to Multilateralism project offered a possibility to con-
tribute theoretically and empirically to these debates. 
The research outcomes of the project are manifold. We have published two jour-
nal special issues, one in English in the Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 
4, no. 6 (edited by Jyrki Käkönen) and one in the Finnish Kosmopolis (edited by 
Marko Juutinen and Karim Maïche). We have also published one scientific mon-
ograph, Revisiting Regionalism and the Contemporary World Order: Perspec-
tives from the BRICS and beyond (edited by Élise Féron, Jyrki Käkönen, and Ga-
briel Rached, 2019) with Barbara Budrich Publishers. In addition, some 
independent journal articles have been published, such as in the Journal of the 
Indian Ocean Region, as well as working papers and blog texts with our institu-
tional partners, in particular with the New Delhi based Observer Research Foun-
dation (ORF). Moreover, we have produced mixed art and science projects led by 
a professional artist Karstein Volle, in cooperation with the academics.  
We have also created an artistic blog, Pluralist World Order, where we popularize 
academic research and provide perspectives on current hot topics and illustrate 
the texts with caricatures. Finally, our project has organized a major international 
conference in September 2018 at Tampere University, which attracted a number 
of leading scholars from all over the world, as well as a panel during the Finnish 
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Political Science conference. Our individual researchers have of course also par-
ticipated in numerous international conferences, as well as in the 6th and 7th edi-
tions of the Tallinn University SOGOLAS Winter School on International Rela-
tions. By undertaking all this, we have sought to cross geographic and disciplinary 
boundaries as wells as the boundaries that separate scientific, artistic, and popu-
larized forms of expression.  
One of the starting points of this project has been what we see as a nuanced and 
multidimensional dissatisfaction with the liberal international order. One dimen-
sion of this dissatisfaction relates to the debates about the so-called Global North 
and South divisions, while another pertains to debates about decolonization of the 
international order. In contrast to the notion that the liberal international order is 
constructed upon generally approved norms and codes of conduct (and hence, the 
belief that international organizations do not rely on great power dominance but 
more on international norms and legitimacy), we took seriously the perceived dis-
satisfaction among the rising powers, as well as among the so-called developed 
countries. While our focus has been on the rising powers and new institutions, the 
shape shifting of US from a hegemon to a dissatisfied power has been an im-
portant puzzle in the overall scheme of our project. 
Multilateralism has been one of the key concepts of the project. How multilater-
alism is realized in practice is, according our view, a major cause of dissatisfac-
tion vis-à-vis the liberal international order. From a conceptual perspective, mul-
tilateralism has a strong normative underpinning. At the same time, it also 
pertains to the major constitutive and legitimizing discourses of global govern-
ance. Therefore, normative ideals and the reality of multilateralism in global gov-
ernance integrate multiple discrepancies. As a normative concept, multilateralism 
can be defined as generalized principles of conduct ensuring that decision-making 
in international governance institutions is not based on particularistic interests of 
a few or of the most powerful players (Ruggie 1992: 571). Several scholars have 
sought to demonstrate that this postulate does not match with the experienced 
reality of the international order. John Ikenberry’s concept of “hegemonic multi-
lateralism” (2015) describes this situation, where the US as the former dominant 
power was able to influence multilateralism on the basis of its particularistic in-
terests.  
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In realpolitik, the perceptions of dissatisfaction are not relevant unless means to 
transform sentiments of dissatisfaction into actions of change exist. Thus, to the 
extent that the thesis of liberal institutionalism does not hold, the ongoing power 
shifts imply some form of changes to the contemporary order. The agents of 
change, however, are not merely the rising powers. Today the international world 
order, whether understood as multiplex or multipolar, integrates a fragmentation 
of significant actors such as cities, multinational companies, non-governmental 
organizations, and different virtual communities enabled by new technological 
developments. One should also remember how cross-cultural individual encoun-
ters are shaping the cultures of agencies, increasing the fragmentation of an inter-
national or globalized environment. 
What is more, the former dominant powers, including not only the US but also 
the EU, Japan, and Canada, show dissatisfaction with the redistribution of deci-
sion-making authority within the international institutions. The empirical focus 
of our original research plan was, nonetheless, primarily on the rising powers and 
some of their new institutional and cultural initiatives. We have thus studied how 
China and India relate to international affairs, how new initiatives like the BRICS 
and the New Development Bank relate to multilateral institutions, and to what 
extent and how can the concept of culture as well as indigenous traditions of the 
rising powers be conceptualized and used in scientific approaches.  
Besides dissatisfactions about hard power, measurable influence in international 
institutions and expressed critique about division of power in global governance, 
another key dimension of perceived dissatisfaction with how things are in the 
world, one that also underpins this project is of ideational and epistemic nature. 
The aforementioned IR scholarship, peace and conflict studies, as well as govern-
ance literature have been challenged within the project by new and more global 
orientations, where the so-called non-western agencies, experiences, and contri-
butions have been stressed. This means for instance a contemplation and critical 
renegotiation of ancient philosophical histories as well as a deconstruction of as-
sumed past identities, myths, and narrations related to Huntingtonian kinds of 
generalizations such as “West”, “Asia”, “Africa”, and so forth. Nationalist 
tendencies have increasingly strengthened the thesis of the world’s divisions into 
competing civilizational cultures as if they had developed separately from each 
other.  
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The objective of discovering pride in one’s civilizational history can easily be-
come a process of distorting, reinterpreting, or remaking the past for the present 
political purposes, be it to serve the interests of a Hindu leader, to maintain the 
economic dominance of upper proprietary class in Brazil, or to strengthen the idea 
of an ethno-nation in Finland. One of the aims of our project has therefore been 
to challenge these reductive conceptualizations of the world’s cultural develop-
ments, notably by shedding light on a networked view of the development of hu-
man kind. Through challenging certain usually circulating aforementioned con-
cepts, we want to stress the more complex processes of the development of socio-
economic premises, whether from post-structuralist, realist, or constructivist 
frameworks. Renaissance would not have happened without Arabo-Islamic con-
tributions. Similarly, without India, China, and Sub-Saharan Africa, there would 
not be the Mediterranean culture with its cultural achievements related to Minoan, 
Phoenician, ancient Greece, or Hellenistic cultures. 
In order to be able to approach international macro-scale phenomena, one also 
has to critically examine how concepts used in traditional scholarship within the 
aforementioned disciplines are understood. Concepts and theoretical frameworks 
produce and reproduce power relations. For instance, by studying multilateralism 
and regionalism as “obvious” configurations in the world order, aren’t we silenc-
ing other types of regional and/or continental arrangements, in Africa for in-
stance? Therefore, there is still much work to be done. 
The present book includes various articles from the project team members that 
tackle the question of change from unorthodox ideational and epistemic perspec-
tives. In his tracking the past in the Chinese and Indian regional cooperation ini-
tiatives, Jyrki Käkönen studies Indian and Chinese perspectives. The centre of 
gravity of the world economy and politics is moving back to Asia and the Indian 
Ocean region in Eurasia where it was until early eighteenth century. In Asia, 
China and India are the most influential rising powers of the global order. Ten-
sions between these two civilizations have at least a 2500-year history. Both have 
expressed a strong interest in becoming core actors in the continent and further 
within the global order. The competition between these two states is demonstrated 
in their initiatives for regional cooperation in Asia and beyond. Although China 
and India cooperate for instance in the BRICS context, they construct their own 
regional forums like BRI and BIMSTEC. In the article, the idea is to evaluate 
initiatives of both states for regional cooperation and how signs of the pre-
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colonial structures are present in those initiatives. At the third level, the interest 
is to track whether the elements of the traditional Chinese (tianxia) and Indian 
(mandala) approaches are present in Chinese and Indian attempts for regional 
cooperation. 
Marko Juutinen focuses even more on Indian traditions and particularly the 
Kautilyan political science as a means to rethink international relations in a plu-
ralistic order. Juutinen argues that the concepts of multiple and overlapping man-
dalas as well as the idea of transnationally intertwined state factors as a key con-
cept in understanding the modern state provide a potential new source for foreign 
policy scholarship and the development of Global IR. He brings his theoretical 
analysis to the field of empirical policy analysis by applying Kautilyan perspec-
tive on taking stock and interpreting some of the dilemmas presented by the 
BRICS. Building on the so-called BRICS paradox (Käkönen and Juutinen 2020), 
Juutinen’s starting point is that BRICS is little bit of everything and that it thus is 
a challenge to understand. For this reason, Juutinen construes and tests an alter-
native way to assess and examine BRICS.  
Karim Maïche reflects whether Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia, 
Turkey, Iran, or Egypt among others, could become BRICS member-states in the 
future? BRICS lacks member from the Islamic world in its explicit struggle to 
strengthen the role of the developing world in the multiple international political 
arenas. While the manifold strategic orientations of the BRICS are highlighted in 
the analysis, Maïche stresses the plurality of the Muslim world in general chal-
lenging the reductive understanding of its use as compact singular entity. In ad-
dition, he challenges certain ideas related to development of capitalistic produc-
tion into inherently “European”, stressing the socio-economic development as the 
more important dimension instead of political cultural explanations that are often 
reproduced in various research methodologies. 
By looking at regional mechanisms of conflict management in one of the world’s 
most turbulent regions, the Great Lakes Region of Africa, Élise Féron draws our 
attention to difficulties related to the presence of, and overlap between, a plethora 
of regional organizations and actors. She shows that military and political con-
flicts can put regional organizations in a competitive situation, and that concerned 
individual states can strategically play regional actors against one another, in or-
der to further their specific national interests. At the same time, examining 
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conflict management practices in Sub-Saharan Africa highlights on the one hand 
the increasing role that regional organizations play in maintaining the world’s 
peace and security, and on the other hand, the existence of oft-overlooked prac-
tices, such as ad-hoc regional alliances for conflict resolution. 
Giovanni Barbieri approaches BRICS from an empirical perspective. He studies 
BRICS and its new initiatives like NDB and AIIB as alternatives to liberal blends 
of development finance. He shows that the underlying idea behind the construc-
tion of the NDB and the AIIB is not intended at directly challenging the Interna-
tional Liberal Order nor at substituting an institutional hegemony, that of the 
USA, with another, that of China. Instead, it shows how the contestation is limited 
to the specific issue area of development finance and how these two institutions 
tend to integrate an alternative set of core norms into the existing world order 
through cooperation and competition between new and existing multilateral insti-
tutions. In the end, the confrontation reflects the existing tension around the core 
values animating the actions of the current International (Liberal) Order’s institu-
tions, and not the existence of an International Order per se.  
Terry McDonald examines the consequences of the Greek crisis and how it con-
tributed to opening the door for China into the EU. More specifically, the chapter 
seeks to explain the origins of the Greek crisis up until the beginning of 2017 and 
drawing lessons from this analysis, and apply those on studying China’s influ-
ence. The author shows how inaction on the part of Greece’s western creditors 
opened a door for China to get a foothold in Greece, and through it to Europe 
itself. Finally, it touches on the lessons for other small states—from classical Re-
alist theory, from critical World Systems theory, and from a modern Financiali-
zation approach—in order to show that the contemporary small state faces dwin-
dling options for insulating their economies from irrational action in the face of 
ever-increasing international financial flows. 
In the present volume, Yana Leksyutina takes a different perspective and studies 
the motivation behind the creation of the NDB and the AIIB. She argues that 
multilateral development banks (MDBs) occupy a place of strategic importance 
in global economic governance. Since the creation of the first multilateral devel-
opment bank—the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—
MDBs have emerged in three waves, each time as a result of the major changes 
in the world arena. The creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the 
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Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) represents the third and latest wave 
of MDBs. These new development banks have arisen as a consequence of an his-
toric shift in global economic power from developed countries to emerging econ-
omies and more specifically the increase in China’s economic might. Leksyutina 
focuses on explaining the motivation of the founding countries in establishing 
these two financial institutions, and the historical landscape that enabled the de-
veloping countries to create new financial bodies despite some skepticism and 
criticism coming from western audience. The author identifies major factors un-
derlying the creation of the AIIB and the NDB. Since both the AIIB and to a much 
lesser extent the NDB are China-promoted financial bodies, the chapter also seeks 
to reveal what national interests and objectives Beijing pursues in creating and 
promoting these two financial institutions. 
In some realists’ interpretation, the idea is that BRICS is a block of unsatisfied 
countries with an increasing global influence that thus form some kind of agent 
for change. Yet, it is difficult to precisely define the challenge that BRICS pose 
for the current international order. Indeed, in the project we have confirmed the 
assumption that while regional institutions can challenge the US hegemonic mul-
tilateral conduct of power, they are simultaneously in favor of multilateralism. 
Therefore, the question lies in what kind of multilateralism, qui bono? How will 
the conditions of multilateralism be shaped in the near future? The case of BRICS 
demonstrates that the rising powers are not dissatisfied with the idea of multilat-
eralism as a form of governance. Rather, they are dissatisfied with the dispropor-
tional influence in global institutions of the US and the EU, as well as with the 
practices embedded in international institutions that are labeled and represented 
as multilateral. For a number of years, the rising powers together with developing 
countries have sought to shift the practice of multilateralism closer towards the 
ideals of multilateralism. Yet, this has not been a success story. The US has been 
naturally reluctant to diminish its role.  
This process has been stalled because of the logical reluctance of former dominant 
powers. In addition, economic challenges, or even the crisis of the current capi-
talist economic system, as well as globalization, have all strengthened nationalist 
tendencies around the world, from the US to Brazil, Hungary to Scandinavia, In-
dia to Philippines and so forth. Populist leaders are elected to power and the rhet-
oric they use challenges the normative grounds of the liberal international order. 
Therefore, its crisis is not only related to a strengthening of rising powers, but 
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also to internal state factors. As a result, the US since the election of President 
Donald Trump have withdrawn and rejected multilateralism, most recently re-
signing from the Paris climate agreement. The US has in fact gone so far as to 
practically freeze the operations of the WTO by crippling its dispute settlement 
system.   
The ongoing struggles against various forms of dominance, whether political, cul-
tural, economic, or military, are still playing important role within the changing 
international world order. When stressing the heritage and ongoing processes of 
European colonial rule around the world, it is equally important to contextualize 
the multiple forms of dominance as processes that can be traced back to various 
historical times. Witnessing new forms of dominance, whether practiced by 
China, India or newer and older multinational entities cannot be done without 
contextualizing and connecting them to more ancient forms of dominant prac-
tices. These include ancient religious forms of governance and their institutions 
(e.g. Hindu, Islamic and Christian), European colonialism, US and cold war pe-
riod practices of power, and other multiple forms related to authoritarian govern-
ance as a result of the decolonizing processes of the twentieth century.  
Regional organizations are no less related to these multiple forms of dominance 
than multilateral or global ones. They reflect similar, and different, patterns accu-
mulating into various realities, experiences and narrations that form the frame-
work where international, domestic, and multinational agencies operate. Commu-
nities that are exerting these powers are also supranational and consequently it is 
rather challenging to categorize the use of power according to national, religious 
or ideological premises. Even the nature of regional trade agreements (RTA) that 
include arrangement of international power relations has changed from a made 
here-sold there basis to a made everywhere-sold there one (Baldwin 2014: 5). 
Considering these ongoing changes, it has become clearer to us that new regional 
and intra-regional initiatives, as well as states, do indeed appear to change the 
current order. We are inclined towards rejecting the idea of a challenge, because 
there is no direct animosity between them and multilateralism. Thus, instead of 
reforming the current order, they seem to be increasing pluralism and fragmenta-
tion within global governance. Given these changes, our project has increasingly 
sought ways to understand how international cooperation in the new context can 
be conceptualized and whether the predominant understanding about stability and 
continuance can encapsulate the ongoing changes.  
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Tuomo Melasuo uses wider perspectives on his contemplation regarding re-
gional and multilateral processes “shedding light” to the evolution of the world’s 
economic and political structures and systems from the Second World War until 
2019. Concentrating on the decolonization and the cold war, he argues that the 
dismantling of the five centuries old European colonial empires, which took place 
in four main phases, can probably be regarded as the most important phenomenon 
of the twentieth century. Firstly, Melasuo analyses how the hegemonic and dom-
inant centers constructed new institutions, such as Bretton Woods and the United 
Nations, in order to reshape their power positions. This process instigated forms 
of counter resistance within the Bandung conference and later on within the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) that opened concerted arenas for the former colonial 
states to operate, e.g., under auspices of the UN structures. Secondly, multilateral 
organizations such as Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
were established alongside with the development oriented connotations after the 
independence of the majority of African countries to counterweight the New In-
ternational Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s. Thirdly, in the next decade “the 
Empire” struck back when multinational companies managed to spread their 
domination and reconquer the former colonies with new performances of global 
governance. Finally, since the end of the cold war the former power structures are 
starting to scatter simultaneously with the emergence of new social movements 
around the globe challenging the hegemony of the contemporary economic order. 
These movements often integrating important amount of the youth can pave the 
way towards future configurations. 
Preceding and following these contributions, the book also includes illustrations 
by the project’s professional artist, Karstein Volle. These selected illustrations, 
produced between 2017 and the end of 2019, aim at stressing the popular dimen-
sion of our project, by combining art with academic outputs.  
We are well aware of the fact that our project displays many limitations. We have 
sought to critically approach power-related methodological and conceptual re-
search frames, but we found, and are still finding multiple restrictions within our 
ability to contemplate the world political, cultural, and economic policies and 
processes. In addition, our expertise related to environmental dimensions are ap-
parently lacking, while we totally agree that climate change is generating impli-
cations to our daily lives increasingly in the forms of collapsing systems, eroding 
global governance, and increasing local violence transforming our futures in an 
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ever more unpredictable way. The fragmentated international order, challenged 
by mass immigration and the rise of populism, yields serious risks to peaceful 
coexistence in our societies. Therefore, these biophysical factors should not be 
disregarded any longer and joint interdisciplinary efforts, especially crossing the 
North-South or East-West divisions, in the fields of research are vital as we enter 
the new decade, often defined as “crucial” for humanity. 
Perhaps the most valuable contribution of this project is after all not in its empir-
ical findings but more in its attempts to foreground alternative perspectives to 
global changes, and to help examine the world with tools that are not only unor-
thodox, bold, but also novel, at least to current generations of IR scholarship. In-
deed, we argue that a holistic and pluralistic take on global change is paramount 
for the human kind to be able to find peaceful solutions in front of the dark times 
ahead. Considering that climate change is actively changing the planet, that scar-
city of the necessities of life increases along with competition among those few 
who control the means of life, we stand face to face with an unpredictable and 
threatening tomorrow. For this reason, the work that started with this research 
project should be brought onwards to the fields of futures studies as well as policy 
research, in order to further tackle each of the identified problems.   
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 Tracking the Past in the Chinese and Indian 
Regional Cooperation Initiatives 
Jyrki Käkönen 
 
Abstract  
The gravity of world economy and politics is moving back to Asia and Indian Ocean 
region in Eurasia where it was until early eighteenth century. In Asia, China and India 
are the most influential rising powers of the shifting global order. The tension between 
these two civilizations has at least a 2500 years old history. Both have expressed a strong 
interest to become core actors in Asia and further within the global order. The competition 
between these two states is demonstrated in their initiatives for regional cooperation in 
Asia and beyond. Although China and India cooperate for instance in the BRICS context, 
they have constructed their own regional forums like BRI and BIMSTEC. In this article, 
the idea is to evaluate initiatives of both states for regional cooperation, and how signs of 
the pre-colonial structures are present in those initiatives. At the third level, the interest 
is to track whether the elements of the traditional Chinese (tianxia) and Indian (mandala) 
approaches are present in Chinese and Indian attempts for regional cooperation. 
Keywords: tianxia, mandala, regional cooperation, historical trade routes, Indian Ocean 
 
 
Introduction 
Many scholars (Amin 2006; Acharya 2014; Tharoor 2012; Mahbubani 2008; Ku-
mar 2014; Jacques 2012; Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000; Tammen et al 2012; 
Juutinen and Käkönen 2016) have argued that world politics is undergoing a tran-
sition with the gravity in economics and politics gradually moving to Asia-Pacific 
region. It is expected that this process will cause the reconstruction of the inter-
national order. China and India shall have an essential role in the transition pro-
cess. Both countries aspire to be leading powers of the future international order. 
And it is likely that their strategies and policies for the future will be based in-
creasingly on their own worldviews and values (Saran 2017; Liu 2015). In the 
Chinese case this aspect was strongly present in the Chinese President Xi Jing-
ping’s introductory presentation for the party congress in 18 October 2017 (Xi 
2017). 
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Marko Juutinen and Jyrki Käkönen (2016) have argued that the Chinese and In-
dian interests to change or at least to reform the existing international order are 
demonstrated for instance in their membership in BRICS. Both countries have a 
key role in success or failure of BRICS. They also cooperate currently in the con-
text of SCO. However, cooperation in BRICS and SCO has not eliminated ten-
sions and the mutual competition between the two countries. This is because nei-
ther of the countries wants to see the other as a future leading power in Asia or in 
the global order. Chinese and Indian initiatives for regional cooperation in Asia 
demonstrate the mutual competition. 
There is a general understanding that BRICS hardly can be a strong international 
actor due to the conflicting China–India relations. The western-centric IR theories 
support this assumption. According to the theories on international cooperation 
or integration, a strong internal cohesion is required for an institution to be effec-
tive; BRICS lacks this cohesion (Brütsch and Papa 2013: 5-7). However, the di-
versity within BRICS has not prevented it from developing into an institution for 
plurality and to establish a New Development Bank to at least compensate the 
World Bank in international financing.  
This article aims to examine whether China–India cooperation for changing the 
international order matters in their initiatives for regional cooperation. Or whether 
both countries have their own initiatives for organizing regional cooperation in 
Asian part of Eurasia. It goes on to analyse whether with the help of those initia-
tives they will be able to achieve leading position in Asia or at least prevent the 
other to rise into a leading position. I also intend to find out whether in their ini-
tiatives it is possible to track features of the past, i.e. historical connections in 
Eurasia from the time before European hegemony in the international system. 
The point here is not about how history would legitimize Chinese and Indian ini-
tiatives. Rather, current Chinese and Indian world politics is problematic to un-
derstand without knowing how the history can be seen from their perspective (Sa-
ran 2017; Datta-Ray 2015; Jacques 2012; Gesher 2015). Another epistemic 
challenge is that understanding Chinese and Indian external policies may also re-
quire the knowledge and understanding of their ancient civilizational worldviews 
and classical theories of international politics. This does not, however, mean that 
western-centric IR theories would be incapable of explaining Chinese and Indian 
world politics; but interpretation of their foreign policies in the context of their 
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classical indigenous theories might give a different understanding about the in-
tentions of those two countries in world politics. 
The following analyses cover three different levels. First, I present an interpreta-
tion about Chinese tianxia and Indian mandala theories. I give only a brief presen-
tation about what those theories can say about world politics. At the second level 
I track how India and China were connected to the world before European expan-
sion to Asia. The brief presentation of the historical perspective enables us to 
estimate whether current Chinese and Indian initiatives for regional cooperation 
in Asia reflect the past.  
In this connection it is also worth pointing out that as state formations of China 
and India did not exist in the historical period covered here. As concepts, China 
and India here refer more to civilizations than to states. Historically these civili-
zations were represented by various states, dynasties and empires. 
On the third level I examine some crucial current Chinese and Indian initiatives 
and already functioning projects in regional cooperation in Asia. This section is 
mainly based on the information these projects provide on their web pages. My 
intention is to explore whether it is possible to track signs of tianxia and mandala 
theories as well as features of the past in those projects. Simultaneously I try to 
answer the question, how China and India are possibly constructing international 
order in the image of their historical experiences and classical theories. 
 
Indigenous Chinese and Indian theoretical approach 
The origins of tianxia and mandala theories go more than 2000 years back in 
Chinese and Hindu civilizations. Tianxia (all under the heaven) theory has its 
roots in Confucian philosophy and in the historical experiences of Chinese dyn-
asties since the so-called warring states period. There does not exist, at least not 
yet, single generally acknowledged tianxia theory. In current Chinese discourse 
different versions have been presented. In this essay I present one interpretation 
and apply it to examine Chinese initiatives for regional cooperation in Asia.  
Mandala (rings of the kings/states) theory has its roots in Vedic literature and 
ancient Hindu philosophy. In the fourth century BC Kautilya presented a coherent 
mandala theory in his study Arthashastra (Käkönen 2017: 23-38). Here I present 
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a short summary about the theory and apply it to present Indian initiatives for 
regional cooperation in Asia. 
In this context, I would like to make it clear that my intention is just to pick up 
some aspects regarding both of the theories instead of reconstructing complex 
theories. The point is that both the theories are more nuanced than it appears from 
their brief summarization below. However, various aspects presented are based 
on those theories. And in case those aspects are to be found somehow present in 
the Chinese and Indian initiatives for regional cooperation, it is justified to con-
clude that the ancient world views are present in those initiatives.  
 
Tianxia theory 
Tianxia is a complex concept and it refers to a system that includes within its 
scope geography, politics and culture or even to morality in the sense that the 
issue concerns the satisfaction of human needs (Xiao 2010: 111-112). William A. 
Callahan has indicated that at least for 2000 years the concept defined how China 
understood itself and its relations to others in the system build around it (Callahan 
2008: 749). 
As a concept, tianxia has its roots in the Confucian worldview. According to Luke 
Clanvill, Confucius believed that the whole universe formed one totality, whose 
ideal state is order, peace and harmony (Glanvill 2010: 329). As a system, tianxia 
refers to a China-centric world system. The issue at hand is to understand how 
China organized its relations with the world based on this concept (Chisen 2011: 
34). Jyrki Kallio extends this understanding further by saying that in tianxia China 
and the world are understood as one and the same (Kallio 2012: 8).  
Whether tianxia is understood in a wider or more limited sense, the issue is always 
about a China-centric system (Xiao 2010: 103). In this system there are three con-
centric circles. China and the Chinese civilization form the centre of the system. 
Next circle is formed by the states in tributary relation with China and which may 
be converted into the Chinese civilization. The third circle is formed by barbarians 
and potential threat to Chinese civilization comes from there (Callahan 2008: 755; 
Xiao 2010: 106-107; Kallio 2012: 12). 
The China centrality of the system was legitimized by Chinese moral and cultural 
superiority, at least from the Chinese perspective (Kallio 2012: 14; Zhang and 
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Buzan 2012: 25). It was further backed by Chinese economic prosperity. From 
the Chinese perspective the world was organized around China, which provided 
an option to Sinocize rest of the world (Zhang and Buzan 2012: 14). 
A vital idea in the tianxia theory is that states around China voluntarily seek ac-
cess into the system. Getting in and belonging to the system opened the gates into 
the Chinese markets. But it also obliged them to pay a tribute to China as well as 
to accept the Chinese predominance. In fact, the unconditional approval of Chi-
nese superiority was the initial precondition for opening relations with China 
(Feng 2009: 550). 
However, the relationship with China was not unilateral. According to Ren Xiao 
and Kallio, China committed itself to protect the states within the system (Xiao 
2010: 111; Kallio 2012: 8). This means that being within the tributary system 
gave economic advantages and security, but it also reduced potential threats to 
China (Yan-kang 2012: 148). According to Callahan (2008: 756), through this 
system peace could be established in China’s neighbourhood and made peaceful 
Chinese expansion possible. In this connection one should not forget that in some 
interpretations of the Confucian philosophy the ultimate goal of politics was the 
unification of the world (Xuetong 2011: 84). 
According to Callahan, it is possible to understand tianxia as a system that con-
verts a foe into a friend; no occupation of territory was needed for this (Callahan 
2008: 752). As long as the centre is attractive the system remains peaceful and 
leadership is not challenged (Kallio 2012: 12-13). Therefore, China had to rule 
the centre virtuously and make it attractive to others. While peace benefitted eve-
ryone within the system, it primarily served Chinese interests. China imposed the 
rules of the system and defined how to act with China (Yan-kang 2012:130). 
Callahan and Chang Chisen stress that the system was legitimized from the peo-
ple’s perspective in that it was supposed to satisfy the needs of the ordinary people 
(Callahan 2008: 756; Chisen 2011: 31). In fact, according to Confucian principle 
a political system has to produce welfare for the widest possible population (Xue-
tong 2011: 51). In the Confucian philosophy this refers to the whole humankind. 
Therefore, tianxia could be a theory about Chinese hegemony of the entire world 
(Chisen 2011: 29). 
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It has been indicated above that the expansion of the China-centric system did not 
mean explicitly conquering new territories. The issue was much more about the 
expansion of the Chinese civilization and through this securing access for China 
into the resources of others (Yan-kang 2012: 133). Yongjin Zhang and Barry 
Buzan have argued that one objective of the system was to establish peace in 
China’s frontier regions (Zhang and Buzan 2012: 7). While China’s neighbours 
defended themselves, they provided security for China (Xiao 2010: 103). Alt-
hough China had a dominant position within the system the tributary states main-
tained their autonomy in internal and external policies (104). 
 
Raja mandala theory 
Kautilya’s mandala approach is a theory about the international system and how 
states and especially the so-called conqueror should act within the system. Here 
conqueror refers to a state that is supposed to unify South Asia into a unified state 
espousing Hindu civilization (Gautam 2015: 89; Boesche 2002: 34; Rangarajan 
1992: 2-3). Since any state in the system could be the potential conqueror it is 
possible to take mandala theory as a general theory of foreign policy in the his-
torical context of the South Asian international system. 
In addition to the conqueror, there are two main categories of states within the 
system: enemies and friends as potential allies of the conqueror. Further, in the 
system there was a middle king or state that is the neighbour to both the conqueror 
and its natural enemy. There is also a neutral state, which is the strongest one 
within the system (Rangarajan 1992: 517; Gautam 2015: 55; Mishra 2016: 91). 
Mandala is a system of concentric circles. In the middle, there is the potential 
conqueror. Around it there is the circle of enemies and beyond that the circle of 
enemies of the enemies of the conqueror and therefore potential allies of the con-
queror. However, the system is not deterministic, and the geography is not the 
only factor to define amity and enmity (Rangarajan 1992: 506-508; Gautam 2015: 
99-100). According to Malay Mishra, the nature of the relations between the 
states within the system is also defined by balance of power and intentions 
(Mishra 2016:79). The object of the conqueror is to become a universal power. 
As long as the conqueror is weak, its interest is to prevent any potential competitor 
to become a universal power. Therefore, alliances are made to become stronger 
than the competitor or to prevent the competitor to become a universal actor 
(Rangarajan 1992: 510; More 2015: 17). 
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In the mandala theory as in tianxia theory, the object of the state is to provide 
welfare for people. According to Roger Boesche and Bruce Rich, for Kautilya the 
ultimate goal of politics is to secure peoples’ happiness and prosperity (Boesche 
2002: 30; Rich 2010: 68). How well a state is successful in realizing this goal 
legitimizes its existence. Further, according to Rich, in the mandala system state’s 
responsibility was to maintain the population and to manage sustainably the re-
sources for welfare (Rich 2010: 68). Foreign policy had to be conducted so as to 
provide welfare for the people. Alignment was a means to increase one’s own 
prosperity and power (Mishra 2016: 87). 
In the Kautilyan mandala system war was a natural tendency in politics. How-
ever, states were committed to seek peace and harmony within the system. Peace 
is a major precondition for people to enjoy their life and results of the fruits of 
their labour. War destroys those fruits and does not generate welfare that gives 
the legitimacy for the existence of the state (More 2015: 31; Gautam 2015: 76). 
Therefore, states should aim for peace rather than for war. 
Strong economy and rational alliances increase one’s own power in relation to a 
potential enemy (Kangle 2014: 255). The state’s own power had to exceed the 
power of potential competitor, either alone or with the support of an allied state. 
Alliances are for increasing the state’s own power and to realize its own interests. 
It is possible to increase one’s power also by conquest. However, conquering a 
territory is not enough; one has also to win the hearts of conquered people. For 
that the conqueror has to respect the customs and culture of the conquered people 
(Set 2015; Kangle 2014: 261). 
 
Historical connections in the Indian Ocean and Asia 
As indicated above, both tianxia and mandala theories emphasize economic con-
nections as factors in providing welfare for people. Economic connections also 
increase one’s own power. The role of economy and commerce is not limited to 
production of welfare and prosperity. They also create networks, which already 
3000 years ago connected empires and civilizations in Eurasia across the seas and 
land. In those networks India had a crucial position in connecting China into the 
western periphery of Eurasia. 
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Western sea routes 
In the Indus valley the Harappan civilization had intensive transaction with Mes-
opotamia and Arabian Peninsula since 2600–2000 BC. One of the ancient world’s 
biggest and major Harappan ports was close to Indus delta (Gilbert 2017: 1). Sea 
routes in the Indian Ocean connected India’s west coast harbours to Egypt since 
2000 BC. Among the major Indian export products were cotton and textiles 
(Sanyal 2016: 48, 57). Coastal vessels transported goods from India to Arabian 
Peninsula and Egypt (Alpers 2014: 2). India also traded with Mediterranean Eu-
rope since 3000 years ago. 
According to Edward Alpers, ancient Greek geographer Ptolemy knew just two 
major seas: the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean (Alpers 2014). This 
demonstrates the importance of the Indian Ocean in the ancient world. Phoenician 
merchants played a crucial role in the commercial transactions between the Med-
iterranean world and India (Gilbert 2017: 5). According to Alpers (2014: 6), dur-
ing 100 BC international trade connected the Roman Empire to Indian west coast. 
Trade between the Roman Empire and India was at its peak in the first and second 
centuries. 
During the early Roman Empire, Greek seafarers and merchants had a central role 
in connecting the Roman-Hellenic world from Egypt and the Red Sea to South 
Asia (Gilbert 2017: 36). The situation changed after the invasion of Egypt. Since 
then connections from the Mediterranean region to India intensified and Roman 
vessels sailed from the Red Sea to Indian harbours. Simultaneously commercial 
connections from the Mediterranean were extended to Chinese harbours 
(Frankopan 2015: 15-16; Alpers 2014: 28). 
In the western-centric history, Roman Empire has an important role and it is often 
presented as an almighty actor. Less attention, however, has been paid to the fact 
that the state of Roman economy and welfare was in good or bad condition de-
pending on trade across the Indian Ocean (Gilbert 2017: x). Rome imported, for 
instance, textiles as luxury products from India and its import was paid in gold 
and silver (36). 
When the ancient world in the Mediterranean region was breaking down and Is-
lam expanding in the Mediterranean as well as in Central Asia the situation 
changed gradually also in the Indian Ocean. The trade in the western part of the 
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Indian Ocean was taken over by Muslim merchants and seafarers. By the eighth 
century, Muslims occupied a central role in the western Indian Ocean as well as 
in harbours on the western coast of India. In the tenth century, Muslim merchants 
were already involved in trade between India and China (Sen 2016: 173). This 
change meant that Arabic became the common language of commerce at least in 
the western Indian Ocean (Alpers 2014: 41). 
 
Eastern sea routes 
In the eastern Indian Ocean maritime connections developed early. Here commer-
cial and cultural transactions were closely combined. Already before the Common 
Era Buddhism and Hinduism were well established in South East Asia (Sanyal 
2016: 86). By then, Indian culture expanded beyond South Asia. Around 100 BCE 
in the Mekong delta there was a kingdom with strong Hindu elements (83). In the 
fifth century, most of the Javanese population were Hindus (106-107). 
In the second century BCE Indian cotton textiles were exported to Southeast Asia 
and Indian merchants traded in Greek and Roman goods to South East Asia. In 
the other direction, Indian merchants also traded in Chinese silk and Indonesian 
spices (Sanyal 2016: 86). This means that Indian ports had an essential role in 
commercial transactions between China and the Roman Empire (Sen 2016: 169). 
After the Roman Empire collapsed, the Indian ports maintained their central role 
through seventh and eighth centuries in the trade between China and Byzantium. 
By the sixth century, trade between China and India was so well established that 
the Chinese commercial ports had permanent Indian settlements (Sanyal 
2016:107, 111). Indians had such a strong position in the eastern Indian Ocean 
that Buddhism and Hinduism still expanded there while Islam expanded in the 
western Indian Ocean (Alpers 2014: 46). In the end of the first millennium, Chola 
Empire ruled most of the southern India and around 1000 AD trade in the eastern 
Indian Ocean was controlled by Chola merchants (Sanyal 2016: 131-134; Alpers 
2014: 4, 47). 
In the eleventh century the Chola Empire had intensive trade connections with 
China and had a strong presence even in the South China Sea (Sen 2016: 231-
232). The impact and presence of the Chola Empire from Indian east coast to 
South China Sea provided stability for the system on the seas. This made it pos-
sible for commercial connections between China and Europe to advance further 
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(166-168). Due to strong Chola influence in Southeast Asia, a number of states 
with strong Hindu features emerged in the region, i.e. Khmer Empire in Champa 
in South Vietnam and at least two more in Sumatra and Java (Sanyal 2016: 127). 
Around AD 1000, Muslims gradually entered the eastern part of the Indian Ocean. 
This brought Muslim settlements into the Chinese harbour towns (Sen 2016: 164). 
On the other hand, the expansion of the Chinese Empire made China a visible 
actor in eastern Indian Ocean in the early second millennium (Alpers 2014: 42). 
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Chinese merchants sailed to India, occu-
pying a place in commercial networks in the Indian Ocean (Sen 2016: 237). Ac-
cording to Tansen Sen, Chinese merchants sailed to the African east coast in the 
thirteenth century and marginally threatened the strong position of Muslim mer-
chants in the western Indian Ocean (238-239). 
Chinese naval great power policy began in the Indian Ocean with the Ming dyn-
asty 1368. Admiral Zheng Hen’s seven expeditions in 1405-1433 made Chinese 
presence apparent in the Indian Ocean. Those expeditions extended to African 
east coast (Sanyal 2016: 153-156). However, China withdrew from the seas by 
1433 (Alpers 2014: 65). 
 
Continental trade routes from China to the west 
In the early third century BCE, the Chinese Han dynasty aimed to control the 
trade routes from China to India. The dynasty expanded to Pamir and that opened 
land routes to northern India (Sen 2016: 2-3). Those routes had an important role 
in the expansion of Buddhism from India to China from the time of Mauryan 
emperor Ashok in the third century BCE. Buddhism became a factor that con-
nected China and India. It was also a factor that increased commercial relations 
between India and China (159). 
Trade routes through Central Asia connected ancient China to the Roman Empire. 
Those were the so-called Silk Roads (Gilbert 2017: 37). From early fourth century 
till ninth century Sogdian trading houses controlled continental trade routes from 
China to India as well as from China to Europe (Sen 2016: 170). However, there 
was a short period in the sixth century when Huns blocked the Silk Roads (Gilbert 
2017: 47). In the eighth century Kashmir became a Chinese tributary state and for 
a while provided security along the East–West trading routes; simultaneously 
Kashmir defended China against the threat from the west (Sen 2016: 28-29). 
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In the thirteenth century, Mongol Empire created by Genghis Khan dominated 
Eurasian trade routes. The prosperity of that empire was based on controlling the 
trade routes. Therefore, it invested in maintaining the infrastructure. Although in 
Europe Mongols were seen as a threat the aim of the empire was not to conquer 
Europe but to control trade from Pacific Ocean to the Mediterranean. The empire 
provided secure transactions over vast Eurasian continent. The Mongol Empire 
was a factor that formed bases for trade between Europe as the periphery of the 
existing world system and prosperous China (Frankopan 2015: 167, 169; Sen 
2016: 212; Weatheford 2004). 
 
Indian Ocean before the European expansion 
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Indian Ocean was the centre of world 
trade. The Indian Chola Empire had an important role in connecting China with 
world economy. Indian ports had an essential role in commerce between the Med-
iterranean world and China (Sen 2016: 165, 169). Then Indian Ocean was divided 
into two different cultural spheres: the Islamic realm from Central Asia and Indian 
west coast to the east coast of Africa down to current Mozambique and the Indian 
or Hindu realm from Afghanistan and Indian east coast to Vietnam in Southeast 
Asia. East and North from Vietnam there was a Chinese realm (Sanyal 2016: 
141). 
With the expansion of Islam, Indian Ocean gradually became the zone of strong 
Muslim influence. Muslim traders connected the western and eastern markets 
(Sen 2016: 175). In fact, with spread of Islam in Asia and North Africa all mean-
ingful trade routes between Europe and China came under Muslim control 
(Frankopan 2015: 90-93). Mongol expansion in Eurasia and expansion of Islam 
marginalized the role of Indian mariners and merchants in the Indian Ocean in the 
early fourteenth century. Their place was taken by Chinese and Muslim mer-
chants (Sanyal 2016: 144-145). 
After the collapse of the Mongol Empire, the Chinese Ming dynasty became in-
terested to increase Chinese presence and influence in Southeast Asia and the 
Indian Ocean (Sanyal 2016: 153-156). Zheng Hen’s expeditions were the expres-
sion of this interest. After China withdrew from the seas, Indian Ocean was left 
open for Portuguese under Vasco da Gama (163). When the Portuguese vessels 
entered the Indian Ocean, it was controlled by merchants of the Ottoman Empire 
 24 
but the Empire itself had a weak presence in the region. Ottoman as well as 
Mughal military presence was not enough to prevent the European expansion. 
 
Chinese and Indian competition in Asia 
The brief historical narrative presented above demonstrates that Eurasia formed 
a world system before the European invasion. In the system crucial actors 
changed in the course of history and Europe had just a marginal role in shaping 
the system. The interaction within the system was not just commercial but in a 
wide sense cultural too. This conclusion is supported, for instance, by Michael 
Scott (2016) and Barry Cunliffe (2017). Although empires rose and perished, the 
commercial networks remained for centuries and China and India had a crucial 
role in those networks until European colonialism marginalized them. Now China 
and India have risen again and simultaneously have begun to look for their civi-
lizational roots and reconquer their historical place. This is reflected in their ex-
ternal policies, which may again elevate Eurasia’s Asian part into a central posi-
tion in world politics. 
Now both China and India present initiatives for Asian networks, which have a 
strong historical flavour. These initiatives stress on the increasing importance of 
Asia in world politics, either by excluding European actors or just giving them 
marginal role in the western peninsula of Eurasia. Below, I will introduce some 
Chinese and Indian initiatives for regional cooperation in Asia. The presentation 
is based mainly on the information from the official websites of those projects. 
 
Chinese initiatives 
In introducing Chinese initiatives, tianxia theory has a guiding role. This means 
that attention is paid to possible China centrism, Chinese attraction and China 
providing welfare also for the partners in those initiatives. Another aspect is how 
those initiatives provide resources as well as peaceful context for continuous 
growth of the Chinese economy. 
The most prominent of the Chinese initiatives is “The Belt and Road Initiative” 
(BRI).1 Xi Jinping presented the idea for extensive Eurasian regional cooperation 
in 2013. It was then called “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st -century 
 
1 See http://english.gov.cn/beltAndRoad for the full report. 
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Maritime Silk Road”. As the names indicate, the issue was about the creation of 
continental and maritime networks of cooperation. The action plan for realizing 
the initiative was presented on 28 March 2015.2 In the autumn of 2017, the Chi-
nese Communist Party congress gave the initiative a crucial role in Chinese for-
eign policy (Xi 2017). 
For China, the aim of the initiative is to build a multipolar world, to advance 
globalization and cultural diversity. The final goal is to reach an open and bal-
anced regional cooperation. An additional aspect in the initiative is to convince 
the rest of the world that China takes global responsibilities and acts for the pros-
perity of the entire humankind. The idea is to make China’s prosperity benefit the 
whole world. The concrete object is to increase interaction of Asia with Europe 
and Africa. Transactions are also expected to increase mutual understanding be-
tween civilizations. 
Ideally the initiative contains at least three economic corridors: China-Mongolia-
Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia and China-Indochina economic corridors. 
As actual projects China-Pakistan and China-Bangladesh-India-Myanmar eco-
nomic and development corridors are already running. In these projects, China 
invested resources on infrastructure for connectivity. In addition to infrastructure, 
the issue is energy and construction of resource-based production chains.  
As a regional undertaking BRI will cover 63 per cent of world population. As 
financiers, China wants to connect into the concrete projects of Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank (AIIB), Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s development 
bank, the Silk Road Fund as well as New Development Bank (NDB) of BRICS. 
In all those institutions, China has a central role. One aspect of BRI is the protec-
tion of cultural heritage what connects the initiative to the historical past. 
There is no doubt that in its functioning the initiative connects China with other 
regional economies as well as into the global economy. Thus, it is possible to 
conclude that it connects Eurasia as well as Indian Ocean tightly into the China 
centric system. However, from a Chinese perspective the issue is about construc-
tion of a system of harmony and peaceful cooperation in Eurasia and Indian 
Ocean.  
 
2 For the full text of the Report, see 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015703/30/content_281475080249035.htm 
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As the eastern development corridor, the China-Bangladesh-India-Myanmar 
(BCIM) initiative is older than BRI. The BCIM had its origin in 1999. Its aim was 
to advance trade, transport and tourism cooperatively. For China, an important 
aspect in the initiative was to connect the landlocked Yunnan province into Bay 
of Bengal and further to the Indian Ocean. On an ideal level, the aim was to con-
nect peripheries into global economy. On a more practical level the project would 
open natural resources of the region for growing Chinese economy. 
China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC) is BRI’s western development corri-
dor. This is important for China since it connects land-locked Xinjiang province 
to the Arabian Sea and further to Indian Ocean. An important component of this 
project is the development of the Gwadar port in Pakistan. In addition to that, 
China has invested at least billion dollars in constructing three roads connecting 
Gwadar to China. It has been estimated that the total costs of the project shall be 
46 billion dollars. One of the financiers is the AIIB.  
The original bilateral project has already expanded with Russia joining the project 
in 2017 as well as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Therefore, the project 
has complicated traditionally strong Russia-India relations. From an Indian per-
spective, an elementary problem in CPEC project is Gilgit Baltistan region 
through which the development corridor passes. In Indian view, the area belongs 
to India and Pakistan has occupied it since the 1947 war. Therefore, the whole 
initiative violates Indian sovereignty and India opposes the whole BRI (See for 
instance, Nag 2017). 
A maritime component of BRI is the twenty-first century maritime Silk Road in-
itiative. It aims to connect Chinese ports with Africa and Europe (in the first case 
to Athens). This project would bring China as a meaningful economic, political 
and even military actor into the Indian Ocean, the Mare Nostrum of India. It 
would also strengthen China-ASEAN relations. A sensitive aspect of this initia-
tive is the South China Sea, where several ASEAN states have territorial claims 
overlapping the Chinese claims. 
 
Indian initiatives  
Indian initiatives will be presented in the context of mandala theory. The issue is 
much about getting allies, which can strengthen India’s capabilities as a potential 
conqueror. It is also important to evaluate how China as a natural enemy of India 
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and potential conqueror can be kept outside effective networks or how its strong 
position in the Asian system can be undermined. 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has connected 
South Asia already for years. However, India-Pakistan conflict has made the as-
sociation ineffective. In the wider Indian Ocean context, Indian Ocean Rim As-
sociation has been a forum for regional cooperation. Both organizations have a 
role in India’s external policy. However, in this connection focus is on initiatives, 
which clearly compete with Chinese initiatives and construct India centric net-
works on historical bases. 
One of India’s new initiatives is the so-called “International North-South 
Transport Corridor (INSTC).”3 This project was launched in 2000 by Russian in-
itiative. It was supposed to be trilateral Russia-Iran-India effort. The founding 
document was signed in 2002. In a historical context the project is based on trade 
routes used intensively during the Safavid dynasty from sixteenth to eighteenth 
centuries. However, those networks are much older, and they connected Northern 
Europe down to India already during the Viking period (Korpela 2014). 
For India, this project is important since it would connect India with its neigh-
bourhood and to Central Asia bypassing Pakistan. Furthermore, the project will 
provide for India a passage to Eastern Europe and to Arabian Peninsula (Singh 
Roy 2015). In addition to the three founder states, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakh-
stan, Kirgizstan, Oman, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine and Belorussia have all joined to 
the project while Bulgaria has an observer status in it. 
From an Indian perspective, an important element in this project is a good mari-
time connection from Mumbai to Iran. In Iran, there are two port options, Bandar 
Abbas and Chabahar, from where land and partly Caspian Sea routes would lead 
to Moscow and St Petersburg. The construction of Chabahar port has been a part 
of the project since 2002. India has expressed that it is ready to invest at least 8 
billion dollars in construction of the port. This indicates that the project is im-
portant for India. In case the project is realized, it would provide a role for India 
in Central Asia and even beyond it in Eurasia (Singh Roy 2015). At the same time 
the project would provide India with an access to Central Asian energy resources 
as well as open a link to West Asia.  
 
3 http://www.instc-org.ir/Pages/Home_Page.aspx. 
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On the east-west axis, an important Indian vision is Indo-Pacific economic corri-
dor. This is supposed to make Indian and the Pacific Ocean into a unitary mari-
time region. The idea is closely connected to India-US dialogue, which began in 
2013. An important element in this effort is freedom of navigation. However, it 
is as important because it connects USA, India, Japan and Australia. Therefore, it 
is hard to avoid the idea that the issue is to balance increasing Chinese influence 
in both sea regions as well as to counter the Chinese politics in the South China 
Sea (Sundararaman 2017). 
Indian opening for eastward regional cooperation is “Bay of Bengal Initiative for 
Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).”4 It has its 
roots in 1997 Bangkok Declaration that was signed by India, Thailand and Sri 
Lanka. The first high-level summit was held 2004 and the latest one in 2017. 
Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar have joined the initiative. The project 
clearly overlaps Chinese eastern economic corridor of BRI. 
As a region, BIMSTEC covers 22 per cent of world’s population. The crucial 
problems of the region are poverty and environment. Poor, if not totally non-ex-
istent, infrastructure is a restriction for any meaningful cooperation within the 
region. Low mutual trade is evidence of lack of infrastructure. On the other hand, 
the growth rate of regional economies has been about 6 per cent annually in 
2000s. For India BIMSTEC provides a mean to isolate Pakistan from South Asian 
cooperation and to replace ineffective SAARC. The importance of BIMSTEC for 
India was clearly demonstrated during the 2016 BRICS summit in Goa. Instead 
of SAARC leaders, India invited BIMSTEC leaders as guests to the summit. 
In a cultural sense, the most interesting Indian initiative is the “Mausam Project.”5 
This project collects together scholars from various Indian Ocean region states. It 
is basically a joint research project what is based on historical spice trade connec-
tions and historical impact of Buddhist and Hindu cultures. The joint research 
project is supposed to remind regional states about common culture and history 
of the Indian Ocean region. Simultaneously the project refers to India’s strong 
impact on the region through some thousand years. The project has already pro-
duced several publications. 
 
 
4 http://bimstec.org/. 
5 http://www.ignca.nic.in/mausam.htm. 
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Signs of the past in the present 
In spite of cooperating in the context of BRICS, SCO and RCEP to challenge the 
existing international order China and India compete for gaining influence in 
Asia. Important means in their struggle to increase their influence are initiatives 
for regional cooperation. In those projects, it is possible to track features from 
their ancient worldviews. They also reflect the pre-colonial Asian networks, and, 
in this respect, it is possible to talk metaphorically about the return of the past. 
When placing the current initiatives for regional cooperation into the historical 
context it is possible to argue that while China and India construct their relations 
into the world around them historical models are strongly present. In a way, the 
issue is about decolonization and reconstruction of connections destroyed by Eu-
ropean colonialism. In constructing possible new international order, they are 
aiming to negate 400 years exclusion. 
India is re-establishing its historical position in connecting the Indian Ocean into 
a unitary cultural and economic space. In addition to its strong continental role, 
China was strongly present also in the Indian Ocean in the fifteenth century. Now 
it aims to return to Indian Ocean in the context of regional cooperation initiatives. 
India in turn extended its influence into the South China Sea in early second mil-
lennium. Now its Indo-Pacific economic corridor initiative gives a message that 
India again has interests in South China Sea. 
In addition to strong historical features, it is possible to find signs of classical 
political theories in Chinese and Indian initiatives for connectivity in Asia. One 
aspect in those theories was leading position at least in their own neighbourhood. 
In tianxia theory as well as in Chinese initiatives one can find the idea of attractive 
Chinese economy. Because of its huge economic potential China has become es-
sential partner for its neighbours and instead of westernization it has to offer a 
Chinese model for modernization. 
In the Chinese initiatives for regional cooperation it is also possible to find the 
model of three concentric circles. In the middle is economically attractive China. 
The next circle is formed by the states willing to cooperate with China and at least 
ready to recognize the one China principle. The third circle consists of the EU 
and USA, which expect the westernization of China. By its own model, China 
aims to create stability in the system and distribute welfare to widest possible 
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area. However, in those initiatives China also gets access to the resources of oth-
ers. 
Indian initiatives aim to connect India to the neighbourhood beyond South Asia. 
According to Kautilyan principles in this way it gets access to the resources of its 
partners. It is also possible to argue that through its initiatives India will try to 
reach a position of a universal actor at least within the realm of Indian Ocean 
although it is economically less attractive than China. This gives an option for 
China to restrict Indian influence in its own backyard. In Yuxi in Yannanon 14 
and 15 June 2018, China organized the first China-South Asia cooperation forum. 
This may indicate the end of ineffective SAARC. 
In the context of mandala theory, it is possible to say that currently India is weaker 
than China though it has to tried to restrain China’s rise as well as to exclude 
China and its “all weather ally” Pakistan from any meaningful South Asian and 
Indian Ocean cooperation networks. On the other hand, according to mandala 
theory India has to seek cooperation with the neutral power, i.e. the USA, still the 
strongest actor in the global system or from the classical Indian perspective, the 
strongest in the mandala, ring of the powers. As a weak actor, it also has to avoid 
open conflicts with China. Therefore, it is rational for India to cooperate with 
China in organizations like BRICS and SCO. 
To sum up it is possible to give brief answers to the questions presented in the 
introduction: 
• China-India cooperation for challenging the existing international 
order or at least improving their voice in it is absent in their initiatives 
for regional cooperation in Asia; 
• In their initiatives for regional cooperation it is possible to track signs 
from historical networks before European colonial expansion and 
European hegemony in the international system; 
• Signs of historical networks in initiatives for Asian regional 
cooperation support the idea that in studying world politics we may 
have to understand world history also from a Chinese and Indian 
perspective; 
• In Chinese and Indian initiatives, it is also possible to track signs of 
their ancient worldviews and classical indigenous political theories 
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and this again supports the idea that we may have to study world 
politics also from non-western IR theory perspectives; 
• To a certain extent, it is possible to argue that both China and India 
are constructing regional if not world orders according to their own 
image and these two potential orders do not necessary overlap. 
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 Emerging Dynamics of Conflict and 
Cooperation in Post-Hegemonic Age? A 
Kautilyan Perspective on ‘the BRICS Paradox’ 
Marko Juutinen 
 
Abstract  
Complementing international relations theories with indigenous perspectives has become 
ever more relevant with the pace of change in international affairs. BRICS is one of the 
new initiatives that can be seen as factors driving that change. Yet, defined by internal 
conflicts, it is difficult to theorise BRICS as an international agent, especially in the con-
text of global governance. This chapter has two objectives: first, to theorise international 
relations from a non-Western perspective focusing on an Indian classic, Kautilya’s Ar-
thashastra; and second, to employ that interpretation to conceptualise BRICS. As a litmus 
test for the analytical viability of the Kautilyan perspective developed here, this paper 
examines what might be called ‘the BRICS paradox’: the mismatch between theoretical 
expectations about the nature of BRICS and the ambiguous empirical evidence about it. 
Having sought to test Kautilyan concepts in the contemporary context, the paper confirms 
their potential for contemporary IR scholarship.  
Keywords: non-Western IR, classical Indian political theory, realism, transnationally in-
tertwined state factors, global leadership, BRICS 
 
 
Introduction: Changing international order and the BRICS paradox 
Since the 1990s, the question of how global power transitions affect the liberal 
international order has puzzled international relations (IR) scholars (Mearsheimer 
2010; Brzezinski 1997; Ikenberry 2018a, 2001). The realist perspective tends to 
emphasize the geopolitical and competitive dimension of the rise of the emerging 
powers and the formation of new international institutions by them (de Graaff and 
van Apeldoorn 2018; Chin 2016; Tammen et al. 2000; Mearsheimer 2010). Those 
who focus on institutional and normative continuities, on the other hand, are keen 
to point out that none of the emerging powers or new initiatives has in a direct 
manner sought to oppose or reform the institutional bedrock of global governance 
(Drezner 2014; Ikenberry 2018b). Still others have focused on ideational and 
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conceptual transformations. Echoing Huntington’s observations about the em-
powerment of cultural identities, scholars like Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan 
have argued that there is a growing interest in local perspectives to IR theories 
and a demand for a global IR built on a dialogue between them and the established 
Western perspectives (Acharya and Buzan 2007; Huntington 1993).  
The grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China in 2006, and later South Africa in 
2010, referred to as BRICS, is a case in point for these transformations. Yet, the 
conundrum of global power transitions, and new international institutions like 
BRICS and their implications for the liberal international order, remains an object 
of empirical and conceptual debate. This chapter provides an additional concep-
tual perspective to these debates. Its objective is a conceptual analysis of an Indian 
classic, Kautilya’s Arthashastra, to develop a local perspective to BRICS studies, 
and the study of international relations in general.  
Three reasons legitimise the use of a local perspective on BRICS studies. First is 
the lack of broadly accepted theorisations about BRICS and the persisting debate 
about its political nature. Second is the uncertainty over the application of Kauti-
lyan conceptualisations on BRICS: we do not yet know whether Kautilya can be 
useful in BRICS studies, what results a Kautilyan perspective yields and how it 
relates to other interpretations. The perhaps ambiguous notion that BRICS schol-
arship has not been conceptually saturated, which underpins the above reasoning, 
provides a third and more general argument for the research task in this study. It 
is also a central argument for using non-Western perspectives and thus treated 
with more detail in the next section, ‘Who was Kautilya and why is his Ar-
thashastra relevant?’ 
BRICS has been subjected to various, sometimes contradictory, conceptualisa-
tions. Some scholars have interpreted it as a challenger to Western dominance 
and the promoter of a new international order (Thakur 2014; Juutinen 2019a; Ste-
phen 2017). Others have claimed it to be more of a paper tiger and of little rele-
vance because its members were quarrelsome and tended to support the existing 
liberal institutions (Gallarotti 2017). Moreover, while BRICS has succeeded in 
creating two new financial institutions, the New Development Bank (NDB) and 
the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), it has not produced a BRICS Con-
sensus, leaving critics of neo-liberal development policies disappointed and dis-
illusioned (Gudynas 2016; Bond and Garcia 2015). Against this background, 
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some scholars have sought to describe these different and conflicting interpreta-
tions as the BRICS paradox (Käkönen and Juutinen, n.d.).  
According to The Merriam Webster Dictionary, a paradox can be ‘an argument 
that apparently derives self-contradictory conclusions by valid deduction from 
acceptable premises’. The BRICS paradox derives from certain theoretical prem-
ises about international relations that pose such expectations and lead to interpre-
tations that do not seem to match with the reality.  
One major aspect of the BRICS paradox is regarding BRICS’ position within the 
contending-dominant power continuum or the classic realist narrative that links 
international order with cycles of hegemonic rise and fall (Ikenberry 2018b; 
Juutinen and Käkönen 2016). For example, power transition theorists argue that 
the international order always tends to be structured hierarchically with a prepon-
derant power at the top of its hierarchy. During a decline of a former hegemon, 
power transition is likely to produce a contender, either as a group of states or one 
single great power (Tammen et al. 2000). Various scholars have already shown 
that this does not fit well with BRICS (Juutinen and Käkönen 2016; Stephen 
2014).  
The same holds for the balance of power theory when employed in this context 
of Ikenberry’s hegemonic realism. It proposes that augmentation of power by one 
actor disrupts the balance in a system and thus is followed by rebalancing 
measures by other actors in the same system (Mastanduno 1999). This would sug-
gest that though BRICS started as a coalition against Western dominance, with 
the increase of Chinese influence in world affairs, it would meet with rebalancing 
efforts by either Russia or India, or even both. However, there is not enough em-
pirical evidence to support this theoretical deduction. Rather, the evidence is con-
tradictory. First, under the Narendra Modi government, India has become the US’ 
partner in the Indo-Pacific and has actively sought closer ties with Japan and Aus-
tralia. This can be seen as a reaction to China’s growing presence in South Asia 
and the Indo-Pacific. In Summer 2017, during the so called Doklam crisis, Sino-
Indian tensions came close to a military showdown. These examples support the 
notion of rebalancing efforts and conflicting relations among the BRICS coun-
tries.  
Second, and in spite of these tensions, there is also plenty of Sino-Indian and 
intra-Asian cooperation, particularly in terms of economic and financial 
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integration. BRICS is just one of the many instances where hugely heterogeneous 
emerging powers have more or less equal influence and where inter-state conflicts 
have been put aside for the aspiration of common objectives and international 
cooperation. According to some scholars (Ikenberry 2018b, 21), these observa-
tions challenge the general viability of the hegemonic realism and the contending-
dominant power dichotomy. However, as they draw on European experiences, it 
would seem logical that they are partially context-specific (Ikenberry 2018b: 19; 
Hobson 2012). Indeed, some commentators have argued that international plural-
ism, coexistence of cooperation and rivalries, is deeply embedded in both past 
and present Asian politics; Asian powers, China and India included, would seem 
to endorse this as a positive feature (Saran 2017; Khanna 2019; Alpers 2014). 
European experience with rivalries, on the other hand, has been less positive. The 
second section will present this theoretical contextuality as one of the reasons to 
expand the repertoire of IR theory with local perspectives, as has been done in 
this paper. 
BRICS may not have challenged the current international order, but it has posed 
a challenge for scholars attempting to understand it. On the one hand, BRICS may 
be seen as a process in making, or that it is merely a paper tiger without any of 
the ferocity of the real beast. Alternatively, it could be that, as part of a new and 
emerging reality, we are lacking in the proper analytical tools needed to assess its 
true potential. Thus, as Michael Liebig has argued, indigenous traditions provide 
us with untapped resources to develop analytical tools to study IR (M. Liebig 
2014). According to the proponents of the so-called global IR, this is not just a 
research gap in the specialized BRICS scholarship (Acharya and Buzan 2009). 
Instead, broader usage of local perspectives would benefit the development of IR 
theory in general. This article contributes with a non-Western local perspective to 
the contemporary BRICS scholarship.  
The focus of the article is on developing an interpretation of the Indian classic, 
Kautilya’s Arthashastra, which is an ancient Sanskrit treatise on statecraft and 
foreign policy. The litmus test of the analytical viability of the Kautilyan perspec-
tive developed here consists of using this perspective to explain the BRICS para-
dox. This is in response to the interest in and demand for developing local IR 
perspectives. By developing a Kautilyan perspective and testing its analytical vi-
ability, this article also provides a conceptual framework that can be used to study 
how and to what extent—if at all—this perspective differs from the established 
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or Western IR theories, and to what extent it resonates with them. In other words, 
it seeks to provide a perspective that can be employed in the further development 
of global IR perspectives.  
The chapter is divided as follows: The second section provides the reasoning for 
why Kautilya is a relevant source in IR. It also provides some methodological 
notes about how I read the Arthashastra. The third section presents some of Kau-
tilya’s key concepts in terms of international relations and seeks to interpret them 
for the purposes of contemporary foreign policy analysis. The fourth section ap-
plies the analytical framework on explaining BRICS, and the fifth section sum-
marises the conclusions reached.  
 
Who was Kautilya and why is his Arthashastra relevant? 
Kautilya, also known as Chanakya, was a Brahman scholar and political advisor 
living during and after the turbulences of Alexander the Great’s conquests. 
Though there is some uncertainty about it, the predominant understanding is that 
the Arthashastra, an extensive treatise in statecraft and foreign policy, was au-
thored by Kautilya. Kautilya, who, together with Thucydides, can be considered 
one of the first realists, served as chief minister and councillor of the Indian king, 
Chandragupta Maurya (321–296 BCE). It is thought that Kautilya's advice helped 
Chandragupta to establish an empire of his own in the Indian peninsula, an empire 
which at its peak covered most of contemporary South Asia (Zaman 2006: 233–
35; Gautam 2013: 74, 75).  
Kautilya’s Arthashastra pertains to ancient Sanskrit literature. With over 200,000 
words in the English translation and more extensive than Aristotle's Politics, Kau-
tilya’s Arthashastra counts among the finest specimen of ancient literature (Mod-
elski 1964). However, unlike Politics, Arthashastra was lost until 1904 when it 
was discovered by Dr R. Shamasastry. Welcoming its recovery, scholars like Max 
Weber compared Arthashastra with ancient Hellenic literature on statecraft, 
while Johann Jakob Meyer, a German Indologist, referred to it as the ‘library of 
ancient India’ (Gautam 2017, 68). In spite of having been lost, various scholars 
have argued that at least some elements of the Arthashastra survived and were 
passed on by oral tradition through Hindu epics such as the Mahabharata and 
Ramayana, as well as through social structures, religious beliefs and according to 
Patrick Olivelle to some extent even in the legal codes like the laws of Manu 
(Saran 2017; Zaman 2006: 240; Modelski 1964: 550; Olivelle 2004). 
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For IR studies, Kautilya is relevant in at least four ways. First, classical texts pro-
vide an important source from which to reconceptualise the present, to rethink, 
refine and even challenge well-established theorisations. While historians seek to 
understand, explain and even reconstruct the past, political theorists attempt to 
hypothesise the present. In this sense, political theorists are not faithful to the past. 
They can use classical texts to develop new solutions to old problems or redefine 
old problems in new contexts. Thus, in my reading of Kautilya’s Arthashastra, I 
seek the tools to conceptualise the present. (Farrelly 2004: 9, 10; Philp 2008: 144–
47; Skinner 2002: 40, 41, 50.) This objective aligns the present paper with IR 
theory and foreign policy analysis while setting it apart from works in history of 
ideas, although these are never fully separate (Boesche 2002; Modelski 1964; 
Sarkar 1919: 7).  
Second, Kautilya forms a crucial element in the conceptual history of IR. Embed-
ded in the historical context of the Hindu king Chandragupta’s empire building, 
Arthashastra opens a window to ancient Indian scholarship and the political 
thought of one of the world’s first great civilisations. Yet, unlike Thucydides, 
Kautilya did not seek to describe past battles but provide a manual for future con-
quests. Still, as his theories gained a broad audience and influential followers, 
they provide tools to understand South Asian history and statecraft. (Gautam 
2017: 72; Modelski 1964: 550; Saran 2017: 9–12.) Third, they are also useful for 
studying India’s contemporary foreign politics and have been used in this manner 
by, for instance, Aparna Pande (2017), Shyam Saran (2017) and Alyssa Ayres 
(2018).  
Fourth, and related to the first, Kautilya’s Arthashastra can be used to comple-
ment and develop contemporary IR. There is a particular need for this, depending 
on the claimed contextual or historic-political bias of Western IR theory (e.g. 
Wæver 1998). The prominent influence of European historical experiences for 
the Western IR has been pointed out by for example John Hobson (2012) and 
John Ikenberry (2018b: 19). Some others, like Kees van der Pijl (2014), empha-
sise the role of US foreign policy interests as a key element in its’ formation. Non-
Western perspectives and the development of the so called Global IR seek to rem-
edy these issues (Acharya and Buzan 2009; Hobson 2012; van der Pijl 2014). 
They have also been seen as part of the epistemic decolonization of IR (Krishna 
2009), but they also help to better understand rising powers and their foreign pol-
icies (Nau 2012), as well as the international order in the post-hegemonic era 
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(Shahi 2019). Furthermore, some scholars have employed local historical tradi-
tions to imagine and conceptualize global ethics. For example Bruce Rich has 
studied Kautilya and the legacy of Chandragupta's grandson, Ashoka, for this pur-
pose (e.g. Rich 2010). 
Having used the concept of Western IR, it should perhaps be noted, as Bilgin 
(2008) and Acharya (2011) have argued, that it is analytically challenging if not 
impossible to exclusively define what actually is Western about Western IR or 
what constitutes the inherently non-Western dimensions in non-Western IR. Like 
technological innovations, ideas too have travelled across regions, mutated on the 
way and assimilated into new contexts (e.g. Hobson 2004). In addition, focus on 
at least partly artificial categorisations can strengthen exclusiveness whereas em-
phasis on what unites and what is common can be seen to increase positive senti-
ments across various kinds of boundaries. From this perspective, the concept of 
‘non-Western’ may contain false connotations about the separateness of, for ex-
ample, Indian and Chinese traditions, even if those form important building 
blocks of what is meant by ‘Western’.  
Consequently, indigenous traditions should not be studied to serve national pride 
or civilisational confrontations. Rather, it should be the realisation that the epis-
temic sources of IR should reflect the pluralism of the current international order 
that should motivate such studies. In the past, the US got the chance to develop, 
employ and interpret IR for its own purposes, to legitimise its supremacy. This 
resulted in contextual biases. Hence, to unravel the secrets of the present world, 
we need not only to acknowledge and understand the particularistic and contex-
tual finesse of ideas, but also to seek to replenish our conceptual sources. (Bilgin 
2008; Acharya and Buzan 2009; Acharya 2011; Hobson 2012.) This is what the 
next section devotes itself to. 
 
Kautilyan international relations and foreign policy  
This section presents Kautilya’s key concepts of international relations and for-
eign policy analysis and attempts to interpret them. Early works by Sarkar (1919) 
and Modelski (1964), and more recent works by, for example, Boesche (2002), 
Zaman (2006), Gautam (2013, ch. 3), Mishra and Liebig (2016) have already 
sought to connect Kautilyan concepts with present-day political science terminol-
ogy. Following Gautam, I have in a previous study (Juutinen 2018: 211–16) di-
vided Kautilya's foreign policy framework into the following seven elements: (1) 
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a specific type of king, the conqueror, (2) four measures to overcome opposition 
(upayas), (3) the seven constituent elements of state, (4) six measures of foreign 
policy, (5) mandala system of international relations, (6) three ways of conquest 
and (7) three ways of war. In this article, I will instead focus on only three, the 
mandala, the constituent elements of state and conquest. I interpret that these three 
elements in Kautilya's foreign policy framework can be expanded to broader an-
alytical concepts providing perspectives to (1) the organizing principles of inter-
national relations, (2) overarching leadership goals of transnational agents and (3) 
the foreign policy obligation of an aspirant global leader. (Gautam 2013: 51; M. 
Liebig 2014: 6, 8, 10; M. Liebig and Mishra 2016: 127; Juutinen 2018: 210; Sha-
masastry 1915: 99, 100; Kangle 2014, Sutra 7.4.11.) 
 
The logic of international relations 
The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines mandala as ‘a graphic and often sym-
bolic pattern usually in the form of a circle divided into four separate sections’. 
In Kautilya’s Arthashastra, it refers to circles of kings, and an international sys-
tem based on strategic relations between them. The central nodes in the mandala 
system, the four circles of kings, are four types of kings: conqueror, conqueror’s 
enemy, middle power and neutral power. Each of the circles, moreover, consists 
of the friends and allies of their nodal power, be it the conqueror, conqueror’s 
enemy, middle king or the neutral power. In addition, king does not merely denote 
ruler but also, depending on the context, the whole state. (Shamasastry 1915: 367; 
Kangle 2014, Sutras 6.2.13.)  
The four central nodes of Kautilya’s mandala system have particular characteris-
tics. The most powerful state, the so-called neutral king, is defined as one that 
would have the material capabilities to resist and even subjugate each of the minor 
kings individually, but is situated beyond their territories. This great power re-
gards the lesser states with indifference because, for Kautilya, enmity depends 
primarily on territorial proximity. The middle king is the second strongest state, 
but it also shares territory with minor powers. Conqueror and its enemy are the 
lesser states that also share a common border. (Shamasastry 1915: 366, 367; Kan-
gle 2014, Sutras 6.2.13-23; Gautam 2013: 54, 55.) As Arthashastra is written 
without direct historical references, various scholars agree that the mandala sys-
tem is primarily a conceptualisation of possible strategic relations between them, 
even though Boesche (2002: 16) has shown that it also has a descriptive dimen-
sion (Modelski 1964: 550).  
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The concepts of enmity and friendship lie at the heart of the mandala’s strategic 
function. Yet, for Kautilya, enemy is a state that ‘is situated anywhere immedi-
ately on the circumference of the conqueror's territory’ (Shamasastry 1915: 366; 
Kangle 2014, Sutra 6.2.14; Boesche 2002: 78). Benoy Sarkar (1919: 405), writing 
during World War I, adopted this idea without deeper scrutiny. Gautam (2013: 
99) conversely, has noted that while the natural enemy of any state is bound to be 
its neighbour, not all neighbours are enemies. Still, to get an idea about the or-
ganising principle in the mandala’s strategic function, we should consider what 
factors cause enmity in the neighbourhood.  
Some of the obvious reasons are competition for the same resources like arable 
land, woods or metals, dependence on the same source of water, increases in pop-
ulation, and migration and the potential colonisation resulting from it. These be-
come causes of conflict only between peoples who live close to each other. Even 
today these matters are relevant to a certain extent, yet global markets and the 
relative ease of travelling reduces dependency on the neighbourhood. Conse-
quently, I would argue that instead of neighbourhood, enmity results from con-
flicting strategic interests, which in Kautilya’s historic context tended to coincide 
with territorial proximity. This resonates with Liebig’s extrapolation about Kau-
tilya’s matsya-nyāya, or the 'law of the fishes', or 'law of the jungle', which define 
conflicting interests as the natural condition of human life. (Liebig 2014: 3, 4.)  
As a result, the constitution of the circles of states, and their relations with each 
other, are a question of conflicting interests between them. This modification 
makes it possible to expand the applicability of the mandala. While territorial 
borders in IR apply to states, conflicting interests apply also on other governance 
institutions as much as matters of international and transnational interdepend-
ences.  
Defined in this sense, mandala can account not only for inter-state relations but 
also for global governance and international organization. This is an important 
observation, because one of the major implications of globalization has been the 
transformation in the political sovereignty of states through various forms of 
shared authority and pooled sovereignty (Elazar 1998). This is what Rosenau and 
Czempiel (1992) referred to with the influential notion of ‘governance without 
government’. The concept encapsulates the resulting fragmentation of public au-
thority and the emergence of new actors including non-governmental and private 
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actors – in addition to transgovernmental (between for example state depart-
ments), intergovernmental, intra-regional, translocal (between for example two 
cities) and public private hybrids (Scholte 2011: 11). 
Thus, it seems both possible and plausible to define mandala as a conceptualisa-
tion of transnational relations structured by how different agents relate to: (1) each 
other in terms of size and influence; and (2) matters of governance. A matter of 
governance can be a conflicting interest or an issue of interdependence between 
at least two actors. In the modern age, many governance issues are not fundamen-
tally about conflicting interests, but about management of interdependences.  
 
Overarching leadership goals 
Mishra and Liebig (2016: 127, 132) have argued that the raison d'état of Kauti-
lya’s political leadership is the optimisation of state power to maintain and in-
crease the welfare of its people. This is because only a powerful state can ensure 
the welfare of its people (Shamasastry 1915: 368; Rangarajan 1992: 525). Kauti-
lya divides power into three components: intellectual strength (which provides 
good counsel); a strong army and prosperous treasury, which provide for physical 
strength; and valour, which builds the psychological bases of energy and morale. 
According to Ramachandran’s (2014: 393) interpretation, Kautilya’s conception 
of power embodies four factors, counsel, military might, economy and motiva-
tion, and in this form is similar to the conception by the Chinese military strategist 
and writer Sun Zi. Pursuit of power is one of the factors that renders Kautilya a 
realist because one of the basic premises in realism is that states seek to maximise 
their power and influence.  
Yet, Kautilya’s realism is conditional. A king is bound to do his best for the wel-
fare of his subjects: ‘In the happiness of his subjects lies his happiness; in their 
welfare his welfare’ (Kangle 2014, Sutra 1.19.34). Welfare is the goal, and realist 
politics the tool. How then does Chanakya define welfare? He defines it as mate-
rial well-being, acquisition and abundance of wealth:  
Hence the king shall ever be active and discharge his duties; the root of wealth is 
activity, and of evil its reverse. In the absence of activity acquisitions present and 
to come will perish; by activity he can achieve both his desired ends and abundance 
of wealth. (Shamasastry 1915: 52; Kangle 2014, Sutras 1.19.35-36.) 
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[W]hen the king is well off, by his welfare and prosperity, he pleases the people; 
of what kind the king's character is, of the same kind will be the character of his 
people; for their progress or downfall, the people depend upon the king; the king 
is, as it were, the aggregate of the people. (Shamasastry 1915: 446.) 
State power is not just an extension of the elements of power (intellectual, moral 
and material capacities and possessions) on an abstract idea of state. In fact, Kau-
tilya’s seven-fold typology of state, or the ‘constituent elements’, ‘state factors’ 
or ‘elements of sovereignty’, are fully comparable with twentieth-century realist 
conceptualisations of state power (M. Liebig 2014: 10; Juutinen and Käkönen 
2016: 17). Kautilya operationalises the optimisation of power through the follow-
ing state factors: (1) king, ruler; (2) government, administrative bodies; (3) peo-
ple, country and the productive capabilities like agriculture; (4) capital or fortified 
city; (5) treasury or perhaps the tax base and tax income; (6) army; and (7) allies 
(Shamasastry 1915: 362–264; Kangle 2014: Sutra 6.1.1). State power refers to 
optimisation of intellectual, moral and material capacities and possession of all 
these seven factors.  
For the purposes of modern analysis, some modifications of these elements are in 
order. The king and ministers should be considered in the broader sense of an 
efficient government and the ability of a central authority to exercise decisive 
influence on its subjects. Roger Boesche (2002: 45, 62) describes Kautilya’s ad-
ministrative system as ‘despotic’, but this interpretation has been challenged by 
for example Deepshikha Shahi’s (2019) constructivist reading of the Arthasastra.  
The third element for Kautilya would seem to be a compound of people and nat-
ural resources, and how they under an efficient and just administration yield both 
the sustanance for the country as well as the tax base that supports the government 
in its undertakings and a strong army. Like the king and governmental officials, 
so would the people be of good character, loyal and capable in their respective 
business. Today, the productive capabilities of a country would embody its indus-
trial base, connectivity to international markets, position in regional and global 
value chains, as well as other elements that form the preconditions of economic 
productivity and competitiveness, like social and physical infrastructure (World 
Economic Forum 2019). Some elements of the modern social infrastructure, like 
the educational and judiciary systems, link to Kautilya’s ’character’ of the people 
and imply not only the build of occupational capabilities but also the construction 
of societial virtues, cohesiveness of the society and individual attachment to 
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community. Finally, for Kautilya, commerce is not an a-political even if it serves 
economic exchange. Commerce is also a key element of ‘intelligence service’. 
(Shamasastry 1915: 363, Book I, Ch. XI, XII.)  
The treasury and tax base are still applicable concepts. The fortified city, con-
structed in order to protect the population against enemy troops, would need some 
modifications to become a useful category for contemporary analysis. Societal 
resilience might be a useful replacement for the ancient concept of a fortified city. 
It encompasses elements of both external and internal security. It also covers the 
soft elements of societal cohesiveness, approval of government and a critical and 
well-informed world-view which provide a fortification against inimical influ-
ence. Indeed, these elements of resilience find expression in Kautilya’s theory of 
society, which combines social control and administration with the material well-
being of people and the general acceptability of the king and social hierarchies. 
However, he does not list these as part of the elements of sovereignty. (Boesche 
2002: 106–8.) 
In the Kautilyan formulation, there is also a non-material aspect to strength and 
happiness, one defined by Vedic tradition and the hierarchical social structure of 
the Aryan caste system. Living well in this context would imply fulfilling one’s 
duties as a member of a caste as given. (Rangarajan 1992: 29, 37, 38; Shamasastry 
1915: 9, 10.) Cultural traditions, belief systems and values can be seen as sources 
of societal resilience, stability and predictability. They also form an element in 
the sociological acceptability of governance. For example, Peter Stillman (1974: 
42) defines legitimacy as ‘the compatibility of the results of governmental output 
with the value patterns of the relevant system’. 
Out of the last two state factors, army and allies, the latter is highly relevant in 
the modern context, defined by environmental and economic interdependences. 
These ties, I would argue, cause a fundamental transformation in the nature and 
operational logic of the mandala system. For example, the productive forces of 
any country are dependent on their connections with other countries. Various 
transnational governance institutions regulate how and between whom these con-
nections are built and supervised. As a result, cooperation permeates most of Kau-
tilya’s state factors: the circles of states in a modern mandala become intertwined 
and tie kingly obligations in one political entity with the happiness of people in 
another. This leaves enmity or zero-sum games with only a side role.  
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Thus, the raison d'être of leadership in the modern era mandala can be defined as 
optimisation of welfare in the often transnationally intertwined state factors. This 
can be defined as the inter-state mandala. Leadership in this context can be about 
solving common problems (compare Juutinen 2018: 214, 125).  
Moreover, if modern mandala has to take into account the transnationally inter-
twined state factors, so can it also be applied to conflicting interests and govern-
ance in cases, where instead of states we have international organizations as 
agents. In this sense, we can speak about transnational mandalas. These organi-
zations do not have (1) kings but they do have leaders; (2) they do not govern-
ments but they do have bureaucracies; (3) they do not have a nation, but they have 
people as their subjects and their objectives are often defined with regard to prob-
lems experiences by peoples in many countries and geographic areas; (4) they do 
not have capitals but they do have a relation with social cohesiveness and societal 
resilience; (5) most of them do not have right to collect taxes but virtually all of 
them have a budget and incomes; (6) some have an army; and (7) many cooperate 
with other international organizations, institutions, non-state actors and states. 
An additional feature in Kautilya’s conceptualisation of state, which strengthens 
the applicability of mandala also on international organizations, is the open char-
acter of Kautilya’s state: it is not territorially bound, nor nationally or ethnically 
defined. The idea of nation-states has been predominant among European 
whereas states in Asia, Africa and South America encompass multiple nations of 
whom many speak their own tong.  
According to Shyam Saran (2017), this openness is distinctive in Asian political 
history. It would explain why pluralism would appear so much more acceptable 
a condition in Asia than in Europe, where the integration process was launched 
to avoid the horrific experiences of the two world wars. Admittedly, EU’s legiti-
macy as an integration process has more recently been contested, partially 
through misguided diagnosis by the Brexiters and populist movements with al-
leged support from China and Russia about the late migration crisis and global 
economic imbalances.  
 
Conquest as a foreign policy obligation 
Benoy Sarkar described Kautilya’s mandala as a ‘cult of expansion’. Sarkar 
(1919: 401, 409) connected expansionism with world conquest; Boesche (2002: 
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4, 79) also hints at this. Liebig (2014: 15) and Gautam (2013: 124), in contrast, 
restrict Kautilya’s expansionism to the geographic and civilisational sphere of the 
Indian subcontinent. Nonetheless, conquest forms an essential part of Kautilya’s 
theory, where the would-be-conqueror or vijigisu is a central actor.  
Conqueror is a singular type of king because of its normative character, and its 
role in the international system. The normative dimension of the conqueror refers 
to certain qualities that legitimise the vijigisu’s role as a conqueror. The conqueror 
should possess excellent personal qualities and be industrious in attaining and 
improving his skills and abilities. He should husband his time efficiently accord-
ing to a carefully planned schedule, and never let selfish desires and urges dictate 
his actions. (Shamasastry 1915: 19, 51, 362; Kangle 2014, Sutra 1.7.1.) 
In addition to these features, the vijigisu is distinctive because of conquest. The 
Arthashastra classifies conquests into three groups: (1) righteous; (2) greedy; and 
(3) demonical. A just conqueror, our vijigisu, does not necessarily need to seek 
usurpation or extension of his state’s belongings. Territorial takeover, moreover, 
would likely involve death, loss of money and impoverishment. It would not nec-
essarily be conducive to the happiness and welfare of his people, least of all those 
newly subjected to his rule. In the Arthashastra, we read that a ‘king […], being 
possessed of good character and best-fitted elements of sovereignty’ and seeking 
conquest, should be neither demonic nor greedy. If he would act in any other way 
than righteous, he would create the space and need for another state to seek a new 
conqueror. This is because it is the duty of a king to aspire for the welfare and 
happiness of his people, which is impossible under a demonic ruler and difficult 
with a greedy one. (Shamasastry 1915: 366; Gautam 2013: 47, 56.) 
To be able to conquer, the vijigisu should have the necessary material and non-
material capabilities both to conquer and to maintain a dominant position after 
the conquest. To establish himself, he needs to set up his rule in a manner that 
advances the happiness and welfare of the new subjects, thus binding them to the 
king for material gains and for non-material reasons. The non-material reasons in 
Kautilya’s Arthashastra have to do with the Brahmanical order and virtues which 
deepen the moral dimension of Kautilya’s realism. (Liebig 2014: 14.)  
As a result, Kautilya’s conquest does not generate rights without obligations. In-
stead, by extending the kingdom, conquest also extends the obligations that come 
with leadership. In this sense, the ethical and material are inseparably intertwined. 
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Interestingly, this seems to resonate with certain modern concepts. There is, for 
instance, a similarity between ‘benevolent superpower’ and ‘liberal international 
order’ on the one side, and the vijigisu and ‘conquest’ on the other. As noted by 
Liebig (2014: 14, 17), these conceptual interfaces deserve ‘long overdue’ schol-
arly attention. However, they are out of the scope of this particular paper.  
Now, if we maintain that the mandala in the contemporary context can be re-
garded as a certain type of strategic constellation of diverse interests around a 
governance issue, or, more narrowly, a constellation of state relations with regard 
to a matter of governance, then to conquer means to solve this issue. A righteous 
conquest would imply a solution that improves or secures the welfare of the vi-
jigisu and the conquered. For example, a mutually beneficial trade agreement, or 
a port or railway connection, would correspond to righteous conquest, while a 
trade war would imply a greedy conquest.  
 
Towards a framework of analysis  
In this section, I have discussed Kautilya’s key concepts of international relations 
and foreign policy and, through interpretative analysis, sought to adapt them to 
the present-day context. I have paid particular attention to the organising principle 
in Kautilya’s mandala arguing that strategic relations do not depend on territorial 
proximity between territorial political entities or nation-states. Instead, mandala 
can be defined as a compound of multiple and overlapping transnational relations 
structured by how different agents relate to (1) each other in terms of size and 
influence; and (2) how these agents relate to a matter of governance, dispute or 
common concern. Furthermore, it is possible to divide between interstate and 
transnational mandalas, which indicates that the strategic relations that the con-
cept seeks to encapsulate are multiple and overlapping on various levels of global 
politics.  
The basic unit in the mandala is the state, conceived of as a compound of seven 
elements, none of which, in the contemporary world, is fully independent or sov-
ereign, but which is tied to other states, friends and enemies alike, with at least 
some environmental, economic and international connections. The objective of 
each state is the optimisation of the immaterial and material dimensions of each 
of the seven transnationally interdependent state factors, which would obligate 
leaders or at least the vijigisu to aspire for win-win solutions instead of zero-sum 
outcomes. This holds in cases where the circle of states is intertwined through 
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interdependent constituent elements. I would argue that these notions might help 
to rethink the dynamics of conflict and cooperation in a manner which perhaps 
underpins the historical experiences of Asian civilizations and is well suited for 
the emerging pluralistic international order.  
Moreover, while the basic unit in Kautilyan mandala is the state, the modern 
mandala also applies to international organizations and governance agencies in 
the global context of complex and inter-relational web of political authority. 
Along with states, these webs of authority can be situated as parts of a state-cen-
tric mandala, as elements of ‘interdependent sovereignty’ affecting people and 
productive forces, treasury and allies. But they can also be interpreted as actors 
in transnational mandalas, where instead of states the focus is on transnational 
agents or international organizations.  
Finally, the ideal leader (vijigisu) would be one that employs all measures in hand 
to ensure successful win-win solutions for common concerns, while ensuring neu-
trality or zero-sum gains in cases where the mandala is divided into clearly sepa-
rate circles, and where the state factors of each central node of each circle are 
disconnected. Let me synthesise these notions shortly as a tentative analytical 
framework: 
1. A key foreign policy objective is righteous conquest. In the context of 
multiple and overlapping circles consisting of transnationally intertwined 
state factors, righteous conquest denotes successful leadership in 
optimisation of welfare in the interconnected political entities through 
win-win solutions for common problems. The modern vijigisu has 
mastery over the complex web of mandalas, knows how to keep them 
separate (e.g., does not mix political conflicts with economic 
cooperation), and has the ability to exercise effective leadership.  
2. In defining the operational environment for foreign policy manoeuvres, 
primary focus is on what constitutes a given mandala:  
• What are the conflicting interests/common problems? 
• What kinds of agents are involved?  
• What does the vijigisu do to lead or overcome, by what means and 
how successfully? 
• What are the shortcomings of his leadership?  
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• From the normative perspective, what should the vijigisu do and who 
or what is most suitable to be a vijigisu? 
 
BRICS and the multiple and overlapping mandalas  
To define BRICS as an international agent and to conceptualise its relationship 
with the changing international order is considered a challenge by BRICS schol-
ars. The BRICS countries portray some elements befitting various theoretical con-
ceptualisations. It seems to be a bit of many things, but not fully anything. This, 
at least, is the interpretation behind the BRICS paradox.  
The BRICS paradox can be defined as a theoretically grounded chain of argu-
ments that lead to deductions about BRICS that are not coherent with empirical 
reality, or at least seem controversial or ambiguous. One aspect of the paradox 
evolves from the idea that because the BRICS countries are so heterogeneous, i.e. 
because they lack the political, geographic, ideational and constructivist elements 
that, particularly from the perspective of European integration theories, are nec-
essary for efficient cooperation, BRICS is defined as fundamentally a paper tiger 
with little expectations regarding its global role. Another perspective, this one 
grounded in power transition theory, expects the BRICS countries to align to chal-
lenge either the hierarchical order of states in the increasingly obsolete US-led 
world order, or the norms and institutions of the current system in order to reform 
them to better fit their own interests. There is contradictory evidence for both 
these claims.  
In Kautilyan terms, the organising principle in both these claims relates to some 
aspects of global interdependence, governance issues or conflicting interests. The 
Kautilyan perspective would thus suggest conceptualising these puzzles through 
relatively narrow, issue-specific mandalas. In other words, this perspective would 
solve the paradox by changing the premises leading to it. Of course, no theory is 
perfect, but most theories can convey some important information. Comparative 
studies would tell us that BRICS is neither a federation nor a supranational gov-
ernance entity, but an interstate alliance subject to conflicts or dissonance be-
tween its members. The Kautilyan perspective can add to this type of analysis 
with insights about what the elements are that bind the BRICS countries together, 
and how they relate to the elements that separate them or create potential for 
 52 
conflicts within BRICS. For this, the Kautilyan perspective provides the tools of 
multiple and overlapping mandalas. 
What then are the BRICS mandalas? The BRICS mandalas divide into various 
transnational and interstate mandalas, which are partly separate and partly over-
lapping. BRICS as an international agent is a compound of how dynamics inter-
relations between these various mandalas. Figure 1. (by author) seeks to illustrate 
some of the complexity of these dynamics. Each colour denotes a specific con-
stellation of strategic and conflicting interests, and each shared border (even be-
tween different colours) denotes a potentially conflicting relation. Enemy in one 
mandala can be friend in another.  
The black mandala, for example, is an interstate mandala with India and China 
as its central node and the main rivals. In this context, the US is China’s enemy 
and India’s friends, while China-led initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) is an enemy of the US and the EU. From the per-
spective of this interstate-mandala, RCEP is also potentially inimical for India, 
because of its asymmetric foreign economic policy implications for China. Belt 
and Road Initiative, even more clearly is an enemy for India and with regard to 
the BRI, RCEP and China itself India’s friends are the EU and the US. South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), on the other hand, is 
China’s enemy but a potential friend for the US and the EU.  
At the same time, in the transnational mandala, denoted with the red colour, India 
and China are friends within the BRICS, and in this context RCEP and the BRI 
are friends for both India and China, unlike in the interstate mandala. In this con-
text, on the other hand, the US and the EU can be seen as enemies of BRICS in 
terms of how they relate to pluralism of global governance.  
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Transnational mandalas 
According to BRICS summit documents, BRICS was formed as a reaction to the 
‘major and swift changes’ in world affairs and the resulting need ‘for correspond-
ing transformations in global governance’. The values that the BRICS (2010: nos 
1, 2) have underlined in all of their summit declarations include mutual respect, 
cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making in ‘a multipolar, 
equitable and democratic world order’. As a result, the organising principles for 
the BRICS transnational mandala are the relation of each international agent to-
wards these values, pluralism and the ‘corresponding reforms’ in global govern-
ance.  
The United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) are three of the most important governance institu-
tions of the so-called liberal international order. They are also the objects of 
BRICS’ critique, causes of conflicting relations, and the targets of conquest. Yet, 
the source of critique is not in the principles of these institutions. Instead, enmity 
arises from the discrepancy between values and practices. In spite of the power 
shift, the US and the developed countries still maintain a strong position in these 
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institutions even today, and the system that should generate indiscriminatory 
gains for all still produces disproportionate benefits to the already powerful com-
panies, countries and groups of people (Hopewell 2016). This is what the BRICS 
countries have argued they want to change.  
Indeed, the shortcomings of what in critical political economy literature is called 
the neo-liberal political economy, dearly felt in the Global South, has been one 
source of major expectations for alternative development models and thus also 
for actual financial and trade initiatives for that purpose. For example, Duggan 
(2015) and Mielniczuk (2013) have separately shown that the BRICS discourse 
about development and political economy deviates from the established neo-lib-
eral jargon. Neither of them, however, is able to demonstrate that the BRICS ac-
tually have an alternative agenda. Other scholars have shown explicitly that they 
don’t (Babb 2013; Gudynas 2016).  
While state influence over markets among BRICS countries is relatively exten-
sive, they have been and are major beneficiaries of economic globalisation and 
stout supporters of capitalism (Stephen 2014; Nölke et al. 2015). For example, 
BRICS country lending to other developing countries is as extractive as invest-
ments from the advanced economies (Bond 2016). The newly founded NDB has 
already been criticised for lack of transparency and disrespect for good govern-
ance. A recent case is the contentious infrastructure loan to Durban port in South 
Africa, strongly objected to by the local population (Independent Online, 10 June 
2018). Another factor is the close institutional relations between the Contingent 
Reserve Arrangement (CRA) and the IMF. BRICS created the CRA as a liquidity 
buffer against potential balance of payments problems, but when there is need for 
more than 30 per cent of borrowing quota, it must first seek structural adjustment 
loans from the IMF before it can receive more support from the CRA (Ibid.; Bond 
2016).  
Nonetheless, even if there may not exist a mandala that is on a systemic level or 
that concerns capitalism, there appears to be a narrower developmental mandala. 
The BRICS rhetoric also emphasises the well-established problems of global gov-
ernance—that poverty and lack of social and physical infrastructure, water and 
electricity are very tangible problems even among the BRICS themselves. 
Mielniczuk (2013) has argued that construction of a new discourse can have long-
term effects on how we see the world, how we create shared purposes and how 
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we imagine the future. It begins with ideational delinking from established and 
predominant discourses. Thus, some scholars have shown that to some extent, the 
BRICS countries have already caused a rupture in ideas about development. This 
is also evident from the NDB’s General Strategy (2017: 11), which seems to in-
vite discussions and debates on development:  
The bank will constructively engage the international community as an independ-
ent voice on development trends and practices. As a new institution, NDB has 
much to learn from the wealth of experience of multilateral and bilateral develop-
ment institutions, as well as civil society and academic organizations. 
 In the context of the developmental mandala, there would be need for a righteous 
conqueror. BRICS has at least so far failed to shoulder this responsibility even if 
it has created space in both developmental discourses and institutional structures 
(Juutinen 2019b). If the BRICS objective is indeed to advance reforms that are 
conducive to a more equitable and multipolar world order, their promotion of 
ideational and discursive pluralism, be it about political economy or cultures, 
should be in line with that objective. BRICS has promoted pluralism in global 
institutions as well as at the regional level. During BRICS summits, it has become 
a practice that the host country also organize a simultaneous conference for some 
regional organisation. For example, during the Ufa Summit in 2017, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) was convened together with BRICS. In this 
sense, BRICS seems to be working as an enabler and promoter of multiple layers 
of cooperation.  
On the global level, BRICS has faced opposition from the former hegemonic 
powers. For example, reforms of the IMF quota system had already been agreed 
upon at the Group of 20 meeting in 2008, a year before the first BRIC summit, 
but were stopped by the US Congress until 2016. That failure met with harsh 
criticism from the BRICS. The BRICS summit declaration from 2015 (no 19) 
states that ‘[w]e remain deeply disappointed with the prolonged failure by the 
United States to ratify the IMF 2010 reform package, which continues to under-
mine the credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness of the IMF’. 
Similarly, BRICS concerns with the UN has focused on unilateralism. In various 
summits, they have condemned ‘unilateral military interventions, economic sanc-
tions and arbitrary use of unilateral coercive measures in violation of international 
law’ (BRICS 2014: nos. 8, 27; 2016, no. 9; 2017, no. 38). Conflicts in Libya and 
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Syria and the dispute about Iran’s nuclear weapons are major triggers for these 
concerns. In these conflicts, BRICS has emphasised sovereignty and non-inter-
ference, while responsibility to protect and human rights have been more im-
portant for the discourse of the US and its allies. The US has been and continues 
to be the ‘enemy’ also in the WTO and in matters of economic interdependencies. 
Prior to the Donald Trump presidency, BRICS voiced concerns about developed 
country regional trade agreements, which contain high regulatory standards that 
could induce additional costs and become barriers for market access for develop-
ing countries. During the Trump presidency, the BRICS countries have also 
voiced their concern over the US refusal to appoint a WTO judge, which could 
‘paralyse the dispute settlement system and undermine the rights and obligations 
of all Members’ (BRICS 2018: no. 64). 
 
Interstate Mandala 
Transnational mandalas thus would seem to encompass developmental concerns 
as well as concerns about global governance. In these cases, BRICS can be seen 
as an actor in its own right, and indeed, one can argue that there is a need for 
global leadership or a vijigisu that would propose solutions to solve common 
problems. At the same time, it can be asked, why has BRICS’ role so far been of 
this relatively modest kind? This, I would argue, depends on the nature of BRICS 
as not only part of transnational mandalas but also itself part of the interstate 
mandalas of its member states. 
States are and remain important even in transnational contexts and thus for exam-
ple the developmental mandala comprises of global and regional institutions, cor-
porations as well as states, who have also other strategic interests. While in the 
transnational context and with regard to development and pluralist global govern-
ance, India and China are friends who cooperate through various arenas like 
BRICS, NDP, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), these initiatives can also be seen as foreign policy measures and employ-
ment of the four upayas by an aspirant conqueror, China. From India-centric man-
dala, they can be seen as tools of its enemy to legitimize its growing influence, 
make friends out of potential rivals, and through economic transactions tie India’s 
constituent elements closer to itself.  
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This does not imply that developmental mandala or transnational mandalas 
would not exist or that the BRICS countries (or that China and India) would not 
have common interests. It does, however, imply that BRICS agendas are forged 
within inter-state mandalas, where India has to be cautious about China and thus, 
where the dynamics between these two countries affect the manner in which they 
cooperate on the transitional level. We can make two conclusions from these ob-
servations.  
First, with regard to the developmental mandala, it would be desirable that 
BRICS could emerge as a vijigisu, a righteous conqueror that would lead interna-
tional cooperation to solve problems of basic social and physical infrastructure, 
environmental degradation and climate warming. Each of BRICS members can 
seek to take that role and from a normative perspective, they should see it as their 
obligation.  
Second, each of BRICS members also have an obligation to protect the welfare 
of their peoples and other transnationally entwined elements of their sovereignty, 
as well as to optimize their influence over these elements. In other words, they 
have to suspicious and inquisitive about the policies of other BRICS members. 
Considering that China has launched three huge economic initiatives, the RCEP, 
AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), BRICS members also need to be 
cautious about not to band-wagon with these initiatives, unless they are convinced 
that China is a righteous conqueror and they are willing to subject themselves to 
it.  
Consequently, from Kautilyan perspective it appears that the questions about 
whether or not BRICS has what it takes to become a global leader in development 
and global governance, or whether it should or should not aspire for such a role, 
might be wrong ones to ask – at least for time being. Main reason is that the 
precondition for BRICS to be able to create a common political agenda for eco-
nomic development and global governance is the rise of a vijigisu among them. 
In the comtemporary context, this would seem quite far-fetched. At the same time, 
BRICS countries do have common concerns as when BRICS as an alliance func-
tions as an agent of global dialogue and promoter of pluralism, it would seem to 
best serve these interests.  
As a result, this paper proposes to approach BRICS through the assessment of the 
dynamics of conflict and cooperation in transnational and interstate mandalas. A 
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more detailed exercise in Kautilyan analyses would focuses on transnational and 
interstate dynamics as well as how they relate to each other. Even this short trea-
tise makes it possible to rule out the paradox. Yet, to establish to what extend and 
how the Kautilyan conceptualizations complement realist IR or in what sense 
Kautilan concepts differ from or bring in something new (or something that has 
been forgotten long time ago), remains an open question. What we have now seen 
is that Kautilya is applicable. But to establish, how useful it is, will necessarily 
involve much further work in comparing kautilyan theoretical concepts with other 
IR concepts and assessing Kautilyan interpretations on policy cases at side of 
other IR interpretations on the same cases. This study has only scraped the surface 
of such scholarship. 
 
Conclusion  
This article has two objectives. First, it has sought to develop conceptual tools to 
study international relations through an interpretative analysis of Kautilya’s Ar-
thashastra. Second, it has tried to apply this perspective on conceptualising 
BRICS using the so-called BRICS paradox as a litmus test for the Kautilyan per-
spective. Starting point of this study, as presented in the introduction, is that we 
do not yet know whether Kautilya can be useful in BRICS studies, what results a 
Kautilyan perspective yields and how it relates to other interpretations. The short 
analysis of BRICS has demonstrated the applicability of the perspective. It sought 
to present the overlapping transnational and interstate mandalas as an analytical 
tool to examine the dynamics of conflict and cooperation that define BRICS as 
an international agent, and which explain the so-called BRICS paradox.  
As the Kautilyan perspective has successfully passed its litmus test, we can reaf-
firm Kautilya’s relevance for IR studies. In the second section of this paper, this 
paper argued that Kautilya is relevant in at least four ways. First, classical texts 
provide an important source from which to reconceptualise the present, to rethink, 
refine and even challenge well-established theorisations. Second, Kautilya forms 
a crucial element in the conceptual history of IR. Third, Kautilya can be employed 
to study and understand India’s contemporary foreign politics. This dimension 
came up in the discussion in the fourth section. Fourth, and related to the first, 
Kautilya’s Arthashastra can be used to complement and develop contemporary 
IR and strategic analysis.  
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A summary of the Kautilyan perspective was provided in the third section of this 
paper. The main conceptual contribution of this paper relates to the concepts of 
mandala and conquest, or the nature of international relations and the main for-
eign policy objectives. Two types of circles were presented, transnational and in-
terstate mandalas. In transnational mandalas, the central agent may be an inter-
national organization or some other agent of global governance. In interstate 
mandalas, the central node of analysis is a state, albeit the circles around it in-
volve non-state actors and/international organizations.  
Contemporary mandalas can be defined as a strategic constellation of multiple 
and overlapping circles of political entities joined by transnationally intertwined 
state factors. This implies that state power and its interests are not territorially 
bound but transnationally intertwined. In this context, righteous conquest would 
denote successful leadership in optimising welfare in the interconnected political 
entities or among the peoples of transnationally intertwined states.  
Finally, with regard to future research, I have already mentioned that the perspec-
tive provided here may be used to study differences, commonalities and comple-
mentarities between this and the established IR perspectives. As Kautilya was a 
realist political theorist, it would be particularly promising to inquire into the re-
lationship between the Kautilyan perspective developed here and some of the key 
notions in other realist theories. For example, what is the relation between ‘trans-
nationally intertwined state factors’ and ‘national interest’ or ‘institutional con-
straints’, and how do the ideas of ‘conquest’ and the ‘circle of states’ relate to 
‘multilateral diplomacy’ or ‘hegemonic transition’?  
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 The BRICS Coexistence and the Islamic World 
Karim Maïche 
 
Abstract 
Could Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia, Turkey, Iran or Egypt among others 
become BRICS member-states in the future? This article seeks to reflect on the potential 
membership of Muslim-majority country within the BRICS, which lacks member from 
the Islamic world in its explicit struggle to strengthen the role of the developing world in 
the multiple international political arenas. Muslim-majority countries and their repre-
sentative institutions are contextualized within the hub of multilateral platforms while the 
impact of their political, cultural and economic performances are reflected within the 
processes of pluralization of the global world order in the twenty-first century. While the 
manifold strategic orientations of the BRICS are highlighted in the analysis, this article 
stresses the plurality of the Muslim world in general challenging the reductive under-
standing of its use as compact singular entity. Drawing on hermeneutic interpretation of 
multiple international phenomena through textual analysis, this article asks how would 
the membership of a Muslim-majority country impact on BRICS’s global policy orienta-
tions, plurality and domestic policies within the theoretical framework of coexistence.  
Keywords: BRICS, Islam, coexistence, culture, multilateralism  
 
 
Introduction 
Various official documents as well as political analysts and researchers depict 
BRICS as an institution which represents as well as safeguards the interests of the 
developing countries (Gray and Gills 2016: 558; Thakur 2014: 1793). Simultane-
ously, BRICS can be considered as the latest attempt with new organized form to 
increase South-South cooperation (SSC) since the Bandung Conference of 1955 
(Kiely 2015: 152-173). The first summit of the BRICS was organized in 2009 and 
today the grouping consists of five significant regional powers that represent 
emergent economies which includes more than 40 per cent of the world’s popu-
lation (Mielniczuk 2013: 1075-1076). It aims at greater voice and representation 
of the developing world within international financial institutions in the context 
of global governance (Acharya 2014: 278-279). In general, the multilateral insti-
tutions such as BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU), New Development Bank (NDB), Asian Infrastructure 
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Investment Bank (AIIB), Group of 20, Group of 77, Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) or African Union (AU) are important tools to bring 
about global change whether political, economic or social. 
What is the role of the Islamic world in the processes of multilateralism and plu-
ralization of the multiplex world order? While Islamic, or Muslim-majority, coun-
tries and their representative institutions are already integral part and connected 
to the hub of various multilateral institutions, such as United Nations (UN), World 
Trade Organization (WTO), Arab League (AL), Organization of Islamic Cooper-
ation (OIC), ASEAN, EEU and AU, none of them are official members in the 
BRICS. All of the BRICS countries have rich historical and cultural backgrounds 
with multi-ethnic and multi-religious populations, for example, Buddhism in 
China, Hinduism in India as well as Christianity in various forms from Eastern-
Orthodox in Russia, Roman Catholicism in Brazil and independent African 
church in South Africa. The combining element with unified cultures within 
BRICS can be considered to be of the tradition of orientalisation vis-à-vis Euro-
pean and North American cultural traditions, leading to shared experience of oth-
erness and sense of consensus regardless of cultural differences (Xing and Wan 
2014: 19).  
From time to time, there has been some speculation regarding the joining of Mus-
lim-majority countries to BRICS in the future. Since the aftermath of economic 
crisis in 2008, Goldman Sachs recognized eleven countries in addition to BRICS 
member states that were able to recover relatively rapidly from the crisis. These 
so-called “next eleven” (or N-11) were Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South 
Korea, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey (Kiely 2015: 12). From this group, 
four Muslim or Muslim-majority states, such as Indonesia, Turkey, Iran and 
Egypt6 among others7 are included within the discussion on potential BRICS 
members. This article is interested in analysing how that would affect the plurality 
and coexistence among BRICS countries? How would that impact on its struc-
tures? If BRICS takes a Muslim-majority country as its official member state, 
would that change its international orientation? If BRICS aspires to represent the 
developing countries, why does it lack representation from the Islamic world, 
which represents over billion of the world’s population?  
 
6 Egypt was invited guest (with Guinea, Mexico, Tajikistan and Thailand) in 2017 Xiamen Summit. 
7 Other Muslim-majority countries that have expressed their interest in joining BRICS are 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Sudan and Syria. 
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When I was asked for the first time about the input of the Islamic world within 
the BRICS, I thought that the whole question was totally absurd and irrelevant. I 
thought that it was unfruitful to study the connection between BRICS and huge, 
heterogeneous and complex entity such as “Islamic world”. I first refused to ap-
proach the whole question, criticizing it as related to its Huntingtonian perspec-
tive: world is split according to assumed and artificial civilizational divisions. 
When faced with the insistence of at least the possibility to pose such a question 
regardless of its complexities and problematic, I decided to take up the challenge. 
So far, I have not crossed any other study that captures similar research problem-
atic or approach: the relations between BRICS and Islam.  
Before going any further, it is of great necessity to highlight the plurality of the 
Muslim world and challenge the reductive understanding of the concept “Islamic 
world” in the first place. The so-called Islamic world, from Morocco to Indonesia, 
contains various historical, cultural and socio-economic intra-state and regional 
variations that complicate its understanding and use as compact singular entity. 
Instead of reflecting on BRICS and its relation with something called “Islamic 
world”, I proceed in my analysis towards discussion on few carefully selected 
individual Islamic or Muslim-majority countries and their political position vis-
à-vis BRICS within the framework of contemporary international relations, while 
reflecting on a normative understanding and interpretation of Islam as a religious 
as well as social phenomenon.  
Is there room for Islamic values in BRICS, which often highlights its positive 
orientation towards pluralism and diversity? I argue that the answer to aforemen-
tioned question lies within the way BRICS and its function is understood and 
defined: does BRICS exist for economic, geopolitical or security premises? Is it 
a platform? As stated before, BRICS aims to gather major emerging economies 
that share common perspective for a new global world order challenging the dom-
ination of the United States and its allies. How and where does this challenge take 
place? Meanwhile, BRICS shares the understanding that the current world order 
should be changed through institutional reform from inside. It does not seem to 
want to get rid of the system completely: BRICS creates parallel institutions in 
order to strengthen its position within current global order (Stuenkel 2016: 127). 
Similarly, there does not seem to exist shared vision about what the new global 
order should be. BRICS have taken position in which diversity is considered as 
strength and this orientation can be described according to Cedring de Coning, 
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Thomas Mandrub and Liselotte Odgaard as “strategy of coexistence” (De Coning 
et al 2015: 3). However, the future BRICS members are supposed to bring in more 
concrete elements than culture and values. They are expected to offer increasing 
political influence and positive economic opportunities. In addition, when ana-
lysing possible future Muslim-majority BRICS member state, one should contex-
tualize multiple political and economic processes in connection with how one sees 
the role and the function of the BRICS as part of the larger configurations of the 
world order.  
In general, BRICS presents itself according to multiple official documents8 as the 
defender of Third World countries and the Global South being representative in 
various multilateral institutions such as UN, G20, the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) and the G77 (Gray and Gills 2016: 558; Thakur 2014: 1793). However, 
recently BRICS countries have gone through multiple internal and external trans-
formations that have weakened its coherence regarding previously mentioned 
aims. The regime change in Brazil, changes in leadership in South Africa and 
recent weakening economic performances gives rise to many questions regarding 
the orientation of its objectives. Meanwhile, China’s extensive Belt and Road In-
itiative (BRI) disrupted India’s economic and security interests pushing Delhi to 
further balance China’s influence with other regional and international powers 
such as US, EU and Japan. Therefore, BRICS, envisaged as a flexible institution 
that gives each member state space to proceed from of the standpoint of their 
individual interests, may be transforming or shrinking into geostrategic tool for 
China and Russia who are using it to develop their multilateral relations and in-
dividual interests. How other players, especially Muslim-majority countries, 
could benefit from that kind of BRICS? 
While BRICS, with good reason, has been hyped for being the motor of global 
change, there has also been recently some speculation about its decreasing im-
portance. Nevertheless, the critical stance of the current US administration under 
President Donald Trump regarding the multilateral processes and globalization in 
 
8 For example: Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries’ Leaders (Yekaterinburg, Russia, June 16 
2009). II BRIC Summit – Joint Statement (Brasilia, April 16 2010). The 2nd Meeting of the 
BRICS Trade and Economic Ministers: Joint Press Release (New Delhi, India,, March 28 2012). 
BRICS Leaders’ Informal Meeting on the margins of the G20 Summit (Hangzhou, China,, 
September 4 2016). Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs (New York, United States, 
September 20 2016). Joint Statement on BRICS Leaders’ Informal Meeting on the margins of 
G20 Summit (Osaka, Japan, June 28, 2019). 
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general as well as trade war with China leaves abundant space and roles for 
BRICS to play in the construction of multipolar or multiplex world order.9 Sim-
ultaneously, emerging countries have been able to gain economic and political 
weight within various regional transformations with declining importance of the 
US in the global world order (Acharya 2014; Rani and Kumar 2018; Roberts et 
al 2018: 5-8). 
Each BRICS member has right to conduct their own foreign policies based on 
their national interests (Beeson and Zeng 2018: 7-9). The role of the BRICS as 
platform to challenge the US hegemonic world order have suffered from internal 
competition (e.g. India versus China), regime changes (e.g. in Brazil), weakening 
economic performances as well as other international multilateral development 
distracting its horizontal and vertical formation. BRICS and its member states are 
functioning in close relation with other multilateral institutions (such as SCO or 
EEU e.g.) and if BRICS cannot re-establish its purpose and design, why should it 
establish the valuable platform for Muslim-majority countries such as Turkey or 
Indonesia? Iran, for example, under economic sanctions and the constant threat 
of US military intervention, is probably more interested in integration within se-
curity organizations such as SCO, not BRICS, unless it would provide some relief 
for economic hardship due to aggressive US sanctions. What opportunities, other 
than economic, BRICS membership would bring to Egypt, close to US, Israel and 
Saudi Arabia, main strongholds of US Middle East –policy? (Rachman 2016: 
156). 
This study is based on qualitative hermeneutic research approach that concen-
trates on subjective interpretations within textual analysis, which is the central 
part of theoretical framework of hermeneutics (Ormiston 1990: 4). Political and 
cultural discussion is reflected in the context of contemporary socio-political en-
vironment. BRICS is mainly understood through its official documents and other 
research based on BRICS, global governance, multilateralism and international 
relations in general. Therefore, this is not comparative economic study where eco-
nomic variables are measured in the context of compatible BRICS environment. 
Besides, various studies indicate that the structures of BRICS economies differ 
from each other as well (Rasoulinezhad and Jabalameli 2018). The main research 
 
9 Amitav Acharya (interviewed on 12.09.2018 in Tampere, Finland) argues that the concept of 
multipolar is inherently Eurocentric concept that springs from twentieth century European 
political thought. Acharya prefers to depict contemporary world order as multiplex due to its 
multiple levels, actors and their inter-dependency. 
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question is; how would the membership of a Muslim-majority country impact on 
BRICS’s global policy orientations, plurality and domestic policies within the 
theoretical framework of coexistence.  
 
Coexistence of the BRICS and possible future enlargement: what is 
BRICS?  
What is BRICS? The most obvious answer is that it is an organization that aims 
for new, more pluralistic world order that challenges US led hegemonic liberal 
order (Chun 2013; Stuenkel 2016; Kingah and Quiliconi 2016). However, it is in 
many ways unclear whether BRICS will develop in the future into deep economic 
alliance, political platform, union of emergent countries or something else. Future 
scenarios related to the BRICS are in many ways dependent on the transfor-
mations of wider international structures. World politics and international relation 
are constantly changing. The number of international actors, whether states, cit-
ies, institutions, groups or associations, functioning within multiplex world order 
have multiplied manifold. 
BRICS offers an interesting example of how diverse states, geopolitically and 
economically, can find orchestrated beneficial action in multiple societal levels. 
Cedric de Coning, Thomas Mandrub and Liselotte Odgaard have instrumental-
ized the concept of coexistence in their work: The BRICS and Coexistence: An 
alternative vision of world order (2015). They understand coexistence as a strat-
egy related to global governance that depicts the potential cooperation of five 
different countries, while they admit that BRICS members still lack “a fully de-
veloped common approach,” it helps to explicate the behavior of the individual 
member states (De Coning et al 2015: 4).  
From historical perspective, each country has its own ways to understand the con-
cept of coexistence. In general, coexistence is often understood as “brainchild” of 
the communist Eastern bloc and is seldom used in North American or European 
political literature (De Coning et al 2015: 5). Soviet Union styled “peaceful co-
existence” was highlighted by Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrush-
chev, in order to advance the pursued aim for worldwide proletarian revolution 
and gradual slip into Communist world (7-10). In India, the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence originating from Buddhism was realized through the Panch 
Shila agreement between India and China in 1954, and formed the basis of non-
alignment under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru; this became central to national 
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security strategy in relation to China (De Coning et al 2015: 10, 13). In Brazil the 
version of peaceful coexistence sprang from social injustices and aimed at an in-
dependent foreign policy within universalist framework, while in South Africa 
the concept has been used indirectly through Ubuntu and batho pele (De Coning 
et al 2015: 4, 11). What is of course relevant here is whether current BRICS coun-
tries share similar narrative of the concept of peaceful coexistence today and how 
far they are bound to follow its principles?  
Coexistence can be understood as antithesis of the political imposition and he-
gemony promoting “the emergence of a rule-based international system charac-
terized by the co-management of global order by states that may subscribe to dif-
ferent world views, different political systems and different approaches to 
economic and development policies” (De Coning et al 2015: 6). Compared to the 
so-called “Western”10 model, which assume shared understanding of universal 
values and norms that has been even used as an argument for military interven-
tions (Afghanistan, Iraq among others), it is easy to draw conclusions from its 
attractiveness among many states around the globe. According to de Coning et al. 
the BRICS strategy is related to normative peaceful coexistence seal in at least 
four principles (De Coning et al 2015: 18): 
• mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
• interference in the internal affairs of other states only within the 
framework of multilaterally agreed upon norms and rules; 
• mutual non-aggression, the legal equality of states; 
• promotion of mutual benefits and national development paths. 
 
10 I find the concept of the West problematic related to certain historical narrations that are often 
attached to it. Using of the concept may be practical in some occasions, but simultaneously 
reproduces power relations integrated to its narrative background. The concept of the West is 
challenging at least from four aspects. Its historical development narration cuts the 
Mediterranean Sea and distorts cultural context when dividing it into Europe, African and Asia. 
It is also problematic from the geographical perspective: where do we have to stand in the earth if 
we want to stand in the West? It is assumed to contain numerous values, such as freedom, 
equality and democracy that could be considered as heritage of the human history at large. 
Finally, it constructs an ambiguous political actor mainly combining US and EU, whose policies 
differ in multiple occasions, not first and foremost during the Presidency of Donald Trump. 
Likewise, I acknowledge that other such definitions such as Middle East, as an example, also seal 
in similar problematics. 
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This means mainly normative interpretation adapted within the BRICS itself in 
order to develop its internal cohesion. Constructing common narratives that 
would lead to strategy of coexistence face numerous practical challenges ahead. 
Individual interests may become obstacles in the near future, as for example may 
be the case between India and China in the context of Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) developed by China. It is also important to reflect the role philosophy of 
coexistence within BRICS as a platform, or as a component to strengthen the po-
sition of its member states in the complex network of other multilateral institu-
tions from Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to United Nations (UN).  
In the final declaration of the ninth BRICS summit held at Xiamen in 2017, the 
pluralism and diversity were stressed:  
We will embrace cultural diversity and promote people-to-people exchanges to 
garner more popular support for BRICS cooperation through deepened traditional 
friendships. We will expand people-to-people exchanges in all dimensions, en-
courage all fabrics of the society to participate in BRICS cooperation, promote 
mutual learning between our cultures and civilizations, enhance communication 
and mutual understanding among our peoples and deepen traditional friendships, 
thus making BRICS partnership closer to our people’s hearts (BRICS Leaders Xia-
men Declaration 2017). 
As the previous example shows, BRICS stresses on cultural diversity, which is 
considered as strength and mutual learning as an asset to intensify communication 
and understanding in order to find new ways to coexist and find synergies. While 
BRICS represents itself as a group of emergent economies and is open to diverse 
and versatile cultural approaches, it simultaneously aims at strengthening its soft 
power capability among various global actors, whether states, multilateral organ-
izations or ethnic groups (Stuenkel 2016; 2016a). The understanding of the scope 
of the soft power conducted by BRICS members is often misunderstood and un-
dermined in the US and EU. Keeping the door open to BRICS can also be con-
sidered as one example of soft power. For many countries, it is tempting idea to 
be part of the club of top emergent economic powers. Especially the explicit con-
notations of changing the contemporary world order towards more equal and plu-
ralist premises through diplomacy and promoting global security for the peoples 
in the South appeal to many Muslim-majority countries that feel being marginal-
ized in the current US led world structures. 
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Muslim minorities and BRICS internal and external policies 
In 2015, BRICS National Research Committee executive director Georgy 
Toloraya told in the press conference: “From my point of view, BRICS is not just 
an association of countries, it is rather a union of civilizations, and only an Islamic 
civilization is missing” (TASS 2015). In recent years, there has been increasing 
speculation whether one of the emerging economies from Muslim-majority coun-
tries could achieve full membership in BRICS. Toloraya continued: “The group 
is very young, and its expansion can lead to the situation in which the whole 
structure will just begin to fall apart, because there are quite a few disagreements 
between the countries. However, sooner or later, the issue of expansion will arise, 
and then Indonesia will be the first among candidates for joining” (TASS 2015). 
Muslim-majority member state could be an important and practical asset for 
BRICS regarding its various foreign policy orientations in the number of crisis 
taking place in the Middle East and Islamic world at large (Souaiaia 2013: 3). 
Since 2013, BRICS leader’ declarations contained direct chapters for various cri-
sis and military conflicts, such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, for example the 
BRICS eThekwini Declaration 2013. Arab-Israeli conflict and the Joint Compre-
hensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) related to Iranian nuclear issue, supported by 
BRICS, can be repeatedly found from the multiple BRICS declarations. There-
fore, this extending foreign policy tendency could be strengthened if the Islamic 
world could be more integrated within BRICS.  
Muslim or Muslim-majority country within BRICS could have relatively signifi-
cant impact regarding domestic policies of the current BRICS member states as 
well. Today, as many other countries in the world, the BRICS member states con-
tain important Muslim diaspora or Muslim background dwellers. The world’s 
second largest Muslim population, about 172 million meaning roughly 14 per cent 
on the country’s overall population, can be found from India. In China, resource-
rich province of Xinjiang with 22 million inhabitants includes over 50 per cent 
Turkic speaking Uyghurs and Tartars (Dorsey 2018: 241-242). Xinjiang is also 
important from the geographical context in relation to China’s vision of Eurasia 
and BRI. It is well known that Russia has engaged with Muslim populations in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia and have formed its own historical discourses on 
Islam and Islamism, where especially latter has been treated as internal security 
issue (Dannreuther 2010: 15-16). In Brazil and South Africa, Muslim diaspora 
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have not been as politicized as much as in India, China and Russia, but they all 
include Muslim minority populations.  
Recently, the Chechen wars in Russia, Chinese “re-education camps” in Xinjiang 
and the alleged Hindu nationalist government of Narendra Modi in India have 
instigated debate on Islamophobia in three major BRICS countries. Meanwhile 
Brazil is moving its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem with its new right-wing 
leader Jair Bolsanero, much to the dismay of the Islamic world. How do Muslim-
majority countries follow these occurrences and how do they impact on BRICS 
image as the defender of the Third World and the Global South? In 2015, when 
China allegedly banned Ramadan fasting in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous re-
gion, anti-Chinese demonstrations erupted in Turkey and were followed by the 
official visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in China (Atli 2018: 
103). However, when Erdogan met with Chinese President Xi Jingping in July 
2019, he stated: “It is a fact that the peoples of China’s Xinjiang region live hap-
pily in China’s development and prosperity. Turkey does not permit any person 
to incite disharmony in the Turkey-China relationship” (Escobar 2019). Does this 
imply that drawing a Muslim-majority country closer could prevent high level 
altercations and possibly even improve interaction with internal Muslim commu-
nities through mediation? 
Simultaneously, it is important to keep in mind that the Islamic implications 
should not be approached only from the negative perspective. Islam has played 
immense historical role in the past in relation with India, China and Russia. Islam 
arrived to India already in the seventh century among the Arab traders while the 
beginning of China-Arab trade can be located to the same century as well. Muslim 
Tartars have lived and coexisted for 400 years in Russia. Ottoman Empire and 
Imperial China were connected by trade, merchants and travelers. Ancient Silk 
Road reflects today’s BRI project. Amartya Sen repeatedly highlights the tolerant 
Mughal emperor Akbar and Iranian scholar Al-Biruni, whose writings about India 
in the beginning of eleventh century represent more positive picture of the Mus-
lims compared to, for example, European orientalist works during the period of 
colonization (Sen 2007). Historical encounters among Islam and BRICS countries 
are numerous while it is challenging not to underestimate the richness of versatile 
cultural and scientific heritage that has been achieved from this exchange. There-
fore, admission of Muslim-majority country to BRICS brings nothing new in the 
sense of cultural encounter from a historical perspective.  
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Regardless of ideological or religious tendencies, whether communism in China, 
Hinduism in India or Islam with possible new member state, BRICS corresponds 
to the main doctrines of international capitalism and market economy, which 
function within international political structures. However, what needs to be 
asked is that if we consider BRICS as an economic actor, which adapts capitalist 
economic performances, does it engender complication for Islamic moral philos-
ophy, even if such a coherent position among the Muslims could even exist in the 
first place? Is there contradiction between Islam and capitalism? According to 
Maxime Rodinson and his extensive study Islam and Capitalism that was pub-
lished already in the 1966, the answer would be no. The Muslim-majority coun-
tries as well as the religion of Islam in general take favourable position regarding 
capitalism and free trade, which has been used for the conduction of economic 
policies among the Muslim, or Muslim-majority, countries both in the past as well 
as in contemporary world (Rodinson 1973; Gran 1998).  
According to Rodinson, Islam is compatible with capitalism, depending on, of 
course, how capitalism is defined. Rodinson argues that “[T]he Sunnah has, quite 
obviously, nothing more to say than the Koran on the subject of capitalism. As 
for private property, it does not challenge this” (Rodinson 1973: 15). According 
to Sulayman Nyang, Islam has through centuries stretched out to embrace private 
property: “Under shari’a, property may be acquired in three ways: by iktisab 
(earning), wiratha (inheritance), and hiba (gift)” and Qur’an also explicitly 
stresses that right for private property is enjoyed by both women and men (Nyang 
2002: 103). However, the Koran includes passages that condemn “increase” or 
“interest” (riba), which means that usury, injustice or exploitation is forbidden. 
Rodinson understand the development of capitalism as initial stages including 
societal and institutional premises; whether Islam has an effect on these processes 
is another question that require another research and discussion elsewhere 
(Rodinson 1973: 4-7). In addition, Muslim-majority countries are already deeply 
involved within the capitalist economic practices through states as well as through 
various international institutions. 
In this context, it is also interesting to ask, whether more or less capitalist (or pre-
capitalist as Marx argues) forms of economic conduct existed even before indus-
trial revolution and should we be worried how ancient cultures deal with it? Fer-
nand Braudel has argued that capitalism has existed as long as there have been 
human beings (Braudel 1981-1984) while Ibn Khaldun’s famous book 
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Muqaddimah (1370), integrates various economic theories, conditions and inves-
tigations showing deep capitalist practices before the period of industrialization 
(Weiss 1995). There are, of course, resourceful interpretations on the subject and 
related discussions on arrival of capitalist practices to Egypt, for example, con-
necting the development of capitalism and rise of the bourgeoisie systematically 
to Enlightenment thought (Chakrabarty 2000: 30). Peter Gran argued in his well-
known book Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760-1840 (1979) that Napole-
onic invasion to Egypt in 1798 was not the watershed for the birth of capitalism 
in the country as much as the output of the ulama during 1760-1840 that enabled 
the development of secularism supportive of capitalism in the country. In that 
sense, he argues, the situation in Mediterranean Egypt was not so much different 
from Italy or Spain (Gran 1998: xvi ). He also criticized the over-emphasis of the 
agency of Europe, or the so-called “West”, in the development of the initial stages 
that are often believed necessary to lead into capitalist production, which may 
imply that processes of multiple and multi-staged development should be ob-
served more carefully.  
 
Indonesia, Turkey, Iran and Egypt: Future BRICS members? 
We now need to consider how to approach Islam and Islamic civilization, which 
stretches from Morocco to Indonesia, and reflect its implication to BRICS in the 
context of peaceful coexistence? Departing from the Huntingtonian civilizational 
paradigm or disposition related to ummah (supra-national community) versus na-
tion-state, I decide to concentrate on Muslim or Muslim-majority states integrat-
ing Islam within state practices and dimension as social phenomenon. I seek to 
understand Islam as social phenomenon that changes over time and place, i.e. as 
a dynamic phenomenon. For example, political Islam has played different roles 
in Turkey before and during the Erdogan’s period in power. In the past, the lead-
ership has had significant impact in Egypt and Iran as well. In Indonesia, nation-
hood has always rested on pre-existing sense of Islamic ecumenism (Laffan 
2003). 
What is more, BRICS officially consists of states, not regional or local cultures, 
religions or ethnicities, though they are elements connected to state affairs. There-
fore, it is more fruitful to contemplate Muslim or Muslim-majority state individ-
ually. After shifting through information from the academic publications, internet 
articles and official statements, the most prominent candidates that came out were 
Indonesia and Turkey, but some discussion was also centred round whether Iran, 
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Egypt or even Algeria could join the BRICS. In December 2018, the speculation 
for Algeria joining11 was also raised in public for the first time (Fethi 2018). Af-
ghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq and Syria have all expressed their willingness to join 
the BRICS, though they can offer quite little. 
However, I chose Indonesia, Turkey, Iran and Egypt for closer examination from 
political and economic basis. I am interested in how their membership could af-
fect the plurality and coexistence of BRICS, and how their joining would trans-
form their economic and political position as well. This necessitates reflection on 
various economic statistics as well as debates and writings within the context of 
hermeneutic premises instead of concentrating too strictly on economic variables, 
which is challenging due to lack of accurate data.  
However, I start my analysis bringing in discussions related to normative demo-
cratic practices related to possibilities to intensify dimensions of soft power and 
international reputation. While it is possible to question the importance of democ-
racy in this context, I argue that systems that mobilize the whole population as 
eligible members of state societies strengthen political and economic premises. 
How democratic structures and transparency echo when discussing about internal 
state policies in Indonesia, Turkey, Iran and Egypt? Does it matter when discuss-
ing about their entrance to BRICS? I would say no. How democratic is BRICS 
and its member states? 
Ziya Öniş and Alper Şükrü Gençer have argued that regardless of the fact that 
Brazil, South Africa and India can be considered as consolidated democracies, 
their capacity to function as role models due to their domestic challenges prevent 
them for acting as democratic examples to other emerging countries in different 
regions (Öniş and Gençer 2018: 2). In addition, Russia and China are rarely 
praised for their transparency, democratic performances and reforms. Meanwhile 
liberal democracy as such has recently been challenged by several authoritarian 
performances around the world. This of course decreases the pressure from po-
tential new BRICS member, because in general the normative democratic endeav-
ours do not play significant role within BRICS official rhetoric, while they are 
neither absent from the official declarations (BRICS Leaders Xiamen Declaration 
 
11 Algeria could also be serious candidate due to its economic investments, geographic and 
political role in the Mediterranean between Africa and Europe, close relations with BRICS 
countries and common foreign policy goals. 
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2017; BRICS Leaders Johannesburg Declaration 2018). Still, BRICS stresses the 
plurality instead of homogeny related to governmental structures.  
I argue that political and economic inputs are of major significance when contem-
plating the possible future BRICS member states. Political implications encapsu-
late foreign policy benefits and shared interests, but also carry impacts on domes-
tic policies of the BRICS countries themselves. Positive economic performances 
and potential advantages are also crucial in order to sustain image of the BRICS 
as alliance of emergent economic states. In general, Indonesia and Turkey have 
been considered as the most prominent candidates, Iran and Egypt less so due to 
their political instabilities and weaker economic performances. The country in-
terested to join BRICS should not only sustain stable and strong economic growth 
but also show political will to challenge, or at least reform the current, so-called, 
liberal US led world order. Meanwhile, the economic growth of the current 
BRICS countries have shown gradual slowdown (especially in Brazil and Russia) 
while the consequences related to the trade war between US and China are still 
unclear and may cause serious challenges for emergent economies as well as for 
the international trade at large. However, BRICS countries are still expected to 
contribute substantially to future global economic growth (McKinley 2018). 
Among the four countries, Iran seems to be most willing to join from the political 
aspect. It has been suffering from US sanctions before and after the so-called 
JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), as well as from the geopolitical 
competition with Saudi Arabia and its led coalition. Iran is sporadically threat-
ened by US, Israeli and Sunni-alignment led military intervention. While China 
played more substantive role in Iran nuclear activities mediation than generally 
recognized, it is also well known that China’s interest in maintaining good rela-
tions with US outweighs the Sino-Iranian interests (Garver 2018: 123, 129). The 
Iran-US standoff may weaken significantly Iran’s possibility to join BRICS due 
to economic sanctions and risk of ending up into military confrontation with the 
world’s strongest military force. Therefore, Iran seems to be merely heading to-
wards multilateral platforms such as SCO, which can provide more security re-
lated assurance. There have also been attempts to bring BRICS and SCO closer 
to each other, which may weaken the argument that US hostile policies towards 
Iran would harm its possible candidacy for BRICS. 
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Meanwhile Iran has multiple possibilities to transform itself into attractive ally 
for BRICS through relevance in China led BRI-project and being valuable partner 
in regard of Russian Middle East policies. US sanctions on Iran has hurt its econ-
omy and driven Iran to look further to the East. It is still difficult to know to what 
extent, but it has forced Iran simultaneously to be more responsive to Sino-Rus-
sian interests. Iran’s economy has suffered from the sanctions. Its inflation rate 
was in April 2019 up to 37.2, while GDP growth -6. Therefore, it is clear that with 
its economy in recession Iran would definitely not be the country that could be 
connected to represent emergent economies (https://www.imf.org/en/Coun-
tries/IRN).  
Political orientation of Indonesia has been a question mark. There has been some 
speculation that its foreign policy interest is close to China (McBeth 2017); how-
ever, Indonesia is still able to conduct neutral policies, which permit more inde-
pendent political latitude. Indonesia seems to incorporate similar strategies as the 
BRICS, especially as Brazil with its interpretation of universalism related to co-
existence: being friends with everybody results more freedom of action (Abdenur 
2015: 49-50). 
One should be careful to make too hasty conclusions, however. Indonesia has 
transformed from authoritarian state to working democracy, according to various 
experts, and has been mostly safe from world economic crisis of 2008 (Brooks 
2011). Meanwhile, Indonesia has bad experience of being sidelined during cold 
war and may want to secure its political autonomy in the near future. However, if 
India, which has been able to maintain its autonomy within BRICS regarding its 
security interests in Indian Ocean and cooperation with US, EU, Japan and Aus-
tralia, why would not multiethnic Indonesia be able to sustain the same margin? 
It is also too early to speculate, whether G-20 and ASEAN would be enough for 
Indonesia. From economic point of view, Indonesia contains major consumer 
markets and could be easily one of the members and form BRIICS. According to 
Oliver Stuenkel, Indonesia would be China’s bet (Stuenkel 2017). Indonesia’s 
economy has been dynamic since at least 2010s with GDP growth of 5.2 and 
inflation rate 3.3 in April 2019 (https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/IRN). 
Turkey and Egypt have been considered as close allies to US, whether from mil-
itary or economic perspectives. However, Trump administration have further ac-
celerated the political drift with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government though US-
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Turkey relations started to deteriorate already under the Presidency of Barack 
Obama. In July 2018, Erdogan was invited to BRICS annual summit in Johannes-
burg as the term chair of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). There 
Erdogan stated: “If you take us in the name of the platform would become 
BRICST,” suggesting adding a ‘T’ to BRICS (Munyar 2018). Erdogan also 
stated: “Especially China says that it stands in favor of enlargement. I have seen 
that they are considering involving other countries in this platform. They are not 
opposed to it” (Munyar 2018). Erdogan stressed the willingness of Turkey to enter 
to BRICS: “We are in the G-20 with five of those countries. I wish they take the 
necessary steps to let us in and we take our place in the BRICS” (Munyar 2018). 
Gokhan Bacik argued few years back that Turkey could not be considered as se-
rious BRICS candidate (Bacik 2013). Today, Turkey has emerged as one of the 
most serious future candidates and it seems to have many interests in joining. 
However, the plunge of the Turkish currency Lira, inflation rate at 17.5, economic 
growth -2.5 in recession and confrontation with Trump administration may either 
speed up BRICST or forestall the process (https://www.imf.org/en/Coun-
tries/TUR).  
Since Egyptian President Anwar Sadat cut ties with Soviet Union after the Yom 
Kippur War in the mid-1970s and concluded peace treaty with Israel, it has be-
come one of the biggest US economic aid receivers. Even though Egypt was in-
vited to join BRICS Xiamen annual meeting in 2017, only few believe in Egypt’s 
chances, whether due to political or economic reasons, even though latest reforms 
have improved the situation. While Egypt has deepened its military cooperation 
with Russia offering the latter to use its air bases, Egypt is still seen as firm ally 
of US. Could Egypt be trusted by BRICS states in its struggle for change in global 
governance? Egypt could bring important benefits due to its geographical position 
in the crossroads of the Middle East, Africa and Mediterranean. However, eco-
nomic performance (GDP growth 5.5 and inflation rate 14.5) and political stabil-
ity is still under scrutiny. Many remember when in 2011 President Hosni Mubarak 
was overthrown with millions of Egyptians gathering in Tahrir Square regardless 
of almost similar economic conditions. Since then, Egypt has drifted into even 
further dependence of Saudi funding, another major US ally in the Middle East, 
in order to keep socio-economic issues in control. In many ways, I consider Egypt 
as weakest runner among these four afore mentioned candidates due to its politi-
cal orientation. 
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EU and BRICS are in many ways different platforms and institutions. The rapid 
EU enlargement, or even over-enlargement, have raised question of the relations 
between functionality, promotion of homogeneity and expansion (Petersson 
2018). Does BRICS want to repeat possible mistakes conducted by the EU? For 
example, India may have various interests to oppose further enlargement of the 
BRICS that may benefit China’s BRI initiative and strengthen the position of Pa-
kistan, rival of India especially due to Kashmir conflict. India, with largest Mus-
lim minority population, is observing closely the Islamic implication to BRICS 
and its geopolitical implications to its geopolitical interests. China would need 
stable Xinjiang for its BRI project. Turkey would possibly have the best influence 
on Uighur populations and latest arms trade with Russia complicates its member-
ship in NATO, which could strengthen its possible future entrance in BRICS. 
However, Turkey has to improve its economic performances in order to be con-
sidered as emerging economy. 
 
Conclusions 
It is difficult to estimate the possible future enlargement of the BRICS. It depends 
on how BRICS and the world develop, what role is left for BRICS in the current 
multiplex multilateral world order and how political and economic structures de-
velop. It is also challenging to reflect possible future changes that may impact on 
economies, governmental structures and foreign policy orientations in four pos-
sible candidates: Indonesia, Turkey, Iran and Egypt. It is also extremely challeng-
ing to foresee how the economies of the current BRICS member states (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) develop in the near future, not least due to 
raging trade war between US and China.  
Simultaneously, it is important to remember that BRICS may enlarge without 
Muslim-majority members as well. It is important to examine closely the require-
ments, fulfillments and contemporary gains of South Africa and its membership 
in BRICS. The next possible future candidacy may follow from lessons learned 
from the process, which led to membership of South Africa. How would the mem-
bership of a Muslim-majority country impact on BRICS’s global policy orienta-
tions, plurality and domestic policies within the theoretical framework of coexist-
ence? I have approached the relation between BRICS and Islam from 
philosophical, cultural, economic and political aspect in the context of under-
standing of the concept of coexistence among BRICS member states. I argue that 
it is challenging to reflect on the role and effect of large and versatile non-static 
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world religion, such as Islam, to multilateral organization such as BRICS. There-
fore, I have moved to analyse how political and economic invariables of Indone-
sia, Turkey, Iran and Egypt, instead of religion could influence on internal and 
foreign policies of the current BRICS member states. In addition, I have added 
economic discussion that is most likely the fundamental question for the potential 
future membership, more so than religious impact, I would argue.  
I have stressed that BRICS underlines the appreciation of diversity of its mem-
bers. Opening a door for a Muslim or Muslim-majority state could bring eco-
nomic, political and social benefits whether from national or international per-
spectives. However, scenarios of the future BRICS will determine most likely the 
development of its enlargement: does BRICS aim for more integration or more 
independence? I argue that Islam as such is not an obstacle for a Muslim-majority 
country to enter the BRICS. Having a member state that represents Muslim-ma-
jority within its population would send substantial message for the international 
Muslim community and gain more support for BRICS through multiple multilat-
eral processes. From the domestic policy perspective, Muslim-majority BRICS 
member state would possibly increase stability within Muslim minorities in Rus-
sia, China and India, because negotiations could be held in high-level meetings 
using BRICS as channel. Religious aspects do matter in the process and cannot 
be, I argue, neglected. Islam as a religion, remembering its diversity, is global 
cultural framework that combines Muslims around the world through various 
shared practices, dispositions and beliefs. However, that would not denote deter-
ministically that any of the characterizations would set cultural obstacles from the 
perspective of the peaceful coexistence.  
It seems that due to political and economic reasons, Indonesia is at this stage the 
most prominent Muslim-majority state set to join BRICS in case of its enlarge-
ment. Turkey, Iran and Egypt do not seem to fulfill at present the economic and 
political requirements that could transform them into profitable members. Re-
garding individual interests of China, Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa, bet-
ter multilateral tools exist regarding the integration of Iran and Egypt, such as 
SCO or AU. Simultaneously, it is important to keep in mind that BRICS may not 
be the most relevant organization for Indonesia, Turkey, Iran or Egypt to maintain 
their international interests with emerging powers. The Hub of multilateral insti-
tutions, such as SCO, NDB, AIIB, G20, ASEAN or AU, may already offer 
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enough leverage to conduct wanted political and economic interests of the afore-
said countries. 
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 Regional Organizations and the Management of 
the Conflict in Burundi: Too Many Players? 
Élise Féron* 
Abstract  
As one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world, the Great Lakes Region of Africa 
is characterized by the presence and influence of a plethora of regional organizations with 
different focuses, divergent objectives and often competing interests. These variations are 
particularly obvious and deep in the field of conflict prevention, management and reso-
lution. In cases such as the ongoing political and institutional conflict in Burundi, as we 
will see, the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) have at times defended 
broadly similar approaches based on crisis diplomacy and peacekeeping, while other or-
ganizations such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) or 
the East African Community (EAC) have frequently been pushing for different, “softer”, 
options. The recurrent Burundian crisis has also sometimes given birth to ad hoc regional 
conflict management alliances, defending yet again different conflict resolution strate-
gies.  
Building on the ongoing Burundian case study, and on the various attempts at conflict 
resolution launched by various global, continental and regional actors, this contribution 
asks what the role of regional organizations as conflict management actors in the African 
context can be. For instance, what can the role of these organizations be, as compared to 
the UN? What kinds of constraints are they facing, and on the contrary what kinds of 
assets do they have, as compared to more global organizations? And how do interventions 
led by regional actors redefine, if at all, the interplay between regionalism and multilat-
eralism? The contribution shows that military and political conflicts can put regional or-
ganizations in a competition situation, and that concerned individual states can strategi-
cally play regional actors against one another in order to further their specific national 
interests. In parallel, the Burundian case seems to signal a potential shift in how political 
crises in the Global South are managed, since “solutions” to the Burundian crisis have 
been mostly put forward by regional actors, either neighbouring states or regional organ-
izations, and not by western powers. 
Keywords: Burundi, African Union, conflict management, East African Community, re-
gional diplomacy  
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Introduction 
As one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world, the Great Lakes Region 
of Africa is characterized by the presence and influence of a plethora of regional 
organizations with different focuses, divergent objectives and often competing 
interests. These variations are particularly obvious and deep in the field of conflict 
prevention, management and resolution. In cases such as the ongoing political 
and institutional conflict in Burundi, as we will see, the African Union (AU) and 
the United Nations (UN) have at times defended broadly similar approaches based 
on crisis diplomacy and peacekeeping, while other organizations such as the In-
ternational Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) or the East African 
Community (EAC) have frequently been pushing for different, “softer”, options. 
The recurrent Burundian crisis has also at times given birth to ad hoc regional 
conflict management alliances, defending yet again different conflict resolution 
strategies. 
Such disparities are not surprising considering that regional organizations might 
have different goals and perspectives than global ones, and that each regional or-
ganization can also have specific concerns and interests regarding the ongoing 
conflict. In addition, it is worth remembering that peace-building is sometimes 
described as a “crowded” stage (Kabutaulaka 2006), where the multiplicity of 
intervening actors can create frictions and generate tensions. These tensions are, 
in particular in the case of interventions in the Global South, notably related to 
the fact that peace-building and conflict management are highly contested no-
tions, with much criticism directed at the colonial taint of peace-building ap-
proaches advocated by global organizations such as the UN. This is particularly 
true of critiques addressed to the liberal peace model (see, among many others: 
Richmond 2010; Campbell, Chandler and Sabaratnam 2011; Richmond and Mac 
Ginty 2014). Similarly, the ways in which the “international community” has 
been imposing specific representations of how peace and stability should look 
like (Goetschel and Hagmann 2009) have been heavily criticized. At the concep-
tual level, these debates have given birth to the notion of “hybrid peace” putting 
the focus on global-local encounters during interventions and peace-building op-
erations (see for instance Millar 2014), and acknowledging the agency of local 
actors, including of regional organizations. At the empirical level, these critiques 
have bolstered the legitimacy, and fostered the development of peace interven-
tions led by local and regional actors. 
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The interventionism of regional organizations seems to question the balance that 
had been established at the end of the Second World War, and that had survived 
until the end of the cold war. There is undoubtedly a wish for collaboration and 
complementarity between the global and regional scales in the field of conflict 
management, but these wishes seem to be too complicated to put into practice. 
Building on the ongoing Burundian case study, and on the various attempts at 
conflict resolution launched by different global, continental and regional actors, 
this chapter asks what could be the role of regional organizations as conflict man-
agement actors in the African context. For instance, what can the role of these 
organizations be, as compared to the UN? What kinds of constraints are they fac-
ing, and on the other hand, what kinds of assets do they have, as compared to 
more global organizations? And how do interventions led by regional actors re-
define, if at all, the interplay between regionalism and multilateralism? The chap-
ter shows that military and political conflicts can put regional organizations in a 
competition situation, and that concerned individual states can strategically play 
regional actors against one another in order to further their specific national in-
terests. In parallel, the Burundian case seems to signal a potential shift in how 
political crises in the Global South are managed, since “solutions” to the Burun-
dian crisis have been mostly put forward by regional actors, either neighbouring 
states or regional organizations, and not by western powers such as the former 
colonial power Belgium, France, or the European Union.  
The chapter focuses specifically on the intervention of continental and regional 
actors in Burundi, and to a lesser extent on the UN, and therefore does not detail 
the multiple local and national initiatives that have also been launched in order to 
solve the conflict. After a presentation of the background and current situation in 
Burundi, the chapter examines the conflict management and resolution capacities 
of African regional organizations. It subsequently explores past and ongoing Af-
rican-based initiatives for the resolution of the Burundian conflict, highlighting 
their limits and contradictions. Finally, the chapter draws lessons from this case 
study, identifying problems and shortcomings in current regional interventions, 
and calling for a better articulation between conflict management and resolution 
initiatives implemented by global and regional actors. 
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Presentation of the situation in Burundi 
Burundi has been going through various episodes of civil war over the past fifty 
years. This lasting instability has resulted in a Human Development Index value 
of 0,417 in 2017, which ranks the country in the low human development category 
and puts it at the 185th position out of 188 countries (UNDP 2018). The ongoing 
conflict is primarily based on an ethnic division which can be traced back to co-
lonial rule, but also on what could be described as bad governance practices, and 
very wide corruption. Before the colonial powers—first Germany and then Bel-
gium after World War I— ruled the region which today constitutes Burundi, the 
area was characterized by peaceful ethnic coexistence. The more numerous Hutu, 
engaged in farming and the cattle breeding Tutsi, which migrated to Burundi 
some centuries after the Hutu, developed in the same direction.12 By the time col-
onization began, both groups used the same language, and shared the same culture 
and religion. Burundi was a monarchy with a strong socio-political order in which 
the Tutsi minority occupied the highest positions and held most of the responsi-
bilities. It is however worth noting that the political system was not completely 
inaccessible for the Hutu, and that the ethnic categories were rather fluid (Uvin 
1999). Nevertheless, during that time, the country preserved stability and did not 
witness the kind of ethnic violence that it has been experiencing since its inde-
pendence (Ndikumana 2005). 
Relations between the ethnic groups began to change during the colonial period. 
The colonial rulers governed through the monarchy and the Tutsi; education and 
employment opportunities were mainly reserved for them. Even though the for-
mal social structure was maintained during the colonial time, inequality and bi-
ases grew (Ndikumana 2005; Uvin 1999). Burundi reached its independence from 
Belgium on July 1, 1962. As Vandeginste (2014) points out, the transition process 
towards independence was not primarily characterized by ethnic tensions. How-
ever, the subsequent outbursts of violence can be understood as the result of long-
lasting discrimination and inequality between the different ethnic groups, initially 
in favour of the Tutsi. The military overthrow of the monarchist rule in November 
1966 and the implementation of a single party (UPRONA: Union et Progrès 
 
12 Today’s ethnic structure reveals a huge Hutu majority (approx. 85 per cent), approx. 14 per cent 
Tutsi and roughly one per cent Twa (Uvin 1999; Vandeginste 2014). These statistics have however 
to be treated with caution, because of the relatively large number of interethnic marriages. Most 
Burundians are Christians, mainly members of the Catholic Church. The country also counts a 
growing Muslim minority. 
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National) system concurred with an increasing division along ethnic lines 
(Vandeginste 2014). The period after the military coup and the end of the monar-
chy witnessed various episodes of ethnic cleansing and even genocide. 
The civil war in its latest manifestation started in October 1993 after the assassi-
nation of the first democratically-elected Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye from 
the Hutu-dominated FRODEBU party (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi). 
The assassination led to massive violence and massacres against the Tutsi, with 
some 20,000 killed. This violent outburst was also fueled by the Hutu’s experi-
ence of the 1972 ethnic cleansing against their own group, and their desire for 
revenge may have intensified the eruption of violence (Lemarchand 1998). Once 
again the army violently restored order and thousands Hutu fell victim to this. In 
the three months following the military intervention, 50,000 to 100,000 people 
were killed and around one million were internally displaced or fled the country. 
In 1994, the plane transporting the Burundian president Ntaryamira and the 
Rwandan president Habyarimana was hit by a missile, subsequently killing both 
presidents. This event triggered the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in the neigh-
bouring country Rwanda, with approximately 800,000 predominantly Tutsi vic-
tims. A power-sharing agreement between the two parties FRODEBU (mainly 
Hutu) and UPRONA (mainly Tutsi) prevented the conflict from turning as lethal 
in Burundi (Omeje and Hepner 2013), although there were many casualties there 
too. Armed extremist groups, both Hutu and Tutsi, started a resistance war. The 
main rebel groups were CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL, both with a Hutu 
interest-based agenda. Unlike prior violent clashes in Burundi, a more traditional 
kind of conflict started, with opposing armed forces and affecting wide areas of 
the country (Bundervoet, Verwimp and Akresh 2009). Despite difficult estima-
tions, scholars say that between 1994 and 2001, at least 200,000 people were 
killed (Bundervoet, Verwimp and Akresh 2009). 
Since that time, the country has been experiencing rampant instability. Democra-
tization process and attempts to reduce the importance of belonging to particular 
ethnic group could not close the gap between the opposing groups. The political 
system has also been characterized by weakness and corruption. After being put 
in power in 2005 following the Arusha Peace Agreement signed in 2000, the cur-
rent president Pierre Nkurunziza won another presidential term in 2010, with his 
party the Hutu-dominated CNDD-FDD. Subsequently, in 2015, he again won a 
disputed election to get into office for a third five-year term, although the 
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constitution only allowed for two terms. Pierre Nkurunziza claimed that he had 
the right to run for a third term as a president, since his first period in office (2005-
2010) resulted from an election by lawmakers and not by universal suffrage. A 
short while before the election, Nkurunziza faced an attempted military coup, 
which was defeated, but which led to multiple purges and to widespread repres-
sion of political opponents. Since then, the political and security situation in Bu-
rundi has been very tense. Human Rights Watch in its 2019 report about Burundi 
(Human Rights Watch 2019) describes political violence, widespread intimida-
tion, murders, torture, and abuses, committed inter alia by the ruling party CNDD-
FDD’s youth organization Imbonerakure. In September 2017, a panel of investi-
gators set up by the United Nations Human Rights Council produced a report 
where they describe alleged crimes against humanity, and call for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) to open an inquiry about the situation in Burundi. 
Considering the fact that Burundi has withdrawn from the ICC in October 2017, 
the chances of such an enquiry to take place are slim. 
In face of the continued opposition by civil society actors both within the country 
and in exile, the regime has radicalized and intensified repression against oppo-
nents. The government has also obtained a revision of the constitution that de 
facto gets rid of key power-sharing arrangements between Hutu and Tutsi estab-
lished by the Arusha peace agreement, and extends the presidential mandate from 
5 to 7 years. The climate in the country is characterized by fear and rampant vio-
lence, as well as by increased poverty and deprivation. Burundi is now amongst 
the poorest countries in the world, and shortages of food, petrol, electricity and 
clean water are daily occurrences, both in large cities and in the countryside. More 
than 400,000 Burundians—among them, most of the opposition’s leaders, the 
civil society leaders, and of the intellectual elite—have fled repression and pov-
erty, mostly to Tanzania, the DRC and Rwanda, but also to Belgium and other 
European countries. Numerous others have been killed or have disappeared; offi-
cial estimates vary between 500 and 2,500 people violently killed since spring 
2015, not counting the thousands who have disappeared. 
As we will see, several peace initiatives have been recently launched by regional, 
continental and global actors in order to deescalate the crisis. The UN, the AU, 
the EAC, the ICGLR as well as other regional actors, alongside various neigh-
bouring countries, individually or collectively, have all been involved in these 
attempts. Yet, so far, all these initiatives have failed to produce visibly positive 
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results, and have proved insufficient for pushing the Burundian Government to 
negotiate with the opposition or to ease the government-led repression on the op-
position and on civil society organizations. The following sections explore the 
role played by various organizations or actors involved in these initiatives, and in 
particular African regional organizations, and highlights potential reasons for 
their failure. 
 
African regional organizations and the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts 
African regional organizations have a mixed track-record when it comes to con-
flict prevention, management and resolution (see for instance Enuka and Nwagbo 
2016). While some have been rather successful in this field, others have been 
mostly ineffective (Nathan 2010: 2). One of the main reasons for these mixed 
results is that as interstate institutions, regional organizations depend on their 
members’ consensus and willingness to intervene and to solve a specific conflict. 
And unlike the UN, most do not have structures like the UN Security Council and 
its permanent members. The UN Security Council can notably be used to create 
a momentum for intervention even when there is no consensus among all member 
states, although of course consensus within the UN Security Council is often dif-
ficult to achieve too. As we will see, other factors have impeded regional organi-
zations’ involvement in conflict management, most notably financial limitations 
and power struggles between their member states. 
The UN has long sought to encourage, but also to control, the intervention of 
regional organizations in the management of conflicts in their areas of compe-
tence, in a wish to ensure the complementarity of multilateralism and regionalism 
(see, for instance, UN 2005). In its provisions for “Regional Arrangements” 
(Chapter VIII), the UN Charter supports and authorizes regional organizations to 
deal with the maintenance of regional peace and security as long as they respect 
the principles of the UN (article 52). According to the UN Charter, regional or-
ganizations wishing to intervene can either refer the concerned conflict(s) to the 
UN Security Council (article 53), or set up peace enforcement or peacekeeping 
missions after getting the UN Security Council’s authorization. As remarked by 
Söderbaum and Tavares, “the main purpose of regional agencies, in this perspec-
tive, is to contribute to a multilateral system controlled by the UN Security Coun-
cil” (2009: 74). However, during the 1990s regional organizations have started to 
emancipate themselves from the UN’s guardianship, and have taken an 
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increasingly proactive role in peace and conflict issues (Diehl 2008). It is also 
worth noting that article 53 has sometimes been interpreted in a flexible way by 
the UN, which has at times given its retroactive approval for regionally-led inter-
ventions (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2014: 4). 
In addition, two parallel and interconnected processes explain that regional or-
ganizations have gained more prominence in the management of conflicts: on the 
one hand, a certain fatigue has developed at the UN level with regards to peace-
keeping operations, as well as a pressure, coming in particular from the United 
States, for decreasing funds allocated to UN peace operations (Mir 2019); on the 
other hand, regional organizations themselves have increased their own capacities 
for intervening in conflict areas, as they are gradually creating relevant mecha-
nisms and capacities in the field of conflict prevention, management and resolu-
tion (see, for instance, Siradag 2012). These two factors have ushered a gradual, 
though limited, shift towards regional, rather than global, mechanisms of conflict 
management. This partial shift is well documented and supported in the existing 
literature, which often defends the idea that regional organizations can be effec-
tive actors for peace, notably because, as “partial insiders” (Skau, Bercovitch and 
Elgström 2003), they have a good knowledge of the local conditions and suscep-
tibilities. However, as we will explore in the next sections, this close knowledge 
has also limited their effectiveness, because regional organizations are often seen 
as partial and biased by the concerned member states. 
As a continent, Africa hosts a multitude of regional organizations, currently num-
bering 39, that are more or less active, whose memberships overlap, and whose 
competences range from the economy, to energy-related issues, to peace and se-
curity, and to the environment. Many of these organizations exist in name only, 
and do not have the capacity to be important political or military actors. Some, as 
we will see, are also undermined by internal cleavages and personal animosities. 
Eight regional organizations have privileged relations with the AU, the main con-
tinental organization: the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Com-
munity of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD),and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). In addition, 
the main regional organizations that take an active role in conflict prevention and 
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management are the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR), the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), and the G5 Sahel. That there 
are so many regional organizations in Africa can be explained by different rea-
sons, pertaining notably to the size of the continent, to its internal diversity, and 
also to its colonial history. As well shown by Melasuo (2019), regionalization 
patterns in Africa are indeed largely related to its colonial past, and determined 
by attempts of former colonial powers to retain influence on the continent.  
At first sight, African regional organizations are above all used for economic pur-
poses, and many of them push for a closer regional economic integration. Political 
issues do not usually figure at the top of their agendas, but over the past two dec-
ades many of them have also been involved in the prevention, containment, man-
agement and resolution of African conflicts. African regional organizations as 
well as their member states have indeed a vested interest in participating in these 
peace-building activities, as designing and implementing interventions in conflict 
areas helps them to produce a certain international image, and to shape and rein-
force their regional alliances (Wodrig 2014). But most of these developments oc-
curred first and foremost because of the sheer number of conflicts occurring on 
the continent, as well as because of the high risk of spillover that many of these 
have been inducing.  
The gradual strengthening of the AU, the continental organization, can be inter-
preted as a sign of the African countries’ wish to take a more active role in peace 
and security issues. A successor of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) es-
tablished in 1963, the AU was formally launched in 2002. One of its main objec-
tives is to “promote peace, security, and stability on the continent” (African Union 
2000). Admittedly, the OAU had already been interested in conflict management, 
and had even ushered a major ideological shift during the 1990s, when the insti-
tution moved from a “non-intervention” to a “non-indifference” doctrine (Wil-
liams 2006). The AU pursued this evolution, notably by setting up various mech-
anisms in the field of conflict prevention, management and resolution. More 
specifically, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which was es-
tablished when the AU replaced the OAU, is seen as a potentially effective but 
still weak framework for promoting peace and security in the African continent 
(Vines 2013). The APSA comprises several institutions, most notably the Peace 
and Security Council (PSC) created in 2004. Its creation embodies the belief that 
the AU as a regional power holds the main responsibility for keeping peace in 
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Africa. The APSA also encompasses institutions such as the African Union Com-
mission, the Panel of the Wise, the Military Staff Committee, the Continental 
Early Warning System, the African Peace Fund and the African Standby Force. 
Interestingly, most of the mechanisms set up by African regional organizations in 
the field of peace and security either mirror, or are tightly articulated with, those 
put in place by the African Union. For instance, among all African regional or-
ganizations, ECOWAS is often described as the most effective for resolving con-
flicts (see, for instance, Khadiagala 2018). ECOWAS’s actions in the field of 
peace and conflict build mostly on its ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework 
(ECPF), which comprises components deemed essential to the maintenance of 
peace, such as early warning, preventive diplomacy, human rights and the rule of 
law, and so on. ECOWAS has also established its own Standby Force, which is 
part of the AU’s APSA, as well as its own Mediation and Security Council, a 
Defense and Security Commission, and a Council of Elders (Adetula, Bereketeab 
and Jaiyebo 2016: 22-27). This has allowed ECOWAS to intervene in various 
conflicts like in Guinea-Bissau, in Mali, in Burkina-Faso, among other places. 
Other regional organizations such as IGAD or EAC have developed similar peace 
and security frameworks, and subsequently launched peace operations, and/or co-
ordinated peace processes. 
It is also worth noting that under the APSA umbrella, the AU and the African 
regional organizations have increased their cooperation (Adetula 2015). The AU 
and the 8 above-mentioned regional organizations with which it has privileged 
relations13 have signed in 2008 a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to coor-
dinate their actions in the domains of peace and security. This MOU notably un-
derscores the role of regional organizations in implementing the APSA, and pro-
motes the principle of subsidiarity in that field. One of the main limits of this 
MOU is however that it does not provide an agreed upon understanding of the 
principle of subsidiarity. This occasionally leads to tensions between the AU and 
regional organizations, and within each of those organizations (Desmidt and 
Hauck 2017: 7). As a result, decisions on whether and how to intervene are often 
the result of political calculations, rather than of a pure application of the 
 
13 To reiterate: EAC (East African Community), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West 
African States), IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), COMESA (Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African 
States), SADC (Southern African Development Community), CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-
Saharan States), and AMU (Arab Maghreb Union). 
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organization’s principles. As remarked by Desmidt and Hauck, “principles of 
non-indifference are often balanced, or even traded, against principles of national 
sovereignty and regional interests” (2017: iii). 
Funding for peace operations is another major constraint, both for the AU and for 
many African regional organizations. One of the main problems faced by the AU 
is indeed its dependence on external funding, and its need for external support, 
for instance, in terms of training and logistics (Wulf 2009). In principle, the AU 
Peace Fund, that provides funding for peace operations in Africa, relies on vol-
untary contributions from the AU’s largest financial contributors, like Algeria, 
Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa, but in fact only a few percentages of the Peace 
Fund come from its members, while the remaining funds are provided by inter-
national donors (Jentzsch 2014: 93). The EU, but also some western countries 
like Germany, Norway, Sweden, the UK, Canada, Denmark and Finland are the 
main contributors to the AU budget, and in particular to its Peace Fund (Stapel 
and Söderbaum 2017). Many experts, as well as AU member states, fear that this 
dependence upon external funding means that the AU and other African regional 
organizations do not fully control their own projects and initiatives (see for in-
stance Buzdugan 2013; Söderbaum 2017). NATO also occasionally provides sup-
port to the AU and the concerned African regional organizations in the field of 
logistics and capacity building (Jentzsch 2014: 96).This generates tensions be-
tween these organizations’ member states (Engel and Porto 2009), but more im-
portantly, this leads to high dependence of the African continental and regional 
organizations on some of their former colonizers. It is also worth noting that 
“most of the external funding mechanisms to regional organizations require UN 
Security Council approval of the peace operation” (Jentzsch 2014: 98), thus 
demonstrating the UN’s continued control over peace and security issues in Af-
rica.  
Other important constraints relate to political factors. For instance, the fact that 
the EAC, just like other African regional organizations or the African Union, tol-
erates authoritarian members within its ranks is sometimes seen as a major im-
pediment to its intervention against repressive regimes (Khadiagala 2018: 2). 
Moreover, the capacity for action of most African regional organizations is lim-
ited by the classical tension between their wish to intervene, and their desire to 
uphold the principle of national sovereignty. This tension is of course also present 
in the case of continental and global organizations, but appears particularly 
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significant in the case of African regional organizations, because “in most African 
regions where states have long-running conflicts, politicians are fearful of relin-
quishing sovereignty, and progress toward integration and multilateralism re-
mains limited” (Khadiagala 2018: 2). 
All in all, one must acknowledge on the one hand the growing competence and 
expertise of African regional organizations in the field of conflict prevention, 
management and resolution, and on the other hand the limits and constraints under 
which they are operating. The next section explores how these various assets and 
restrictions have played out in the ongoing Burundian case. Because this contri-
bution focuses on actors intervening in Burundi rather than on the resolution of 
the conflict itself, this exploration will be thematic rather than chronological. 
 
Regional, continental and global peace initiatives on Burundi: a story of 
divisions, oppositions, and some cooperation 
Since Burundi is currently a member not only of the African Union, but also of 
eleven African regional organizations,14 some of which with competence and 
mandates related to peace and conflict issues, it seems logical that regional initi-
atives for solving the recurrent political crisis would have been launched. After 
the end of the cold war, it is however the OAU, the predecessor of the AU, that 
took the lead for these attempts. In what many authors interpret as an assertion of 
Africa’s renaissance and wish to take ownership of its destiny, the African Union 
has been particularly active in regards to the successive Burundian crises (see, for 
instance, Mangu 2014). After the 1993-1994 civil war for instance, the AU (then 
OAU) had put in place several initiatives in order to solve the conflict in Burundi, 
notably through the appointment of a special envoy, or the deployment of an Ob-
server Mission (OMIB 1993-1996). The AU also supported other international as 
well as regional, often ad hoc initiatives for ending the crisis (Muyangwa and 
Vogt 2000: 12). During the 1990s, this led to cooperation for peace-building pur-
poses between organizations active at the global, continental and regional levels 
(Ayebare 2011). More specifically, during that decade, African regional organi-
zations and actors, the AU and the UN joined forces in order to solve the conflict 
 
14 COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), EAC (East African Community), 
ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), CEGPL (Economic Community Great 
Lakes Region), EAPP (Eastern Africa Power Pool), LTA (Lake Tanganyika Authority), LVBC 
(Lake Victoria Basin Commission), NBI (Nile Basin Initiative), EASF (Eastern Africa Standby 
Force), ICGLR (International Conference on the Great Lakes Region) and COMIFAC (Central 
African Forest Commission). 
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in Burundi and push for the Arusha peace agreement eventually signed in 2000 
(Wodrick and Grauvogel 2016). 
Later on, the AU took again the lead in peace-building operations by deploying a 
peace mission in Burundi, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003 and 
2004, whose objective was to monitor the ceasefire and stabilize the country. It 
also set up a smaller operation called “Special Task Force Burundi” (2006-2009) 
whose main aim was to provide VIP protection for negotiating rebel leaders. 
When Burundi witnessed another phase of conflict escalation, as of 2015, the AU 
initially took the lead in conflict resolution attempts along two main strategies, 
one which can be described as soft, and the other as hard (Williams 2016): on the 
one hand, it tried to mediate between the conflicting parties, and to conduct both 
public and private diplomacy in order to deescalate the crisis; and on the other 
hand, its Peace and Security Council recommended the deployment of a 5,000 
strong military force called the African Prevention and Protection Mission 
(MAPROBU). This military force’s mandate would have been to prevent further 
escalation of the conflict, but also to protect civilians, and to help creating the 
conditions for political dialogue within Burundi. 
The ability of the AU to take such a bold lead in the Burundi crisis was facilitated 
by the fact that the UN was at that moment paralyzed by divisions within the 
Security Council, between on the one hand the US, France and Belgium pushing 
for an intervention, and on the other hand Russia and China,15 alongside Egypt 
and Venezuela, opposing it (Crisis Group 2019: 14-15). It must also be noted that 
the Burundian Government had long voiced its opposition to another UN inter-
vention, even staging public street demonstrations against the UN, in order to 
“demonstrate” the people’s refusal of any external interference (see, for instance, 
Al Jazeera 2016). In the past the Burundian Government had already resisted UN 
peace-building policies, for instance, by claiming that the UN and other interna-
tional actors could not be allowed to interfere with Burundian internal politics 
(Curtis 2013: 89). In line with the previously mentioned critics of the liberal peace 
model, which UN peacekeeping forces are often said to embody, the Burundian 
Government has long been hostile, and has even straightforwardly rejected inter-
ventions that it views as contradictory to its own sovereignty, but also as carrying 
 
15 Both Russia and China have increased their investment in the country since 2015, and especially 
following the EU sanctions against Burundi. This financial and political support has significantly 
helped the Burundian Government to resist the pressure induced by international sanctions. 
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a strong colonial taint. The inability of the UN Security Council to reach a con-
sensus among its members, and to secure the approval of the Burundian Govern-
ment for any type of UN-led intervention, even small-sized, thus paved the way 
for continental and regional initiatives. In that sense, the example of Burundi 
shows how the world’s multilayered security architecture could in principle func-
tion: when one level is blocked or is prevented from acting, another level can take 
over, in this case the African continental and regional organizations. 
Unfortunately, the AU’s proactive stance on Burundi ended up being short-lived, 
with the AU heads of states refusing to agree to the deployment of the 
MAPROBU peacekeeping force recommended by the AU Peace and Security 
Council. Several contextual factors can account for this setback, notably the 
strong opposition of the Burundian Government to such intervention, which it 
described as an “invasion”, or the apparent rapid de-escalation of the crisis at the 
beginning of 2016 (Crisis Group 2019: 13). But some more structural reasons 
explain the AU’s inability to implement a strong response to the Burundian crisis. 
As explained by Siradag (2012: 238), the AU is not very strong politically; it lacks 
an effective leadership, as well as funding and capacity. In practical terms, this 
translates into deep political rifts between its member states, but also between its 
various institutions, such as between the Assembly of the African Union regroup-
ing all heads of states, the AU Commission (AUC) which is the executive branch 
of the AU, and the Political and Security Committee (PSC). According to Des-
midt and Hauck: 
The AU as a whole was divided over the situation in Burundi and on the question 
of finding the balance between non-indifference and sovereignty. Many AU mem-
bers states favoured a less confrontational and interventionist approach than the 
more proactive AU Commission and PSC. … The decision-making process around 
the deployment of a mission in Burundi highlighted the lack of coherence between 
the AUC and the PSC, where the AUC was seen as having overstepped its bound-
aries (2017: 26). 
This initial setback in the AU’s strategy vis-à-vis Burundi damaged its credibility, 
and from then on obliged it to take “a back seat” regarding the crisis (Crisis Group 
2019: 13). As a consequence, when Burundi decided to change its constitution in 
2017, the AU did not react, in spite of the fact that this change contradicted its 
2007 Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (Khadiagala 2018: 8). 
One of the other consequences of AU’s failure is that regional actors have subse-
quently had the primary responsibility for trying to dilute the situation in Burundi. 
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Of course, regional organizations and actors had not waited for the AU’s failure 
to launch peace initiatives in Burundi. However, this turn of events gave them a 
new impulse and legitimacy. Among other regional plans regarding Burundi, the 
Regional Peace Initiative in Burundi (in short: Regional Initiative), launched in 
1995 by the governments of Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Zaire (now Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo), is worth mentioning. It initially included measures 
such as economic sanctions, the sending of troops and of humanitarian aid, many 
of which were cancelled on the face of, here again, a strong opposition from the 
Burundian Government and political parties. Interestingly, the Regional Initiative 
also faced opposition from the UN, the European Union and the US, which were 
against the maintenance of economic sanctions, accused of being ineffective. Wo-
drick and Grauvogel (2016: 282) suggest that this opposition primarily stemmed 
from the fact that “the Regional Initiative questioned the international commu-
nity’s historic dominance in the intervention scene and resisted its interference 
with regional mediation attempts.” Such interpretation is in line with the idea that 
peace-building being a crowded stage (see Kabutaulaka 2006), interactions be-
tween peace-building actors at the global, continental and regional levels are char-
acterized by multiple frictions and tensions. 
Nevertheless, the Regional Initiative succeeded where other regional, continental 
and global organizations had not. It is indeed the Regional Initiative, and not an 
African regional organization, the AU or the UN, which appointed in May 1996 
the former President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere as a mediator to the crisis. This 
mediation led to the opening of the Arusha Peace Negotiations, and eventually to 
the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000. The Regional Initiative is 
also particularly interesting, because it is representative of a relatively recent 
trend of “increasingly ad hoc or improvised forms of collective conflict manage-
ment, which involve collaboration—sometimes loose and uncoordinated, some-
times more tightly scripted—among a wide constellation of different intergovern-
mental, regional, sub-regional, and civil society actors” (Crocker, Hampson and 
Aall 2014: 2). 
In parallel, African regional organizations themselves played an important role in 
the management of the Burundian crises too. The EAC in particular became a 
major actor in Burundian politics, as it often took over from the AU. The EAC 
notably established the Inter-Burundi Dialogue in July 2015, and appointed the 
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni as mediator, as well as the former 
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Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa as facilitator. The EAC also worked 
closely with the ICGLR, which was associated to most of the EAC initiatives, but 
never took their lead. In 2015, for instance, the EAC asked the ICGLR to use its 
Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM) to monitor the alleged presence 
in Burundi of militias sponsored by other states (Richard 2016). Weaker than the 
EAC because of its even more divided membership, the ICGLR is an interesting 
actor for mediation purposes, because contrary to most other African regional or-
ganizations, it also engages with non-state actors through its various forums, like 
its Civil Society Forum. Unfortunately, the measures taken by the EAC, and/ or 
in tandem with the ICGLR, have not yet produced the expected results, and show 
no sign of doing so in the near future.  
Several reasons account for the difficulties faced by the EAC with regards to the 
Burundi crises. The first is that the EAC is clearly not designed for, and adapted 
to the needs of conflict mediation and resolution. Just like in the case of the AU, 
leadership within the EAC is unclear. While it was initially dominated by Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda, power relations within the organization are perpetually 
evolving in function of political alliances between its member states. The EAC 
was primarily created for fostering economic integration, and its decision-making 
structures and internal procedures prevent it from taking bold decisions regarding 
events happening on the territory of any of its member states. For instance, all 
decisions have to be taken by strict consensus, and all its member states have to 
be represented at its summits for them to take place. Needless to say, the Burun-
dian Government has made good use of these rules, and has at times prevented 
summits where the Burundian situation was supposed to be discussed from taking 
place, by simply not showing up. It has also consistently voted against any inter-
vention in Burundi. In addition, like most other African regional organizations, 
the EAC lacks adequate financial resources for conducting peace and security 
missions. 
The second reason explaining the EAC’s failure in Burundi pertains to the deep 
divisions and cleavages existing between its member states. Some of these divi-
sions pushed states like Uganda and Rwanda to adopt different positions with 
regards to the situation in Burundi, in order to protect an ally, or to thwart an 
enemy. There is good empirical evidence indicating that the crisis in Burundi has 
been instrumentalized in these disputes, and did not necessarily stand at their core 
(Crisis Group 2019: 10-12). The Burundian Government has deftly used these 
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divisions to its own advantage, and has constantly played regional powers against 
one another. Many of the EAC internal divisions relate to deep historical rivalries, 
economic competition and personal animosities between the heads of states. In 
particular, personal and political rifts between the presidents of Rwanda, Uganda 
and Tanzania prevented the EAC from adopting a common strategy on Burundi: 
“While Rwanda has criticized President Nkurunziza’s management of Burundi, 
Uganda and Tanzania are seen as more favourable to maintaining the status quo. 
These differences between EAC member states paralysed the EAC’s efforts” 
(Desmidt and Hauck 2017: 26). Such rifts between member states are however 
common in other regional and multilateral organizations, and certainly not spe-
cific to the case of Burundi and/or the EAC. For instance, deep internal divisions 
within ECOWAS have also emerged in the past, notably in the case of peace in-
terventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Skau, Bercovitch and Elgström 2003). 
Other reasons explain the failure of EAC’s initiatives, among which a certain dis-
interest in Burundian affairs on the part of the appointed mediator, President Mu-
seveni, and a lack of synergy between the various diplomatic efforts, which left 
the facilitator Benjamin Mkapa isolated and powerless (Crisis Group 2019: 17-
18). All these issues coalesced to undermine the EAC’s efforts for peace media-
tion and conflict resolution. Although some of these factors are clearly related to 
the specific political context in the Great Lakes Region of Africa over the past 
few years and even decades, there are good grounds to assert that they also pertain 
to more general constraints under which regional organizations have to operate. 
Intertwined relationships and closeness between member states exacerbate power 
relations and tensions that are also experienced within the AU and the UN, and 
lead to frequent paralysis. Because regional interventions can be understood “as 
a political project on the part of the interveners” (Wodrig 2014: 215), they are 
often strongly resisted not only by the target state(s), but also by rival states in the 
region. The capacity of African regional organizations to act as peace and security 
actors is also severely constrained by financial issues, and by a lack of clarity 
regarding how to exactly operationalize the subsidiarity principle. The issue of 
who can, but also of who is allowed to intervene is heightened in the case of 
Africa, because of the sheer number of regional organizations operating on the 
continent. The fact that the memberships of these organizations overlap further 
clouds any order of precedence between them, complicates decision making, and 
often ends up producing situations where no significant action is taken, or fol-
lowed through. 
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Conclusions 
So what can we learn from the Burundian case study in terms of international 
conflict management, multilateralism and regionalism? Traditional explanations 
of regional peace-building failures in the Great Lakes Region of Africa have 
pointed at the exclusion of local actors (elders and traditional authorities, women 
groups, youth groups, etc.), or at the existence of spoilers in the form of non-state 
armed groups (Sikenyi 2013). Other authors, like Jobbins and Ahitungiye (2015), 
suggest that the international community has not pushed hard enough for conflict 
resolution, and that the Burundian case demonstrates “the limits of crisis-driven 
foreign policy” (2015: 216) without longer term engagement and vision. All in 
all, as compared to the UN or to local actors, the specific responsibilities of the 
regional actors themselves, or the limits related to their positionality, have so far 
been a lot less scrutinized. 
Without denying the importance of long-term strategies, of spoilers, or of the ex-
clusion of local and civil society actors, this contribution has tried to shed light 
on some of the specific challenges related to the interplay between global, conti-
nental and regional organizations in the field of peace and conflict. The example 
of the management of the successive Burundian crises shows how global, conti-
nental and regional organizations could in principle complement each other with 
regards to peace and security issues, by taking the initiative when others cannot, 
or when they think that they are less well placed to do so. This, in itself, of course, 
does not guarantee any success, but it opens up a range of options for peace in-
terventions. The multiplicity of regional organizations in Africa allows in princi-
ple for a certain division of tasks, following geographic scope, capacities and ex-
pertise. But at the practical level this requires much more coordination than what 
has been experienced so far. Regional, continental and global organizations can 
also work hand in hand to reinforce each other’s legitimacy and efficiency, for 
instance by using regional support for a UN intervention, or vice versa (Crocker, 
Hampson and Aall 2014: 15). In view of these options it seems, eventually, un-
helpful to strictly oppose global and regional mechanisms for conflict manage-
ment, as they might serve complementary purposes, and face different kinds of 
hurdles. 
Another lesson that can be drawn from the Burundian case is that political rivalry 
or a lack of capability and of political will are not the only factors that can prevent 
an international intervention from succeeding. States targeted for a potential 
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political and/or military intervention can also play one organization against the 
other, or one member state against another. This is what the Burundian Govern-
ment has repeatedly been successfully doing during the past few years. Because 
so many actors are active on the peace-building scene, the concerned government 
will always have the option of appealing to another institution. By showing how 
“frictions” (Björkdahl and Höglung 2013) between and within global, continental 
and regional forums can be instrumentalized, the Burundian example points at the 
importance of setting up common strategies between the UN and the concerned 
continental and regional organizations. The lack of coordination between the UN, 
the AU, the ICGLR and the EAC, among others, has generated overlaps, confu-
sion, as well as a lack of clarity on strategy and responsibilities. Therefore, it is 
not so much that regionalism has worked against multilateralism, or vice versa, 
but that regionalism and multilateralism have mutually impeded each other by not 
clearly delineating their respective responsibilities, strategies and goals. 
What this example also demonstrates is that the principle of subsidiarity is not the 
main mechanism through which such cooperation between levels is currently or-
ganized, quite on the contrary. It seems that it was mostly when the UN was too 
paralyzed to act that the AU could become more active, and that is was when the 
AU’s initiatives failed that regional organizations and actors stepped up their role 
and initiatives. All in all, at least in the Burundian example, the principle of sub-
sidiarity has been repeatedly turned upside down. Political concerns have often 
taken precedence over pragmatic considerations, more often than not undermin-
ing the efficiency and legitimacy of international interventions, in the eyes both 
of the Burundian Government, and of the Burundian population. This lack of le-
gitimacy has been worsened by suspicions of meddling by former colonial pow-
ers, which are seen as controlling both the UN, but also the funding and therefore 
the characteristics of peace operations in Africa (Stapel and Söderbaum 2017). 
Finally, the Burundian example suggests that sometimes “less is more”, in the 
sense that having too many peace-building actors trying to intervene is actually 
impeding the chances for successful conflict resolution. This does not mean that 
the number of organizations competent in the field of peace and security should 
be reduced, but it calls for a better cooperation between the various regional actors 
and regional, continental and global organizations competent in that field. Even-
tually, the efficiency of peace interventions seems to depend not so much on 
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smooth multilateralism, or well organized regionalism, but on a careful interplay, 
and division of tasks, between them. 
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 Contesting the International Liberal Order: 
Institution Building and Challenge for 
Hegemony 
Giovanni Barbieri 
 
Abstract 
Today, the Liberal International Order is increasingly being contested by rising powers 
with respect to the universality of liberal norms through which it was revealed to be in-
efficient in addressing the development needs of rising powers. The creation of alterna-
tive Multilateral Development Banks like the NDB and the AIIB reveals a desire to over-
come the liberal prescriptions in the issue of development and finance governance, to 
create an international institutional framework that is indifferent to liberal core values of 
the existing world order. The underlying idea is that the construction of such institutions 
like the NDB and the AIIB is not aimed at directly subverting the international liberal 
order, but at diminishing the hegemonic position of the USA within the system. There is 
evidence that the contestation is limited to the issue areas of development and finance 
and that, through a sort of ‘Institutional leveraging’, China’s actions can be interpreted as 
an effort to integrate an alternative set of core norms and principles into the existing lib-
eral order through cooperation and competition between new and existing multilateral 
institutions. In the end, the confrontation reflects the existing tension around the core 
social and political values fueling the current International (Liberal) Order’s institutions 
resulting in a challenge to the United States’ authority within the order they shaped so 
far. 
Keywords: International Liberal Order, China (People’s Republic of), United States, He-
gemony, Institution building, AIIB, NDB 
 
 
Introduction 
The international system, today, is undeniably undergoing a transformative pro-
cess in what concerns the overall distribution of power among its main actors. 
One of the most debated issues is whether this power shift is hurting the United 
States’ hegemony over the international order and, in particular, over the liberal 
international order they set up starting from the Bretton Woods agreements in 
1946.  
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During the last years, since Donald Trump took office as the President of the 
United States, the US has heavily reconsidered its position within the interna-
tional system, a shift that in the next years will be remembered as perhaps the 
most striking revision of its foreign policy posture. This revision involved in equal 
measure the practice and content of US international action, through the shift from 
multilateralism to unilateralism and going towards a sort of renewed neo-isola-
tionism. Recent moves in this way are represented by such actions like the with-
drawal from the Paris Climate Pact, the retreat from the Trans Pacific Partnership 
(that they previously sponsored under the Obama administration), the imposition 
of new tariffs in those trade sectors that could be harmful to the US national eco-
nomic interests. 
Rather than asking if this shift was prompted by the loss of relative power in the 
international system, it would be worth asking when it started. One answer is that 
the shift started in coincidence with the rise of other international actors who 
gradually began to contest the legitimacy of the existing international order and, 
in particular, of its ‘American’ liberal blend concerning specific issue areas. To 
this extent, BRICS group is the most representative experience in what this con-
testation looks like. China as well is positioning itself as the most proactive actor 
in proposing and delivering an alternative institutional setting to the current US 
led one. 
BRICS and China delivered two brand new institutions to the international sys-
tem. One is the New Development Bank (NDB) that, together with the Contin-
gency Reserve Arrangement (CRA), can be considered as an alternative to the 
World Bank–International Monetary Fund duopoly. The other is the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB), through which China is trying to set out a new 
institutional framework in the field of Multilateral Development Banks and to 
redefine the principles and rules of economic development outside the boundaries 
of the Washington Consensus neo-liberal watermark.  
While it would be pretentious to draw empirical conclusions from the action of 
these institutions, due to their young age, it is nonetheless possible to dig into the 
motives that pushed towards their creation and the potential impact they could 
have in the future of the existing international order. To do so, it is worth to frame 
the discussion within the context of Chinese international activism, focusing on 
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the possibility for this wave of institutional craftsmanship to alter the shape of the 
liberal international order. 
The main argument is that the contestation of the current international liberal or-
der is not aimed at contesting the existence of an order, but the way in which that 
order is managed. To this extent, the creation of new international institutions can 
be interpreted as an effort to develop an alternative set of core norms and princi-
ples to the liberal ones, around which dissatisfied actors would coalesce. This 
process is fundamentally aimed at putting pressure on existing institutions, 
namely the Bretton Woods institutions, for the reform of the current system.  
Attached to this, there is the issue of power transition within the current order. 
The international liberal order has been shaped around the core political and eco-
nomic values put forth by the United States, a circumstance that granted them the 
dominant position within the system. Thus, the contestation of the inability (or 
unwillingness) of the international liberal order to reformate itself in order to 
grant a higher degree of integration for emerging countries, could turn into an 
argument against the authority of the system’s hegemons and hence to the legiti-
macy of the international liberal order. 
 
No order or non-liberal order?  
A preliminary step for the discussion must be that of clarifying what the expres-
sion “international liberal order” stands for. The concept of international order is 
one of the most debated concepts in IR literature, reflecting the vast and various 
existing theoretical traditions of the discipline. While I will not provide a litera-
ture review for the concept of international order, I will instead adopt a working 
definition. International order can be understood as the sum of, at least, three dif-
ferent levels: material, social and normative. This is the view of Robert Cox 
(1987), who defined the international order according to three central compo-
nents: the distribution of material capabilities, the typology of the prevailing ideas 
at certain times and the nature of existing institutions. According to this defini-
tion, an international order is an international political space within which the 
actors are positioned according to the degree of their material capabilities, in a 
pattern of dominance and submission. The power pattern determines the norma-
tive foundations of the existing institutions and, consequently, the quality and the 
nature of the predominant ideas inspiring the functioning of the order. The 
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international liberal order, thus, is the specific form of international order com-
mitted to the achievement of liberal social purposes (Ikenberry and Lim 2017).  
The fact that many states started a contestation of the legitimacy of the current 
world order does not necessarily mean that they are contesting the existence of an 
international order, but of a liberal one. To this extent, it is worth noting that the 
discourse about acceptance or contestation of a given international order involves 
all the three dimensions mentioned above and, in particular, the normative and 
political content that set out its functioning.  
In a recent research, Stephen and Skidmore (2019) coined a working definition 
of international liberal order, as “international institutions that wed the exercise 
of international power to liberal social purposes” (64). In the same paper, they 
tried to develop a framework to analyse the role of the Asian Infrastructure In-
vestment Bank within the US led international liberal order. Their main argument 
is that the most appropriate framework to carry out such an analysis is one that 
includes both state-centric (Functionalist and Distributive Institutionalism) and 
societal theoretical approaches (World Society and Social Order Approaches), 
depending on whether one is looking for relative power gains or “the compatibil-
ity of the AIIB with the societal purposes of the Liberal International Order in the 
issue area of development lending” (76).  
In other words, the creation of new institutions like the AIIB or the NDB can be 
a signal of power balancing (He 2018), but it could be interpreted, at the same 
time, in terms of revisionist efforts against the existing Multilateral Development 
Bank institutional order (Hamanaka 2016; Liao 2015). It could be also understood 
in terms of a sort of love for variety where institutional proliferation and inter-
institutional cooperation could lead to positive and productive competition (Bis-
ley 2018; Prizzon et al. 2018). 
This conclusion resembles what I elsewhere defined as “Globalization by other 
means,” meaning that current undergoing regional dynamics are not aimed at dis-
missing the existing global institutional framework but at integrating newly emer-
gent regional groupings in a multilateral international framework. Given the be-
havior of the involved regional actors like BRICS, this integration is likely to 
occur with a brand new approach to global governance through the redefinition 
of the normative content of specific policy issue area and, specifically, develop-
ment finance. To this extent, it is possible to state with reasonable certainness that 
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a contestation of the international liberal order is at work, at least against its nor-
mative content concerning the neo-liberal (post-) Washington Consensus blend 
of most part of the policy prescriptions attached to development lending processes 
(Puranen 2019).  
This path seemingly does not involve the practice of multilateralism, which is the 
main component of the grand-strategy adopted by the US in designing an Amer-
ican post-WWII international order. That order had its main pillar in the Bretton 
Woods agreements and, later, in other functional international institutions like the 
GATT (WTO), the United Nations and NATO (to mention the most relevant), 
through which the US built their own global order. The main aim of the American 
foreign policy was to structure the international environment in a way responsive 
to its strategic interests and through the creation of an interdependent net of inter-
national institutions, through which they successfully managed to dominate the 
system or the so-called international liberal order. 
The international liberal order crisis is often identified with the progressive con-
testation of existing multilateral practices and frameworks (Morse & Keohane 
2014), as well as the contestation of the legitimacy and authority of international 
multilateral institutions like the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. Most part of 
the criticisms come from developing countries like China, India and Brazil, who 
started advancing grievances concerning the low degree of voices they have in 
the decisional processes shaping the global governance rules that are shaped ac-
cording to the American interests.  
All these features come under the label of ‘liberalism’, which characterizes the 
international liberal order with market openness, a high degree of institutionali-
zation and a certain degree of exclusiveness, depending on the adherence to the 
underlying political principles of rule of law and value of democracy. What is not 
clear at all is whether these countries are discontent with the American specificity 
of the system or they are simply contesting the ineffectiveness of that system in 
addressing new challenges arising in contemporary world and in distributing the 
gains coming from the integrated capitalist global economy. The answer to the 
first question would require an analytical approach to the moral dimension of the 
political discourse, which would be ineffective in addressing the reasons why the 
existing multilateral framework is losing grip among emerging countries. An-
swering the second question could be easier, considering that it would point at the 
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core of the liberal discourse concerning multilateral practices and, specifically, to 
the capacity of international institutions to set up functional cooperative frame-
works through interdependency. 
 
Historical background 
A preliminary step should be that of tracing out the main motives lying behind 
the post-WWII creation of the American led global order (or international liberal 
order). The American government was pushed by the desire to place order and 
continuity in three main intertwined issue areas: economics, politics and security. 
The outbreak of WWII highlighted how a fragmented global political arena in 
which each actor was concerned with preserving its own privileges and pursuing 
its own interests at each other expenses was not sustainable. The lack of a political 
guidance, embodied by the failure of the League of Nations, showed well how 
such a system could easily break down leading the world towards the brink, and 
over.  
The first issue-area, concerning world economy, was perhaps the most important 
area of intervention. The American idea for the future of world system was the 
creation of an open, interconnected world market economy able to prevent the re-
birth of imperial aggregation, as it used to be under the British, German and Jap-
anese empires between the second half of the nineteenth century and 1945. The 
rationale for such a project was twofold: to inhibit imperial temptations and to 
link the other world powers to the American economic system.  
The United States was conscious that the existence of imperial preference sys-
tems, regional blocs structured around isolationism and regional trade dynamics 
would inhibit its ambition to exert the role of global power, a status it already 
possessed the end of the WWII. The United States’ strategic aim was to gain 
worldwide access to resources and to push the greatest possible amount of coun-
tries to trade with them, in order to extend the American economic presence to all 
the regions of the world.  
The deep and extensive scope of such an economic grand design would have re-
quired effective system management skills. The United States needed the tools to 
control and address the functioning of such a world system that would have been 
characterized by a high degree of interdependence. The Bretton Woods agree-
ments laid down the institutional structure that would have served the purpose of 
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preserving the system stability. Moreover, the essential condition for the US was 
to control the newly created institutions, a condition through which it would have 
been able to manage that complex interdependent system and to exert the role of 
global power they intended to. The creation of the Bretton Woods institutions was 
also the moment when western powers laid down the basis for the contemporary 
multilateral cooperation system.  
In Bretton Woods, the wartime allies had divergent visions about the necessary 
degree of economic openness of the new system as well as over the institutional 
framework that should have governed it. In order to include necessary and funda-
mental partners, as European countries were, the institutional layout was one 
made of loose legal rules and high degree of inclusiveness in the decision-making 
process. That was the key to render the Bretton Woods institutions inclusive and 
to lock the European allies within a common multilateral framework, with the 
United States retaining the golden-share. The success of such a political and in-
stitutional framework was evident to the extent that it managed to include coun-
tries like Germany and Japan, traditional imperial states, who became active part-
ners in the construction of the American world order, as well as other European 
and Asian countries who found the multilateral American system a resource rather 
than a restraint.  
Security was also a cornerstone of the American multilateral design. Although 
the world security complex shaped itself mostly during the cold war, the US 
started to define it right in the aftermath of WWII. The whole globe was under 
the scope of the American security concerns, as the United States was well con-
scious that the role of global power included also the main responsibility in guar-
anteeing seas openness, regional stability and global reach capacities. The secu-
rity design of American policies stressed a lot the nexus between security 
cooperation and economic integration, making the two aspects intertwined. This 
has been also the strategic element that favored the spontaneous adherence to the 
American multilateral system and, thus, to the reinforcement across decades of 
the international liberal order as we know it.  
The most peculiar aspect of the US led international liberal order (that possibly 
opposed to its Soviet counterpart during the cold war), is the attractiveness it ex-
erted with respect to its members and aspiring members. Perhaps, the most im-
portant strength of that system has been that of appearing as an opportunity rather 
 122 
than a limitation to the countries who participated in it. According to Ikenberry 
(2011), this strength derived from the consciousness of being part of a broad po-
litical project, aimed at promoting “democracy, openness, rule of law and human 
rights” (Ikenberry 2015: 408). Cooperation within the American-led international 
liberal order sustained the perception that it was advantageous for each one’s na-
tional interests, finding a national way for development within a broader multi-
lateral framework (Ikenberry 2015: 408). 
 
Truly or instrumentally contesting? 
Given this evolutional background, it is possible to advance some hypothesis 
about the reason why some developing countries began to contest the American 
led international liberal order. Firstly, and most importantly, it is an ambiguous 
issue whether or not they dispute its liberal nature. If we assume BRICS countries 
to be representative of the ‘discontents’ alignment, we easily find out that all of 
them adopt an open-market economic model, all of them are integrated in the 
global financial markets and, on different scales, they enjoy the benefits of being 
part of the existing traditional multilateral international and commercial institu-
tional framework.  
Although China commands the lion’s share among them, during the last 15 years 
BRICS countries improved their economic fundamentals, as it emerges from data 
concerning overall GDP, GDP per capita and FDI flows. One preliminary con-
clusion could be that emerging countries are not dissatisfied with the current in-
ternational multilateral framework per se, but probably with the adverse effects 
in terms of differential economic growth it favors, especially when it happens 
between neighbouring countries.  
A second possible source of explanation for the difficulties the multilateral frame-
work is going through is of political nature. Although BRICS countries present 
rather different features from the West with respect to the values governing such 
issues like human rights and democracy, it is nonetheless possible to sort them 
according to some slight differences and understandings each of them share in the 
same fields. Brazil, India and South Africa have in common, formally at least, the 
same political system and share the same democratic values, a circumstance that 
made them converge on much more issues than those in the domain of BRICS 
cooperation.  
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A typical liberal argument in IR towards the possibilities for a successful pattern 
of international cooperation is the qualitative similarity of the domestic political 
structures. As demonstrated in an empirical research by Haggard (2013), the de-
gree of voting affinity within the UN General Assembly between each BRICS 
country and the United States has been discontinued and low, characterized by 
particular low levels of affinity in the case of Russia and China (period 
1946/1971-2011). Institutional and political differences at the domestic level 
could well turn into regional disputes between neighbouring countries, but at first 
reflects themselves at the global multilateral level. The existence of intra-institu-
tional diplomatic alignments, like in the case of the WTO (Hopewell 2017a), re-
veals how much multilateralism turns to be ineffective when it fails to address 
new challenges in a way adherent to all participants’ interests. The reasons why 
it fails could be variegated, but one could be assumed to be to most relevant, at 
least for the case in discussion.  
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the steady expansion of the multilateral 
framework embedded in the US-led international liberal order caused an over-
stretching of the system itself, with the consequent over expansion of the system 
leader’s duties. The accession of new countries to the system revealed the sys-
tem’s inability to address the needs and interest of the new members. The original 
condition of a trans-national community of countries sharing a common vision of 
the future world order and a common faith in the effectiveness of the multilateral 
practices in providing growth and prosperity began to falter.  
That happened mainly because of two factors: power shifts occurring at the sys-
temic level and larger institutional dimensions. The efficiency and effectiveness 
of the multilateral liberal order relied mainly on the hegemonic role of the United 
States. The new global context that emerged during the ’90s pushed the global 
hegemon to devote more resources to regulate security issues in order to preserve 
the systemic stability. This move led way to a relative decline in power of the US 
with respect to China, a situation that let the academic debate openly argue in 
favor of a presumptive end of the unipolar era and start of a new multipolar one. 
Larger membership in existing international institutions played its part in compli-
cating the scenario, mainly because of a process of power dispersion within inter-
national core institutions and growing cooperation difficulties.  
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The IMF, the World Bank and the WTO barely managed to represent the new 
international equilibrium, failing to accommodate the requests for increased rep-
resentativeness made by emerging countries after the 2008 crisis. This dynamic 
has been evident within the WTO in particular, where the traditional western 
alignment, centered on the old triad formed by the United States, Europe and East 
Asian countries entangled in security alliances with the US, kept pushing forward 
commercial policy proposals with no respect for the new members’ interests. The 
failure of the Doha Round is enlightening, as well as the failure of the IMF in 
welcoming the vote reform request headed by China. The result of these dynamics 
is that the global hegemon (USA) is experiencing a condition of military power 
supremacy coupled with a loosened political legitimacy and a lessened capacity 
to keep control of the core international institutions. Hence, the ‘imperial’ temp-
tation (instrumental hierarchy) goes together with the retrenchment option from 
those issue-areas that has become too resource expensive and politically problem-
atic to govern.  
 
China and BRICS: a marriage of convenience? 
The event that brought BRICS into a formal annual meeting schedule was on 16 
June 2009. The meeting, held in Yekaterinburg, was the occasion to bring Brazil, 
Russia, India and China around the same table to analyse and discuss economic 
issues, especially concerning the ongoing financial crisis. The BRICS group does 
not come from the land of nowhere. Many scholars believe BRICS’ formation 
have become easier by previous groupings like IBSA, RIC and SCO (Flemes 
2009). These groupings constituted the opportunity to meet and discuss at politi-
cal and diplomatic levels, bringing together converging visions of the needs and 
the wills of developing and emerging countries for a non-western centered future 
world order (Sun 2013). 
The Yekaterinburg meeting was the intermediate step in the transition from in-
formal meetings, held since 2006 at the margins of the UN’s general assembly, to 
stable annual formal meetings. For the truth’s sake, it is worth mentioning that 
among the four members (and South Africa since 2011) the most pro-active and 
pressing actor was China, along with Russia. The other two, India and Brazil, 
were lukewarm towards the idea of forming a stable ‘objectors’ group, remaining 
more focused on step-by-step coordination and cooperation about specific issues. 
Probably, the frustration coming from the substantial inertia of the G7/G8 ‘out-
reach process’ pushed Brazil and India next to Russia and China in coordinating 
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among them outside the traditional forums. Notwithstanding, Brazil and India 
(and, later, South Africa) showed a lack of willingness to fully side with Russia 
and China, showing that within BRICS great differences still exist, which go well 
beyond geographical boundaries. In particular, only China and Russia showed a 
pragmatic approach in building a real political group, with China putting forth 
most of the proposals concerning factual coordination mechanisms in order to 
keep the talks in continuity between the different meetings. The first institution-
alization step occurred in 2009, when the four decided to meet on a regular annual 
schedule. Most probably, they made this further step because of the disregard 
showed by the G7/G8, World Bank and IMF to respect with the needs of emerging 
countries in facing the global financial crisis. The G20 agenda setting also should 
have marked the BRICS group discomfort with the existing global governance 
framework, given that the first four meetings have been dominated by a western-
centric political agenda. In particular, the agenda setting and hosting and the G20 
enlargement to US allies like South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Australia and 
Turkey fostered BRICS’ perception of a willingness to dilute their influence 
within the forum (Cooper 2009). Growing coordination among BRICS surely en-
forced their voicing power within international institutions’ policy-making pro-
cesses, also strengthening their capability to cooperate, outside those institutions, 
on very specific policy areas, with those among whom trade, economic growth 
and agricultural policies are at the top. The WTO case is a striking example of 
this (Hopewell 2017b). 
Another major step towards a growing integration has been the establishment of 
the NDB and of the CRA. The CRA in particular is likely to be considered as the 
BRICS’ counterpart of the IMF in that it sustains and fosters their development 
and economic growth, removing the traditional political ties posed by their lim-
ited votes’ share at the IMF.  
When India launched the idea of setting up a new bank at the 2012 New Delhi 
meeting, it met with the positive attitude of the Chinese Government. Chinese 
officials considered the proposal as an opportunity to offer China’s abundant cap-
ital resources to sustain the new bank. Behind this offer, there was a clear vision 
by Beijing about the future of international affairs. The creation of a non-western 
centered development bank, funded mainly by China’s huge amount of foreign 
reserves, would have served the aim of putting pressure, on the international 
stage, for a reform of the voting rights scheme at IMF. Eventually, it would have 
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stimulated further reforms at the World Bank and at the UN, leveraging on times 
of ‘reduced legitimacy’ of existing international Institutions (Stuenkel 2015: 9).  
Russia as well looked at the initiative with great interest, sharing with China the 
desire to create an alternative ‘political club’ functional to a geopolitical shift.  
Another coup brought by China in the same year was the creation of the AIIB. 
The AIIB was put forward as an alternative for finance infrastructural investment 
tool, with respect to Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. The main 
feature of the AIIB is that it gave China the possibility to leave aside the con-
straints posed by its limited voting rights in the existing Asian Development 
Bank. Chinese Government warmly invited other BRICS members to join the 
new institutions, which many see as a set of instruments that are functional to 
counterbalance United States economic influence in the Asian Region.  
 
Beyond appearance: BRICS’ weaknesses 
Despite the likely potential of BRICS in the direction of ‘change’ in international 
politics and global governance, there are still many problems that pave the way 
to their full cohesion and integration into an institutionalized group. It is possible 
to categorize these problems in three areas: economic divergence, strategic and 
security issues, political issues.  
First, BRICS members greatly differ among themselves from the economic point 
of view. If we try to rank them by their GDP in PPP, what comes out is the huge 
disproportion of the aggregated GDPs of Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa 
compared to China. In 2008, China’s GDP was nearly equaled to the total aggre-
gate of the other four countries, with China scoring $5.04 trillion, Brazil $2.057 
trillion, Russia $1.583 trillion, India $1.385 trillion and South Africa only 
$369,900 billion. In 2016, the figure greatly changed, with China having a GDP 
of $9.505 trillion, nearly five times that of India and about ten times the GDP of 
Brazil, South Africa and Russia (Figure 2).  
Similarly, GDP annual growth (Figure 1) rates greatly differed for each member, 
showing a converging path only between China and India since 2016 (respec-
tively 9.65% and 3.89% in 2008; 6.68% and 7.10% in 2016). A similar trend is 
reported for FDI’s and GDP capita (with Russia standing at the top). 
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Fig. 1. Annual GDP growth rate (%)  
Source: Graph developed by the author based on World Bank Data (2019) 
 
 
Fig. 2. Nominal GDP (Constant 2010 US $)  
Source: Graph developed by the author based on World Bank Data (2019) 
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Fig. 3. GDP per Capita (constant 2010 US$)  
Source: Graph developed by the author based on World Bank Data (2019) 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. FDI net inflows (Current US$)  
Source: Graph developed by the author based on World Bank Data (2019) 
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While the GDP per capita figure should be attributed to dimensional factors, due 
to the large amount of population (1.379 billion people in 2016), the other data 
show that China stands at the top of BRICS group, representing at the same time 
a threat and an opportunity for their development. China’s development strategies 
revolve mainly around two pillars: domestic industrialization and international 
connectivity.  
From the second point of view, China is an important commercial partner for 
almost all BRICS, weighting more for its exports towards BRICS’ markets rather 
than for the imports. To this extent, China is an opportunity in the sense that it 
supports these economies’ demand, but it could be perceived as a threat when it 
comes to assess how much other BRICS members are dependent on China’s ex-
port.  
From a geopolitical perspective, there are several divergences among BRICS. 
First, and remarkably, is to be mentioned the growing risk of potential rivalry 
between India and China. The contrasts may develop along two main drivers: 
regional trade and hearth land strategic issues.  
Concerning regional trade, India is starting to perceive China as a potential threat 
to its strategic interests, due to China’s economic leveraging policy within 
ASEAN. The history of China-ASEAN relations is one made of Chinese efforts 
to gain weight inside the multilateral forum, in order to be the largest, and thus 
necessary, trading partner of ASEAN. Today, China is looking at ASEAN as the 
fundamental tool to implement the Maritime 21st Century Silk Road and, as a 
secondary goal, to secure its sovereignty over the South China Sea.  
India has divergent goals to the extent that it prioritizes the Bay of Bengal Initia-
tive for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and 
asserts its centrality in the evolving geography of the Indo-Pacific (Käkönen in 
this book), contrary to the Chinese perception of the same area as its backyard. A 
growing number of ASEAN members are starting to gauge whether it would be 
the right move to completely rely on China in the next digital connectivity tran-
sition of the ASEAN economy, and started looking at India’s digital sector as a 
possibility to ‘dilute’ China’s grip.  
At the hearth land level, security issues are at stake when it comes to defining 
who is siding with whom. India is a traditional supporter of the US pivot to Asia, 
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siding in this with Pakistan, while China is making all its efforts to ‘counterbal-
ance’ the American influence in the same area. The goal would be reached also 
by eventually revitalizing the SCO, implying an active Russian involvement. Fur-
thermore, the Chinese ‘Economic Belt and Road’ initiative implies, in the next 
future, a growth of China’s influence in Central Asia, which is likely to be per-
ceived as detrimental to Pakistan and India strategic interests in the same region 
(Käkönen in this book). Moreover, notwithstanding their common BRICS mem-
bership, China’s and India’s interests could collide, in turn, with Russia’s Eura-
sian Economic Initiative, which represent an attempt by Russia to foster its re-
gional influence in Central Asia and Eastern Europe.  
Partially related to the geopolitical divergences, there are some political elements 
marking the difference among the five, namely the democratic issue. Brazil, India 
and South Africa have in common the same political system and share the same 
democratic values, a circumstance that made them converge on much more issues 
than those in the domain of BRICS cooperation. From this point of view, China 
and Russia demonstrated the sharing of different visions about specific issues, 
like human rights and social development, as well as in the case for the reform of 
the UN Security Council, when both opposed to the entry of IBSA countries as 
permanent members (Flemes 2009).  
Political differences produce also alignment’s outputs, like the would-be Pacific 
democratic alliance, sponsored by the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, be-
tween Australia, Japan and India to contain China’s influence expanding in the 
area and to prevent a SCO’s takeover. This last circumstance sounds familiar, if 
we are to consider the existing situation of strategic rivalry between India and 
China, coupled with New Delhi’s support to the American pivot to Asia embodied 
by the India’s Act East policy (Gaens & Ruohomäki 2017) and the recent revival 
and reorganization of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Eisentraut & Gaens 
2018). 
As it emerges from the facts discussed above, BRICS experience is still loaded 
with shadows rather than lights, and China takes the lion’s share among the five 
members. Despite the coordination efforts made during ministerial meetings and 
talks, their action seems to be less than coordinated, as it takes place more on the 
ground of the adoption of common principles and guidelines for action than on a 
mere and factual political level. Moreover, there exist many fragile areas of 
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conflicting interests, which rest mainly among China, India and Russia on very 
pragmatic issues like trade, security and economic regionalism. 
The relative lack of cohesion on this ground could lead one to side with the critics 
of BRICS, considering it more an eclectic diplomatic move earmarked to conti-
nuity in international politics rather than a possible move towards change. The 
opposite tensions that exist between regionalism and multilateralism within 
BRICS show the reality of a process in its first phase of development. All mem-
bers are clearly discontent with the present economic global governance frame-
work and, when it comes to take collective action at the multilateral level, the 
BRICS consensus coalesces around major and general topics. Things change 
when action is taken to address issues concerning national interests. At this level, 
regionalism tends to prevail over multilateralism even within BRICS, letting con-
tradictions arising. Moreover, Chinese behavior can be considered one of ‘con-
tested multilateralism’ (Morse & Keohane, 2014; Weaver 2015), where every 
multilateral move is counterbalanced by an advancement of Chinese national in-
terest fulfillment.  
Given the weight of China, the following section will focus on the potential ca-
pability of China to influence the process of continuity or change through the two 
mentioned China-led MDBs, the NDB and the AIIB.  
 
Non-liberal multilateralism? 
The growing consensus about the necessity for a change in the global governance 
of development let the two new banks come to life, in a context of growing infra-
structural investment needs and opportunities. In comparison with other invest-
ment actors and tools, multilateral development banks have the merit of being 
able to mobilize much more capitals than traditional private economic operators 
do.  
Both NDB and AIIB were born to meet the needs of infrastructure investments in 
the developing countries. The history of multilateral development banks roughly 
follows the evolution of regionalism in its phases, which are conventionally 
named ‘First, second and third wave’.  
The first wave of regionalism took place during the ’50s–’70s, and it led to the 
further expansion of the World Bank Group with the creation of the International 
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Finance Corporation and the International Finance Association. Many other 
MDBs were born in that period, including those attaining regional integration 
processes in Africa (African Development Bank), Asia (Asian Development 
Bank), South America (Andean Development Bank) and Arab Countries (Islamic 
Development Bank).  
The following wave occurred in Europe, at the apex of the European political 
integration process in the early ’90s. After the dissolution of the USSR, the inte-
grating the Eastern European countries into the political community of the EU 
became a priority. The enlargement process required a pragmatic approach to ac-
commodate these countries’ economies migration to market economy. For this 
reason, one of the actions taken was the creation of the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development in 1991, coupled with the empowerment of the 
existing European Investment Bank. These two institutions shortly became the 
economic and financial core tool of European enlargement process, boosting both 
infrastructure investment and finance in those countries during the post-Soviet 
era.  
After the European-centered wave of regionalism, we finally get to the third, and 
last, wave, mainly based in Asia and characterized by a notable Chinese activism. 
Even if NDB and AIIB follow the path of MDB’s flourishing in regionalist expe-
riences, they differ from their existing counterparts in that they are run by emerg-
ing countries. This specificity acquires even more relevance if we think that 
MDB’s are state driven banks, whose capitalization is backed by public balances. 
This means that, for the first time in the brief history of global multilateral insti-
tutionalism, emerging countries took the initiative in a critical sector, signaling 
that some kind of power shift is occurring within the international system.  
Even more interesting, both NDB and AIIB’s first declared mission is to boost 
infrastructure investments in emerging countries, at times where existing western-
led institutions struggle to invert the path of infrastructure investment disengage-
ment previously adopted. As testified by many sources, it is plenty of room in the 
sector of infrastructural investment needs. As reported by GiHub (2017), based 
on a projected GDP 4 per cent annual growth, the global infrastructure investment 
gap for the period 2016-2040 would be of about $ 9-10 trillion (the figure scales 
up by additional $3.5 trillion if UNSDG are to be meet). On a projected total 
infrastructure investment need of nearly $93 trillion for the period 2016-2040, 
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Asia will need nearly half of that amount, around $50.770 trillion. China alone 
would absorb $28 trillion, more of the half of the Asian quota and about 32 per 
cent of the global total. These huge finance requirements for developing coun-
tries’ growth have had a heavy impact on the substantial inertia of existing inter-
national financial institutions.  
The main reason behind the creation of NDB and AIIB is exactly the desire, by 
these countries, to define on their own the rules for their development, without 
being tied to the lack of voicing option in the western-led World Bank and IMF. 
Although a reform of the voting rights in both the World Bank and IMF was in-
voked in 2010, many developing countries still experience an underweight of 
their voting option. It is not surprising that regionalist temptations are arising 
throughout the developing countries. If we look to the growing weight of the Bra-
zilian, Indian and Chinese economies (just to mention three out of five BRICS 
member) and, more generally, if we consider that the demographic and economic 
growth of whole continents like Asia and Africa, they are supposed to overwhelm 
those of North America and Europe by 2050. 
Some scholars consider the experience of the new MDB’s as an effort by China 
to turn upside down the power balance in global governance (Ikenberry and Lim 
2017). Indeed, China enjoys the lion’s share in the NDB and the AIIB, and it 
provides them financial backing through its public finance. Moreover, China re-
tains the major share of voting rights within the AIIB and it is the major share-
holder in the NDB’s Contingent Reserve Arrangement, where it has subscribed 
$41billion out of $100 billion paid-in capital (CRA). 
There exists no consensus about whether China is pursuing a national interest-
based strategy or merely a counterbalancing strategy against the United States 
and its allies. What we can say with relative certainty is that China is following a 
nuanced strategy, relying on the one hand on the consolidation of its hard power 
through intensive industrial and infrastructure investment policies and, on the 
other, on the consolidation of its soft power through the political coordination 
with other developing countries.  
Victor Cha coined the term powerplay (Cha 2016), meaning a mixed strategy 
based upon bilateral diplomacy and multilateral bargaining, both realized at the 
same time. Though the original focus of his theory was to explain the successful 
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post WWII American policy in alliances’ building, the same theoretical scheme 
could be applied to China’s foreign policy in Asia and abroad.  
 
Strategic contestation: a matter of Hegemony? 
Posited that all the initiatives mentioned so far aim at contesting the existing he-
gemony within the current international order, it is worth trying to frame concep-
tually how actually China is doing that.  
According to the definition of international liberal order given in the beginning 
of this chapter, the main understanding here is that China wants to contest the 
hegemony of the United States within the current order, and not the international 
liberal order per se. To this extent, it is worth nothing that it would be a no-sense 
for China to contest the international order, given that within this order it experi-
enced more than a 10 years long double-digit growth path, which let Chinese 
Government laying the foundations of contemporary China’s economic power.  
What is all about the contestation is the liberal blend of the current international 
order, which is the trademark of American hegemony. Emerging countries like 
BRICS and China in particular, seem to be dissatisfied with the current systemic 
hegemony. Given that the first task to be performed by a would-be hegemon is to 
structure the international institutional system according to its needs and desire in 
order to become the hegemon, that’s no surprise that the American and western 
dominance over multilateral institutions paved the way for a contestation dy-
namic. It is a matter of distributive inefficiency, where the most influential actor 
of the international system is no longer able to provide public goods within the 
international order. To this respect, Richard Saull (2012) has provided a convinc-
ing analysis on how the relationship between hegemony and uneven development 
can be understood. Saull’s analysis starts from a neo-Gramscian perspective, link-
ing the evolutionary path of hegemony to the complex relationship between the 
regime of material accumulation and the social, political, ideational, and institu-
tional fabric of the historical block that is a specific grouping of actor coalescing 
around a specific set of political values. He understands “hegemony as interna-
tional leadership centered on a particular state society complex whereby the re-
production of dominance is realized through the active involvement of other state-
society complexes” (Saull 2012: 324).  
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In Saull’s words (2012: 330-335), the current state society complex, or historical 
bloc, is a neoliberal one, that started forming in the early ’80s and completed the 
transition after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. According to his analysis, the 
dynamic of uneven development is structurally tied to the neoliberal historical 
bloc, to the extent that in order to reproduce the legitimacy of the neoliberal his-
torical bloc certain economic and political outcomes are to be obtained.  
This is because hegemony founds itself on the mutual relationship between struc-
ture (distributive ability of the capitalist economic system) and agency (political 
outcomes produced by the historical bloc). When the relationship is broken, that 
is the material structure is no longer followed by an effective action in the politi-
cal, economic and social domain by the historic bloc, a crisis outbreaks. 
According to this interpretation of the evolutionary dynamic of hegemonic cycles, 
that’s no surprise that China and BRICS started to contest the US led international 
liberal order moments after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. That was the moment 
when the state society complex of the neoliberal block was no longer able to adopt 
(or to adapt) policies that were coherent to the new conditions created by the au-
tonomous development of capitalism.  
The conceptual framework laid out by Saull is not, in principle, inconsistent with 
power transition theory (PTT). Although PTT is a state-centered theory and it 
basically assumes a hierarchically organized international environment (Kugler 
et al 1989), it nonetheless reveals itself to be much more dynamic and integrated 
than traditional Realist and Hegemonic Stability Theory approaches. PTT departs 
from the static representation of the international system in that it focuses on dif-
ferential growth rates and on the way how different growth paths have the poten-
tial to alter the distribution of relative power among nations. Therefore, interna-
tional stability or instability is the result of the degree of satisfaction with the 
existing status quo. If one assumes that the existing status quo is that of the inter-
national liberal order led under US hegemony, it is not difficult to understand 
Chinese actions in terms of dissatisfaction with American hegemony within this 
order. From this point of view, Chinese foreign policy looks to be crafted exactly 
in order to propose an alternative approach to the conduct of international affairs, 
in what concerns its economic initiatives in the fields of development finance, 
trade and investments.  
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Together with the Belt and Road Initiative and China’s participation to the NDB’s 
CRA, the AIIB is part of this economic foreign policy. Through the establishment 
of the AIIB the Chinese Government seems to be oriented to mirror the role of 
the World Bank, at least in what concerns development finance and the redefini-
tion of the governance schemes of international economic policy. As it is stated 
in art. 31.2 of the Articles of Agreement, the bank “…shall not interfere in the 
political affairs of any member…Only economic considerations shall be relevant 
to [its] decisions” (AIIB, 2015). This statement is in sheer contrast with the es-
tablished practices of the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the World Bank 
through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and 
the IMF in the field of monetary and financial governance. These institutions put 
conditionality on the provision of loans, like domestic political and economic re-
forms, which typically are the main instruments through which the American led 
Bretton Woods system has promoted the spread of liberal democracy and mar-
kets’ liberalization.  
On the contrary, the loans provisioning system of the AIIB is untied from such 
kind of domestic interference, making the AIIB intervention in the developmental 
infrastructure investment process apparently neutral. As Bräutigam and Gallagher 
(2014) highlighted, the new MDB’s gave the opportunity to all participating 
countries to meet their own national interests. Moreover, the structure of the AIIB 
reflects emerging countries’ dissatisfaction with respect to the degree of repre-
sentativeness that the current international multilateral framework is granting 
them.  
If one looks to the distribution of voting shares within the WB-IBRD, it is evident 
how the major world economy after the US, China, is overtly under-represented, 
with 4.8 per cent of voting share, lagging behind Japan (7.79 per cent) whose 
economy is roughly one third of Chinese GDP. A similar situation is replicated 
within the IMF, where China holds 6 per cent of voting shares, against 16.7 per 
cent of the United States and 6.2 per cent of Japan.16  
Within the AIIB, instead, the figure is reversed, with China holding the superma-
jority threshold of voting shares up to 26.5 per cent, while Japan and the United 
 
16 WB-IBRD website 
(http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/795101541106471736/IBRDCountryVotingTable.pdf) and 
IMF website (https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx)  
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States have not subscribed any capital quota and keep working within the other 
regional MDB, the Asian Development Bank (ADB). In the ADB, where China 
weights 6.4 per cent, the United States and Japan both have 15.6 per cent of voting 
shares, which empowers them with the veto power.17 Most interestingly, notwith-
standing American ostracism, many US-aligned countries (Germany, Great Brit-
ain, France, Italy, South Korea, Australia) subscribed the AIIB paid-in capital. 
This, as Summers (2015) made clear that the creation of the AIIB marked the 
moment in which “the United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global 
economic system.” 
Table 1: Voting shares in Multilateral Institutions 
Data from IBRD (WB), IMF, AIIB and ADB 
 
States Population 
(2018) 
GDP 
(2018 – 
constant 
2010 
US$) 
ADB AIIB World 
Bank 
(IBRD) 
IMF 
China 
(PRC) 
1,39 B 10,79 T 6,4% 26,53% 4,79% 6,09% 
Japan 126,5 M 6,19 T 15,6% ------ 7,77% 6,15% 
United 
States 
327,1 M 17,85 T 15,6% ------ 15,45% 16,52% 
Germany 82,9 M 3,93 T 4,3% 4,17% 4,08% 5,32% 
India 1,35 B 2,84 T 6,3% 7,60% 2,96% 2,63% 
France 66,9 M 2,92 T 2,3% 3,19% 3,80% 4,03% 
 
17 ADB website https://www.adb.org/site/investors/credit-fundamentals/shareholders 
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Russian 
Fed. 
144,4 M 1,72 T ------ 5,98% 2,70% 2,59% 
Brazil 209,4 M 2,84 T ------ * 2,18% 2,22% 
South Af-
rica 
57,7 M 429,500 
B 
------ * 0,74% 0,64% 
*Brazil and South Africa are prospective founding members 
These figures show how, within the framework of the Bretton Woods system, the 
WB and the IMF give representation only on the basis of the subscribed capital, 
while they ignore the demographic and economic dynamics of such countries like 
China.  
Recently, the 15th IMF quota review ended with a big failure. The original prop-
ositions made by the G20 and the IMFC summits were to bring about a successful 
conclusion of the quota review process so that quota shares of the dynamic econ-
omies would have been increased in line with their relative positions in the world 
economy. The quota review ended on October 2019, leaving the framework un-
modified. Many criticisms have been raised by the Governor of the People's Bank 
of China Yi Gang. Yi expressed his deep disappointment for the failure of the 
quota redistribution process and, most importantly, he stated that “China will, 
along with the other parties, continue to push for reforms of the IMF's quotas that 
will strengthen the voice and representation of emerging market economies and 
developing countries, narrow the gap between actual and calculated quotas in a 
constructive manner, and reduce distortion in quota structure to reflect members' 
relative positions in the global economy” (Yi 2019:5, emphasis added). 
To this respect, the NDB’s Contingent Reserve Arrangement could be understood 
as an alternate institutional instrument to the IMF. Within the CRA, BRICS coun-
tries have set up their own monetary fund, which is supposed to provide liquidity 
assistance in case of the outbreak of a financial crisis. Moreover, China is the 
largest capital subscriber with $41 billion on a total of $100 billion subscribed 
capital. Although the CRA is not legally formalized, thus lacking the capacity to 
act as a real alternative to the IMF (Würdemann 2018), it is nonetheless true that 
in the long-run it can evolve into a viable alternative to the IMF for developing 
and emerging countries, unless a serious reform of existing multilateral 
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institutions takes place. Notwithstanding China is considered an ‘immature cred-
itor’ (McKinnon & Schanbl 2014: 13), the creation of the CRA and the inclusion 
of the Renminbi (RMB) in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights basket 2015 is part 
of a strategy of internationalization of the RMB. As Paola Subacchi defined it 
(2017: 139), the RMB is a ‘currency in progress’, and its inclusion in the NDB’s 
CRA is likely to be a Beijing strategy to expand its economic and financial influ-
ence abroad and, in particular, outside Asia (South Africa and Brazil). 
In support of the counter-hegemonic argument, it should be noted that the United 
States has reacted accordingly to the fundamentals of the power transition theory. 
The creation of brand new international multilateral institutions by China may 
have been understood by US officials as signals of the existence of a Chinese 
counter-hegemonic strategy, aimed at weakening the hierarchical structure of the 
current international liberal order. The US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership negotiations and the war on tariffs put in place by President Donald 
Trump, just to mention the most recent policy outputs, can be read as moves ori-
ented at diminishing the gains in relative power obtained by China in the last two 
decades. Although the theory is strongly rooted in the material power argument, 
the issue at stake here is not power-maximization but utility-maximization. A 
cross-interpretation between the very content of power transition theory and 
Saull’s contribution could lead to a different conclusion than the mere great pow-
ers confrontation, advocated by some as the most likely output (Friedberg 2012; 
Mearsheimer 2010; Swaine and Tellis 2000). China may be exploiting its relative 
power gains vis-à-vis the United States to build new institutions with two inter-
twined purposes. 
The first one is to exploit new institutions like the AIIB and the NDB to coalesce 
all those developing countries that are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the 
current international liberal order. Providing new rules for development finance 
and offering new perspectives for international financial governance with the 
backing of China’s financial and economic capabilities could eventually push 
small powers to take a stance in favor of China and its continuous call for a sys-
tem’s change. 
The second purpose is to create pressure for structural reforms, through the same 
institutions, on existing ones, by leveraging on their dysfunctional design. Here 
the hegemon condition of the United States must be taken into consideration. If 
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it’s true, as it is, that the international liberal order is led under the political direc-
tion of the United States, this has to be confronted with the capitalist development 
process of China and the effects it is producing on the ability of the current 
hegemon to properly address upcoming challenges. China’s actions have taken 
place in the framework of a paradoxical situation. Chinese growth has occurred 
within and thanks to a neo-liberal capitalist model of accumulation. Despite its 
loose ties with the western geopolitical bloc (United States, Europe, Japan, Can-
ada and Australia) and its distance from the stances of liberal politics that charac-
terize that bloc, China greatly enjoyed the benefits of the neoliberal mode of ac-
cumulation by realizing heavy trade surpluses that sustained its persistent 
economic growth. The direct consequence of such large trade surpluses, paired 
with the manipulation of the Renminbi exchange rate and a state-driven economy, 
has been the creation of a large amount of liquidity that flowed into the American 
economic system, sustaining its over-indebted financial sector (McNally 2009).  
When the crisis exploded in 2007-2008, it unveiled the unsustainability of a 
global economic system based on the US absorption of the world’s exports. The 
crisis has broken the neoliberal cycle of differential growth and global demand, 
which is the material foundation of American hegemony, and hit as well the so-
cio-political foundations of American hegemony (Saull 2012: 335). The crisis did 
not actually undermined the American hegemonic position within the interna-
tional liberal order, given that all the measures taken to absorb the shock have 
been developed in the framework of the G20 forum, which applied neoliberal 
prescriptions and principles. To this extent, the crisis was addressed by replicating 
the role of the American hegemon among a major number of neo-liberal capitalist 
actors, thus reproducing the logic of the social, political and economic founda-
tions of neo-liberal American hegemony. China has fundamentally adhered to the 
system, accepting those governance rules, even if the crisis proved the normative 
and regulative inefficacy of that model of global governance featured in the in-
ternational liberal order. 
Thus, the Chinese strategy of institutional leveraging could be understood as an 
effort to expose the growing inability of the neo-liberal model of governance to 
govern the capitalist dynamics. If this is going to be the case, the most likely 
consequence would not be the breakdown of the international order as a whole, 
but the end of the legitimacy of the current hegemon and, consequently, the fall 
of the authority of the neo-liberal model of global governance (Cardenal and 
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Araujo 2013; Kupchan 2012; Jacques 2009). To this extent, the creation of new 
multilateral institutions by China can be interpreted as an effort to develop and 
consolidate an alternative working framework to govern the capitalist dynamic, 
within a different kind of international order.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined the international and political environment in which 
new institutional designs are being created. The core argument, the contestation 
of the current international order, has been linked to the dissatisfaction of devel-
oping and emerging countries with the way how the neo-liberal model of global 
governance addressed and is addressing the global economy and finance.  
The liberal international order, today, is put under pressure by the growing con-
testation of its legitimacy on behalf of those countries that are asking for major 
reforms, specifically in the issue areas of development and finance. The process 
of institution building, through which AIIB and NDB have been established, can 
be signals of an ongoing effort by China to alter the structure of the current inter-
national order, in what concerns the fundamental set of political and social values 
that inspire the liberal international order’s model of governance.  
The alteration of the structure, in particular, is not directed against the order itself, 
but against the dominance of the United States within that order. As discussed 
before, the US dominance within the liberal international order is the source of 
the liberal character of the current international order. The recent inability of the 
system to keep the pace with the evolution of the global economy by adopting an 
adequate set of reform policies has the potential to become a major weakness for 
the liberal model of global governance. It could be exploited by dissatisfied states 
like China to directly question the adequacy of the liberal economic and political 
values as the sole guiding principles in defining the models of global governance. 
To this extent, an augmented criticism, together with an increased inability to 
govern the whole system, could result in the weakening of the American authority 
and legitimacy within the system.  
The Chinese foreign policy activism, to this respect, is coherent with the idea of 
a phase of transition in the structure of the international order. China set up alter-
native multilateral institutions in response to the inability of existing ones to ad-
dress important issues like representativeness and reform of specific policy areas. 
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The question of whether Beijing will manage to shape the international environ-
ment is largely a matter of how the current hegemon, the United States, will react 
to Chinese moves.  
The most consequential strategy for the US and its allies would be that of accom-
modating the requests for reforms. This would be a useful tool to gradually tone 
down alternative institutional framework like the AIIB and the NDB, through a 
greater integration of emerging countries within the governance structure of the 
international liberal order.  
This is not an easy task to pursue. As discussed before, China’s integration within 
the current economic global order has been the main source of the growing Chi-
nese economic power worldwide. Considering that Beijing’s foreign policy rests 
largely on its economic power, an accommodation strategy by the West should 
be accompanied by some kind of revision of the hierarchical structure of the cur-
rent order. 
It must be highlighted, however, that the result of this dynamic is still largely 
uncertain. Whether or not the US will remain the system’s hegemon or China will 
overtake it to occupy the apex of the international order is a long-term issue. In 
the short and medium-term, the confrontation is likely to remain on the ground of 
simple contestation and institutional leveraging.  
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 Crisis and Opportunity: How the Greek Crisis 
Began, Continued, and Opened a Door for China 
into the EU 
Terry McDonald  
 
Abstract 
The formation of the Euro zone was supposed to mark a new age of economic stability 
for member countries, especially those prone-to-fluctuation small states therein. Instead, 
the age of the Euro has been marred by a deep and protracted crisis, rigid response, and 
new vulnerability for Europe to challenges internal and external. This paper will first 
explain the origins of the Greek crisis up until the beginning of 2017, chosen for available 
complete economic statistics. Then, it will list 6 main economic lessons to be drawn 
therefrom. It will then show how inaction on the part of Greece’s western creditors 
opened the door for China to get a foothold in Greece, and through it to Europe itself. 
Finally, it will touch on the lessons for other small states—from classical Realist theory, 
from critical World Systems theory, and from a modern Financialization approach—in 
order to make the case useful for IR application to the central issue: that the contemporary 
small state faces dwindling options for insulating their economies from irrational action 
in the face of ever-increasing international financial flows.  
Keywords: Greece, Economy, China, Realism, World Systems, Financialization 
 
Introduction  
There has been, and continues to be, a great deal of research into the Greek eco-
nomic crisis from the discipline of economics; yet the lessons for the causes and 
implications of the Greek economic crisis may lie just beyond the realm of the 
economy. What is to be learned by other small states from the specifics of the 
Greek experience? How does the rigid western institutional response—especially 
as compared to China’s—shape the future of governing institutions? As such, this 
paper will not rest at explaining the economic factors behind the case, but will 
seek to interpret them through the lens of IR, specifically through the use of Re-
alism, World Systems Theory, and Financialization. This should serve to help 
bridge the gap between the wealth of economic study in this matter, and the 
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necessary discussion thereof in IR circles. Covering as much ground as it has, it 
does not seek, however, to provide a comprehensive deep theoretical analysis; 
rather the aim is to provide a clear platform thereto, in clarifying the case to fa-
cilitate the necessary IR discussion of the question: do small states posses the 
capability of rational choice in economic policy and planning in a financialized 
world? 
The article shall thus take the form of three main sections. First, it shall present a 
historical overview of the origins of the Greek economic crisis. The following 
section will be devoted to analysis of the role of Greece’s membership in the Euro 
zone as both beneficial and limiting factor in the onset of and recovery to the 
economic crisis. The article will then highlight the self-defeating geo-economic 
result of the ideological rigidity of the western creditors. In being strident in mak-
ing an example of Greece, and imposing austerity in such forms as insisting upon 
the sale of assets as opposed to tax increases, even in time of primary surplus, the 
door was opened for China to buy its way into Greece’s economy, and in so doing, 
into Greece’s diplomatic calculations, to the detriment of EU unity. The third sec-
tion will interpret the lessons of the case though the prisms of Realism, World 
Systems Theory, and Financialization in order to demonstrate the theses that, no 
matter how approached, the small state faces diminished options for economic 
sovereignty in the face of ever-increasing international financial flows. All this 
should answer the questions: what does the Greek experience in the financial cri-
sis teach other states about currency policy and exposure to irrational capital 
flows, and how could new IR approaches, especially Financialization, add to clas-
sic IR theory in understanding these lessons? 
 
Theoretical framework 
After completing the case, this chapter will offer initial IR theoretical analysis of 
its implications for small states and the system in which they operate. This anal-
ysis will build upon the framework of previous works (McDonald 2015, 2016) in 
using Realism, World Systems Theory, and Financialization as lenses. The func-
tion of these choices is in the rationale that “Realism is state-centric, world sys-
tems is systemic, and the use of both allows for a suitably representative sample 
of the possibilities of IR analysis of the matter,” (McDonald 2016), and Finan-
cialization providing context where “political and popular control of the economy 
has increasingly given way to ‘expert governance’, so that political parties, left 
and right, are reduced to tinkering and social issues, as opposed to fundamental 
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questions of the organization and goals of this now ‘financialized’ economy” ( 
McDonald 2016). Offering insights as to how these theories could be used to con-
textualize the constraints small states face in their economic policy choices serves 
the chapter’s goal of providing a coherent platform from which this discussion 
can move from the realm of economics to international relations in future analy-
sis. 
 
The makings of crisis 
Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011) provide a model of the events leading up to the 
crisis in which the process is divided into five stages. This model leaves out the 
longest and most important stage: the deficit spending and accumulation of debt 
from 1979-2009, but this will be covered below.  
The first stage begins at the onset of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United 
States in summer 2007. As noted by Gibson et al (2012), Reichlin (2014), Missio 
and Watzka (2011), and others, Greek sovereign bond yields up until this point 
had held at low, perhaps irrationally low levels. In stage one, these made a small 
climb, from 25 basis points to 65 against the German bund by August 2008.  
The second stage occurred between September 2008 and March 2009. This, the 
peak of the global credit crunch, saw Greek bond spreads shoot up to 285 basis 
points. Greece was not alone in facing rising costs of borrowing in these tight-
ened, nervous markets, especially amongst the EU periphery, but it was apparent 
that Greece and Ireland had been identified as the riskiest bets.  
The third stage offered a brief respite, with bond spreads declining to 121 basis 
points in August 2009. This, however, was more reflective of an overall easing of 
the global credit crunch, as Greek and Irish bonds still faced unique pressure.  
The fourth stage, from September 2009 to mid-November 2010, is not exceptional 
economically, but politically. A snap election in October 2009 resulted in a land-
slide left-wing victory. The new government, upon auditing, drastically increased 
the projected deficit from 6 to 12.7 per cent of GDP. Markets still held relatively 
steady until the submission of the new budget to the European Commission in 
November 2010.  
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In the fifth stage all hell broke loose. Markets, seeing insufficient budget reform, 
bolted. Spreads shot up from 135 basis points in mid-November to a whopping 
586 basis points in April 2010. EMU member states bickered over a response, 
attempted a half-hearted 45-billion Euro loan which failed to calm markets, and 
on 23 April 2010, Greece was forced to request the activation of the EU/IMF 
rescue mechanism (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas 2011: 175). 
 
Internal 
The origin of the Greek crisis is debt and deficit spending. Until 1979, Greece had 
maintained a healthy level of public debt, holding consistently around 25 per cent 
of GDP under both the rule of the military junta and the Karamlis regimes (Kou-
retas and Prodromos 2010). It was under the socialist government of Papandreou 
that deficit spending began to rise. Public debt rose above 75 per cent of GDP by 
the end of Papandreou’s first turn as Prime Minister, and then reached well over 
the oft-cited as unsustainable level of 100 per cent of GDP under Mitsotakis and 
Papandreou again, dipping only under this line briefly for a couple of years before 
exploding in the crisis.  
Featherstone (2011) observed the “Paradoxes of Domestic Governance” in 
Greece as a factor in the creation of the crisis. These paradoxes served to limit the 
reform capacity of Greece, and continue to do so.  
The first paradox is that although the Constitution of Greece gives unusually 
strong power to the executive branch of its government, there is a decided lack of 
implementation strength in the public administration at large. Such bureaucratic 
problems can manifest themselves in embarrassing fashions. A striking example 
occurred in the negotiations for the bailout, when the government was forced to 
admit that it “did not really know how many employees they had” (Daley 2011). 
The second paradox is that liberal democratic formal structures are supposed to 
co-exist with a political culture of “clientelism, rent-seeking, and corruption” 
(Featherstone 2011: 196). Daley (2011) noted that since the 1970s a tradition had 
emerged of each victorious party adding its supporters to the government pay-
rolls, compounding over time: 
“There was really a party going on,” said Yannis Stournaras, an economist and the 
director of the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research in Athens. “The 
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government kept adding bonuses and benefits and pensions. At election time there 
was a boom cycle as they handed out jobs. Now they need to cut,” he added. “But 
they have already lost precious time” (Daley 2011). 
Indeed, such practices have inspired a level of cynicism that undermines any re-
form agenda. Transparency International ranked Greece as having the highest per-
ceived corruption index in southern Europe (Featherstone 2011:197). 
This paper will include Featherstone's third paradox, which is of an attachment to 
the statist forms of delivery of services to the public, under the umbrella of the 
second paradox. While Greeks pay the highest private levels of expenditure on 
both health and education in the EU, both are administered in a statist form.  
An offshoot of these paradoxes is seen in the collection of tax revenues. Schneider 
et al (2010) have calculated that the informal economy of Greece is equivalent to 
29.5 per cent of GDP. There are well-known examples of tax evasion amongst 
professionals as well. Featherstone cites the example of the outrage that followed 
the Finance Ministry announcing that, in a wealthy part of Athens, 90 of 150 doc-
tors claimed net annual incomes of less than 30,000 Euros, with 30 of these claim-
ing less than 10,000. Even more telling are the results of a 2012 study in which 
the authors used the data of a large commercial bank to show that the reported 
incomes of debt holders would leave them in what would be financially impossi-
ble situations if true (Artavanis et al 2016). The results were that “On average, 
self-employed Greeks spend 82% of their monthly reported income—i.e. the 
amount they declare to the tax office—on servicing debt payments. Some profes-
sions, like lawyers and doctors, appear to spend more than 100% of their income 
on debt servicing,” which represents clear evidence of wide-scale under-reporting 
of actual incomes (The Economist 2012).Even more disturbing is that the banks 
themselves in Greece have come to accept that incomes will be under-reported, 
and administer loans on the basis that applicants have falsified their reported earn-
ings (Atravanis et al 2016). 
 
External 
The obvious external cause of the Greek financial crisis was the collapse of the 
US sub-prime mortgage market and economy. Greece had maintained low sover-
eign spreads and thus low borrowing costs from the lead up to its entry into the 
Euro in 2001 until the onset of the crisis (Gibson et al 2012). While US crisis did 
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not change the fundamentals of the Greek economy, it did present two forms of 
pressure. First, these wild miscalculations by the major ratings agencies caused 
markets to raise fresh doubt about assets previously seen as safe (Stiglitz 2010). 
This scrutiny and volatility pushed sovereign spreads against Germany towards a 
level that better reflected the structural differences in the health of their respective 
economies. This was the trigger for the sovereign debt crisis, which in turn was 
the trigger for the Greek banking crisis, and as such, while not changing the fun-
damentals of the Greek economy listed above, still acted as a major external factor 
(Provopoulos 2014). 
Another factor was the indecision and inaction of the Euro zone governments 
(Kouretas, and Prodromos 2010: 396). Mired in resistance, largely on the part of 
Germany, and haranguing over questions of the legality of a bailout under the 
aegis of the Maastricht agreements, the Euro partners fiddled while Athens 
burned. This was not helped by the doubts cast by the ECB about whether down-
graded Greek bonds could count as collateral in liquidity requirements, further 
destabilizing an unstable ship.  
Additionally, Greece's major trading partners in the Balkans were hit by the same 
global crisis. These negative trade effects further compounded the downward cy-
cle.  
Indeed, Stiglitz (2016) and Streeck (2014) have argued that the root of the crisis 
lies largely in the structure of the Euro zone itself. The massive imbalance of 
financial flows from richer states (i.e. Germany) had no offsetting force in the 
structure of the agreement for the poorer states (i.e. Greece). When the crisis hit, 
and the flows flowed outward, the sole remaining option—internal devaluation—
was both inadequate and overly punitive for the affected societies.  
 
Lessons 
There are many important lessons to be taken from the events and factors outlined 
above, which are important in understanding the Greek Government’s options 
and constraints in both a currency union and wider financialized global economic 
system.  
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1) The bond market can both under- and over-react 
From its entry into the Euro in 2001, Greece had enjoyed favourable interest rate 
spreads compared to Germany (Provopoulos 2014: 242). The problem, however, 
is that this convergence of pricing did not accurately reflect the economic funda-
mentals of the two nations. Greece continued with deficit spending, never once 
coming below the 3 per cent of GDP for 2001-2009, with its debt to GDP ratio 
always near (and usually well above) 100 per cent of GDP; and yet from 2000 to 
2008 these spreads actually dropped and held low. So, as Greece’s debt went from 
103.7 per cent of GDP in 2001 to 129.7 per cent in 2009, the bond market never 
imposed the corrective pressure that supposedly underpins the market. As Gibson 
et al have calculated, “prior to 2008-2009, financial markets paid little attention 
to the deteriorating Greek economic fundamentals in pricing spreads” (2014: 
417). Thus it is shown that the bond market cannot be relied upon to impose pro-
portionate discipline in times of growth and plenty.  
The same study has shown that, at the onset of the crisis, the market swung too 
far in the opposite direction. The markets got caught up in the psychology of a 
self-reinforcing-feedback-loop, and as such overcorrected upon earlier mistakes. 
Thus, in failing to act rationally both in the time before the crisis and in its wake, 
the bond markets and the pricing therein have proven to be an imperfect means 
of ensuring discipline in issuers of debt.  
2) A sovereign crisis can quickly become a banking crisis 
Before the onset of the sovereign crisis outlined above, the Greek banking sector 
had remarkably sound fundamentals, with “high capital-adequacy ratios, low 
loan-to-deposit ratios, and essentially no toxic assets of the kind that set off the 
2007 global financial crisis” (Provopoulos 2014: 242). It was also not dispropor-
tionately large relative to the overall size of the economy, possessing assets of 
193 per cent of GDP, compared to 777 per cent for Ireland, 311 per cent for Spain, 
685 per cent for Cyprus, and those in Iceland had reached more than ten times its 
GDP by the time of the Lehman Brothers collapse (McDonald 2014a). Nonethe-
less, instability spreads, and the domestic banking sector could not escape.  
Sovereign downgrades led to liquidity problems, and such uncertainty led to with-
drawals, reducing the assets upon which debts were leveraged, which forced a 
selloff of assets at reduced prices compounding the problem in a viscous cycle. 
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This deterioration led to ratings downgrades for the banks themselves, which 
forced them from global credit markets, leading to a full-blown banking crisis, 
which then required funding from an already over-extended public treasury 
(Provopoulos 2014: 244). Thus, the lesson is that even a seemingly secure bank-
ing sector is not immune from the pressures of sovereign stresses, and then, in 
needing bailouts itself, compounds them. Infection from a sovereign crisis can 
therefore destroy banking sector equity (Gibson et al 2016). 
3) A state cannot run deficits in good times and bad 
As stated above, Greece resorted to deficit spending every year from 1979 on-
wards to the present (Chronis and Zombanakis 2016: 32). This cumulated into the 
staggering debt loads discussed above, projected to surpass 150 per cent of GDP 
by 2020. In so doing, Greece squandered a major opportunity offered in the initial 
years of its Euro zone membership.2001-2008 not only featured the low sovereign 
spreads discussed earlier, but also were marked by strong economic growth, as 
seen in fig 1.  
 
Fig. 1. Economic growth (2001-2008) 
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com, National Statistical Service of Greece. 
With such robust indicators, and capital from the EU exacerbating current account 
deficits, time was ripe for Greece to undertake the needed reforms of its economy 
to tackle structural deficits. Instead, it dawdled, and having thus squandered its 
opportunity to gets its internal affairs in order, Greece had to turn to the ‘Troika’ 
(IMF, ECB, EC) for funding, and the harsh austerity measures they required.  
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4) Currency Union likely requires a Banking Union 
In the absence of the ability to devalue a currency, there remain four adjustment 
mechanisms to deal with asymmetric shocks (Goodhart 2014). These are wage 
flexibility, migration, fiscal federalism, and cross border/federal banking. It has 
been noted that, in comparison to the USA (taken here as a relatively successful 
currency union), the Euro zone has no proven advantages in wage flexibility, for 
legal and political reasons, and that while migration is an option that is availed of 
in the Euro-zone, there are far greater barriers, namely language, culture, law, and 
other social conditions. Given these, the need for further federalization in a cur-
rency union becomes more pronounced, especially regarding the need for cross 
border/federalized banking, as an absence of this can create the ‘doom loop’ dis-
cussed above (Farhi and Tirole 2017). Here, problems in the sovereign create 
problems in the banking sector, which exacerbate problems in the sovereign, and 
so on into the abyss (De Groen 2015). The extreme regionalization of these banks 
(in the context of the width of the currency union) makes them susceptible to 
asymmetric shocks in a way that more a federalized banking sector could better 
absorb, thus the danger in having a currency union without another of banks.  
5) Currency Union is a mixed bag of benefits and detriments 
Here we find the most inscrutable lessons of the Greek crisis. Consequently, this 
lesson shall be broken into two further main sub-headed sections. The design of 
the Euro and its institutions has been ‘a battle of ideas’, but it is questionable how 
much the interests of states like Greece play in the larger design and policies of 
the Euro zone (Jones 2017; Stiglitz 2016). 
Benefits 
• Bond-pricing confidence 
As was shown above, the Greek Government bond spread versus that of Germany 
was held irrationally low for an extended time. Over the years that covered the 
build-up to its joining of the Euro all the way to when Germany expressed its 
willingness to support emergency funding in the wake of the crisis; Greek bonds 
defied market fundamentals, and in so doing passed on great benefit to the Greek 
state. Lower rates not only served to reduce the cost of borrowing and cycling 
debts, but contributed to high real growth rates over this timeframe (Gibson et al 
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2012: 510). Evidence has shown that in the period from 2000 to 2011, of the ten 
variables that would normally affect bond pricing, four (current account deficit-
to-GDP ratio, relative prices, and fiscal debt-to-GDP ratio) were shown to have 
had negligible, or even counter-intuitive, effects upon the pricing spread of Greek 
bonds. This breathing space was the benefit to Greece that came from Euro mem-
bership, and the implicit partnerships that it entailed.  
• Catch-up 
The period that followed Greece's entry into the EMU saw consistent gains in per-
capita GDP (The Economist 2011). Greek gains outstripped those of EU but non-
EMU members Denmark and the United Kingdom, as seen in the graph (fig. 2).  
 
Fig. 2. Per capita GDP 
Source: The Economist, 2011 
• Lower Inflation 
Greece had long struggled with high inflation even prior to its ascension into the 
EMU. As fig. 3 demonstrates, from the restoration of democracy in the mid-
1970s, inflation rates soared high and remained so until the process of moving 
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into the Euro, during the late 1990s. Rates then stabilized around the 4 per cent 
mark for the remainder of the time until the onset of the crisis, and even then only 
spiked just above 5 per cent before lowering.  
 
Fig. 3. Greek Inflation Rates 
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com, National Statistical Service of Greece. 
This is especially impressive considering that wages in Greece had strong upward 
momentum throughout this period (another benefit in many ways), as will be ex-
plained further below.  
Costs 
• Loss of competitiveness 
In joining the Euro, Greece lost one of the most basic means of regulating com-
petitiveness with its trading partners and the international markets. Greek com-
petitiveness relative to Germany fell precipitously over this time. Honkapohja 
(2014) noted that the unit cost of labour in Greece rose sharply and unfailingly in 
the period from Euro ascension until the crisis, and even post-crisis remain sig-
nificantly higher than original levels, as shown in fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4. Rise and fall of Greek Unit Labour Costs 
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com, National Statistical Service of Greece. 
This means that Greece has lost wage competitiveness; the IMF put the figure at 
9 per cent and the Bank of Greece put it at a whopping 27 per cent (Malliaropulos 
2010). This has combined with loss of competitiveness in another way: pricing. 
Greek price competitiveness has slid by 19 per cent according to the Bank of 
Greece, or 21 per cent according to the IMF.18 
• A reset has been and will be difficult 
A major downside of the conjoined currency situation in which Greece finds itself 
is that restoring lost competitiveness is not when depreciation is not on the table. 
The only option left in such a situation is what is called an internal devaluation, 
and it can be as painful as it sounds (Angelini et al 2015). The process is already 
well underway, undoing some of the gains in wages mentioned above. Krugman 
(2015a) points out that Greece has already committed itself to one of the most 
painful aspects of this process, a decline in wages, as shown in fig. 5. 
 
18 Numbers in this area vary according to methodology, as it is a relative measure with many 
moving parts, but the salient point is that there is a consensus that Greece suffered a major 
competitiveness loss since its ascension into the EMU. 
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Fig. 5. Relative Decline in Wages 
Source: Krugman, 2015. 
Unfortunately for Greek workers, this decline has coincided with a rise in prices 
(fig. 6). 
 
Fig. 6. Greek Price Index 
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com, National Statistical Service of Greece. 
Thus, much of the brunt of this internal devaluation has been borne by the Greek 
worker (fig. 7), although this process has made for fewer workers, as well.  
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Fig. 7. Greek Unemployment Rates 
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com, National Statistical Service of Greece. 
If Greece had been able to devaluate its currency, at least lower wages would have 
been partially offset by a reduced cost in domestic goods. Instead, there were a 
large number of unemployed and reduced wage workers paying still-high prices 
for goods.  
6) There is no easy way out 
Having come through the crisis, then having suffered the austerity-induced rav-
ages of an internal devaluation, Greece still finds itself with an insurmountable 
pile of debt on its books.  
 
Fig. 8. Rising Debt in Greece 
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com, National Statistical Service of Greece. 
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At a new crossroads brought about by political change in the form of the 2015 
election of the anti-austerity Syriza party, Greecere-engaged the Troika in debt 
write-down negotiations. These, according to Harrison (2015), would seem to of-
fer only three possible conclusions. 
The first is a negotiated settlement. The details of this are still unfolding with 
negotiations for the release of every tranche; but with Finland and Germany mak-
ing clear signals that a reduction of the principal is a non-starter, it is difficult to 
envision a scenario where Syriza would accomplish enough to placate the restive 
populous that swept them to power.19 Extending the maturity dates and reducing 
the interest may offer some slight temporary relief, but would be an unexciting 
prize for a supposedly reformist government with a mandate for challenging au-
thority. Besides, forestalling maturity does not serve to lower the final amount.  
The second possible outcome is starker: default. Following Syriza’s election in 
2015, Greek three-year bond spreads reached 18.5 per cent amid a Standard and 
Poor’s downgrade warning caused by its belief that Syriza policies are “incom-
patible with the policy framework agreed between the previous government and 
Greece's official creditors” (Financial Times 2015). As Greece returned to a pri-
mary surplus, it could theoretically stand on its own minus the interest payments 
due. This would cause other forms of havoc, but could serve Greece well in the 
negotiations.  
The third scenario is the dreaded Grexit: Greece leaves the Euro zone. The mere 
threat of such an outcome has brought disquiet to Greek markets and threatens 
the fragile recovery that has finally pulled Greece out of official recession 
(Iordanoglou, and Matsaganis 2017). This outcome would not seem to be desira-
ble for Germany either. Through the incorporation of weaker economies in the 
EMU, Germany has enjoyed a currency value that is much lower than its own 
fundamentals would dictate. A higher Euro would be a blow to German exporters 
in a time when Europe needs no further blows to its remaining economic engines.  
 
19 Indeed, they did not, as they were swept from power by a centre-right majority in 2019 elections. 
This was widely seen as a result of their failure to enact an anti-austerity agenda due to pressures 
of the Troika:– “Syriza rose to power on a strong anti-establishment platform but disappointed 
many of its supporters after ignoring the results of a referendum on the Euro zone’s austerity 
package” (BBC News 2019 ) 
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There exists a fourth alternative, which this paper would be remiss not to investi-
gate: the idea of a two-currency EMU (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas 2010, 2011). The 
basic premise is that the single Euro would devolve into two Euros, both governed 
by the ECB. Core-EMU countries would continue with the current Euro, and pe-
ripheral EMU states would adopt, for an undetermined but finite time, and second, 
weaker Euro, while maintaining bonds and debts in the first.  
There is some strength to this idea. It would allow an easier fix to the competi-
tiveness problems outlined above. The ECB could devalue the second Euro by a 
large enough percentage to restore the competitiveness losses to its major trading 
partners discussed earlier. This could promote growth while these economies un-
dertake the necessary structural reforms. The ECB would then allow weak-Euro 
states back into the strong-Euro once certain parameters had been achieved. The 
mechanism would allow a temporary reprieve from the pressures of structural 
reform in a high-value currency situation, and would still afford these states some 
benefits that ECB governance could give them in inspiring the confidence of in-
ternational markets.  
There do, however, seem to be some problems with the proposal. First, in main-
taining the existing debts in strong-Euro denomination, peripheral nations will 
not only be facing the challenge of paying back debts in a currency they do not 
control, they will be facing the pressure of repaying these debts with a devalued 
currency. Krugman (2009) outlines how the pressures associated with foreign de-
nominated loans struck the Thai Baht. Could the reassuring presence of the ECB 
be enough to guarantee that investors—or even speculators—could never make 
similar moves against the weak-Euro? Moreover, without the peripheral states 
holding down the value of the strong-Euro, what is to prevent it from rising? This 
would not only create the difficulties for core-Euro exporters mentioned above, 
but would serve to make holders of strong-Euro debt operating with weak-Euros 
further extended. For these reasons, while it is a useful idea to ponder (and the 
authors did suggest it as a measure of last resort), it does not seem likely to be 
workable.  
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IR interpretation 
Opening the door for China 
Greece’s frustrations with the inaction of and restrictions imposed by the Troika 
and other western institutions did serve to provide political opportunity for others, 
though. Some western pundits were decrying the choices and policy prescriptions 
imposed upon Greece. Paul Krugman, especially, was vociferous in pointing out 
that the policy prescriptions being dictated to Greece—in that the creditors re-
jected Greek budgets on the grounds that they were too high on tax increases and 
not on spending cuts—were failing before their very eyes, and yet they were still 
imposing them well into 2015.  
 
Fig. 9. Greek GDP 
Source: Krugman (2015c). 
This ideological rigidity was measurably depressing Greek economic growth de-
spite it having the largest primary budget surplus (as in balance outside of debt 
obligations) in Europe.  
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Fig. 10. Primary Budget Surplus 
Source: Krugman (2015c). 
Greece was playing by the rules imposed by the West, by still struggling. Natu-
rally, the eye starts to wander, and here China was ready to step in. As reported 
in the New York Times in 2017: 
After years of struggling under austerity imposed by European partners and a 
chilly shoulder from the United States, Greece has embraced the advances of 
China, its most ardent and geopolitically ambitious suitor. 
While Europe was busy squeezing Greece, the Chinese swooped in with bucket-
loads of investments that have begun to pay off, not only economically but also by 
apparently giving China a political foothold in Greece, and by extension, in Europe 
(Horowitz and Alderman 2017). 
China first invested in Greece in shipping interests, through the COSCO firm 
(Johnson 2018). It bought into Pier II of Piraeus port outside Athens back in 2008 
but began angling for a controlling interest in the whole structure. China had ar-
ranged a handshake deal to purchase a massive $1.5 billion in Greek t-bills in 
exchange for Syriza flexibility on further port investments, especially as the party 
had campaigned with elements of economic nationalism and fighting the privati-
zation of national assets. This (according to then-Finance Minister Yanis Va-
roufakis) was then quashed behind the scenes by a phone call from Berlin to Bei-
jing (Matthews 2017). The end result was that Greece, without the ability to sell 
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its t-bills within Europe, and then with Europe preventing its selling them else-
where, was backed into a corner when it came to raising capital.  
So, unable to sell enough of its t-bills, penned in by austerity imposed by its cred-
itors and western institutions, the Syriza government had to resort to the selling 
of assets, and China was ready to jump in. COSCO purchased a 51 per cent con-
trolling interest in the entire Piraeus port facility, with a further tranche of 16 per 
cent to be transferred in the future (Brînză 2016). China set to work making it the 
‘dragon’s head’ of President Xi’s signature Belt and Road initiative. With the 
addition of Pier I, the busiest sea passenger hub in Europe to its already built up 
shipping capacity in Piers II and III, China now had a massive foothold in the 
European shipping industry, and a newly compliant partner in Greece.  
Talks are already underway about a Chinese purchase of Greek railway interests, 
and a massive project connecting the North Sea to Piraeus by rail. The American 
Enterprise Institute has tracked 5.4 billion Euros of Chinese investment in Greece 
as of 2017, and the total is still rising (Tonchev and Davarinou 2017). As such, it 
leaves China in a position of influence on Greece economically, and in China’s 
geo-economic strategies, Greece is now a component.  
It hasn’t taken long for China’s investment in Greece to pay dividends, econom-
ically, as well as in terms of prestige (in helping make the Belt and Road initiative 
more tangible), and diplomatically. Greece has, since its turn to Chinese invest-
ment listed above, become a reliable bulwark for China in holding back EU action 
that is displeasing to Beijing.  
Horowitz and Alderman (2017) list three such incidents of note thus far. The first 
occurred in response to China’s having been ruled against in the South China Sea 
disputes with the Philippines by an International Tribunal in The Hague. The EU 
member states could not get Greece to sign a statement directly calling upon 
China to modify its behaviour, and the eventual statement simply “called on all 
parties.” 
The second occurred when Greece blocked an EU statement about human rights 
abuses in China (Emmott and Koutantou 2017). The other EU states had come 
together at the UN to issue a statement condemning China’s crackdown on activ-
ists, but Greece blocked what it called an ‘unproductive’ move. As reported in 
Reuters, the failure to issue a joint statement “raises questions about the 
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economically powerful EU’s ‘soft power’ that relies on inspiring countries to fol-
low its example by outlawing the death penalty and upholding press freedoms” 
(Emmott and Koutantou 2017). 
The third diplomatic assistance Greece has provided to China is more directly 
economic. Greece has been one of the states taking the lead in blocking initiatives 
by Germany, France, the UK, Italy, and Poland that would deepen scrutiny in 
Chinese investments into Europe (Corre 2018). 
 
Theoretical application 
Having covered the historical progression and economic lessons of the Greek cri-
sis, it remains now to contextualize these in the discipline of International Rela-
tions as a conclusion.20 
 
Analysis: Realism 
A Realist perspective could easily align itself to the state of affairs in which these 
actors find themselves after the crisis. Greece, as a minor power, finds itself sub-
ject to the whims of the greater power, in this case, Germany. Greece has freedom 
to do as it wishes, so long as those wishes align with the interests of the larger 
power. Realists would recognize the imposition of austerity as in keeping with 
the wisdom of the original Realist Thucydides, in that “the strong do what they 
will, and the weak suffer what they must” (Goldsmith, 2005). Indeed, in turning 
to another major power in China, Greece has shown that one way to deal with a 
troublesome major power is to align with another.  
One could argue that the sovereign spreads issues outlined above would match a 
Realist understanding of the functions of the world. Greek spreads remained low, 
thus Greece remained safe from speculative ‘attack’, so long as it had the implicit 
guarantee of protection from the great powers of the region. It was only when this 
guarantee appeared to be removed that Greece found itself vulnerable to the rav-
ages of a Hobbesian world.  
 
 
 
20 The definitions used for these terms can be traced to earlier articles in this series. See 
McDonald (2014) and McDonald (2016). 
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Analysis: World Systems Theory 
From a World Systems perspective, Greece is suffering the fate of the semi-pe-
riphery. First, it has institutions that mimic those of the core. This is generally a 
prerequisite of EU and especially EMU membership. It does not however, have 
the same wealth and shared culture; thus it cannot receive similar benefit from the 
systemic arrangement of flows. Many have argued that the design of the Euro—
and the absence of corresponding fiscal redistribution—is more for the benefit of 
the Northern European states (Vermeiren 2017; McNamara 2018). This arrange-
ment continuing unchanged is testament to the power of the core (Kugler et al 
2015). The two-Euro solution presented above is confirmation that, while pos-
sessing enough common institutional frameworks to be an ECB member, Greece 
is peripheral in its function.  
Additionally, Greece has been used in the facilitator of trade (lowering the Euro, 
stock and bond markets, etc.), but is not an endpoint for the flow of wealth. This 
corresponds with World Systems tenets related to the semi-periphery outlined 
above. The semi-periphery is destined to be a conduit of wealth, siphoning off 
just enough to rise above peripheral status, but not attaining core status. Clearly, 
this is not an inaccurate description of Greece as it stands in the crisis’ wake. 
 
Analysis: Financialization  
It is through this perspective that we get to see a true picture of the constraints 
under which the Greek Government and populace is acting in dealing with the 
crisis. As a result of its obligations to the Euro zone, the EEC, and institutional 
creditors, the array of policy options that are before Greece are severely limited. 
For example, monetary policy, already depoliticized in most states, has gone the 
further step of being exported in this monetary union. Thus, Greece has no sov-
ereign control over its monetary policy. This is the essence of what Streeck (2014) 
and Mair (2013) have described; the levers of economic controls have, through 
the process of Financialization, moved beyond the sovereign purview of state 
government, and democracy.  
The similarities to the ‘structural adjustments’ forced upon Latin American coun-
tries (which led to many a ‘lost decade’ there) in the past are striking—and un-
flattering (Hermann 2016). Indeed, through the bailout process, Greece has had 
to submit its budget to the Troika for approval, surely a death knell for any idea 
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of economic sovereignty, and it was foretold that elected Greek officials would 
have no choice but to ‘cave’ in negotiations with the Troika, no matter what the 
elected platform had said (Tsebelis 2015).It is this sort of constraint that has led 
to the above-mentioned disillusionment with Syriza’s inability to enact their elec-
toral agenda and their loss in 2019. Other authors, such as Blyth and Ban (2015) 
have warned of the potential incompatibility of democracy and enforced austerity, 
yet the push to austerity continues. The rigidity financialization imposes even led 
to pushing Greece towards China, but still it could not be resisted, even as it cre-
ates vulnerabilities in the EU and western institutions themselves.  
 
Conclusions and Future Discussion 
The case above, in reframing the economic discourse on the Greek crisis for IR 
application, has shown the origins of the problem and the systemic constraints 
under which the Greek Government has had to operate in dealing therewith. In so 
doing, the chapter lays the interdisciplinary groundwork for the necessary IR dis-
cussion of the capability of rational choice in economic policy and planning small 
states possess in a financialized world. 
States, especially smaller, semi-peripheral states like Greece, are all facing the 
same pressures described above. Classical power politics still shape issues as 
large as the design of international organizations and institutions, to the faith of 
the bond markets, to states having to choose between major powers (EU/China). 
Through this, systems of perpetual dependence are formed, where institutions are 
mirrored; but the semi-peripheral is but a conduit of capital, not an endpoint. Fi-
nally, through the process of Financialization, these states are then deprived the 
means of changing the fundamental natures of their economies, and thus changing 
the nature of these relationships into which they find themselves bound. In such, 
the application of all three theories is necessary to gain an accurate picture of the 
relationships that define Greece’s situation in IR and IPE.  
If we focus on Financialization going forward (as it is the newest and least inves-
tigated), currency policy is but one part of this larger process. Greece, in a cur-
rency union, could clearly not use currency policy as a means of insulating its 
economy from the pressures of international markets and capital flows. However, 
as in the cases of Iceland (McDonald 2015) and China (McDonald 2016), the 
other forms of currency policy—floating and pegged/closed, respectively—have 
similar problems, and interventions come at a cost (Taylor 2016). If an economy 
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is open to capital flows, currency policy does not play a major role in insulating 
it from the diktats of the market. A state with an exceedingly high reserve of for-
eign currency can resist pressure on currency value in the short term—see China 
spending hundreds of billions of dollars to maintain the price of the RMB—in the 
end the unrestrained capital flows mentioned above can impose their will upon a 
given economy, and no currency policy can offer adequate protection.  
Capital flight goes beyond the reach of currency policy today (Gunter 2017). The 
market behaved irrationally and was punitively exuberant (Jones 2015). Moreo-
ver, it was able to behave in such a manner within the light regulation of the EMU 
and global financial structure. If economies are to be insulated from the type of 
destabilizing quick selloffs and irrational overreactions we have seen in the cases 
of Greece, Iceland, and others, systemic moves, such as a Tobin / Transactions 
tax, will likely be required. The politics of Financialization, as seen in Greece and 
other TINA (There Is No Alternative) scenarios, stoke the fires of backlash and 
risk the rise of faux-populism and authoritarian nationalism in their wake (Gon-
zalez-Vicente, and Carroll 2017).We have seen above that the unresponsive west-
ern institutions created vulnerability, leaving Greece to seek out other partner-
ships (i.e. China). Currency policy cannot insulate economies from irrational 
capital behaviour; but that does not mean other ways cannot be found. The ques-
tion is if these structures of global governance are responsive enough to popular 
will to make it happen.  
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 The Creation of the NDB and the AIIB as a 
Third Wave of Multilateral Development Banks: 
What Stands Behind?** 
Yana Leksyutina 
 
Abstract 
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) occupy an important strategic place in global 
economic governance. Since the creation of the first multilateral development bank—the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)—MDBs have emerged 
in three waves, each time as a result of major changes in the world arena. The creations 
of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) represent the third and latest wave of MDBs. These new development banks have 
arisen as a consequence of a historic shift in global economic power from developed 
countries to emerging economies and more specifically related to the increase in China’s 
economic might. This paper focuses on explaining the motivation of the founding coun-
tries in establishing these two financial institutions, and the historical landscape that en-
abled the developing countries to create new financial bodies despite some scepticism 
and criticism coming from western audience. The author identifies major factors under-
lying the creation of the AIIB and the NDB. Since both the AIIB and to a lesser extent 
the NDB are China-promoted financial bodies, the paper also seeks to reveal what na-
tional interests and objectives Beijing has been pursuing in creating and promoting these 
two financial institutions. 
Keywords: multilateral development banks (MDBs), Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB), New Development Bank (NDB); emerging economies; China; infrastruc-
ture investments. 
 
 
Introduction 
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are financial institutions set up by more 
than two countries to extend financial and technical assistance, as well as exper-
tise to developing countries to foster economic and social development. They play 
a very important role in the international economic system and are the pillars of 
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global governance institutions next to the UN, IMF, WTO, etc. Alongside with 
the World Bank, until recently the only global multilateral development bank, 
there are now more than 250 multilateral development agencies, including over 
twenty-five regional and sub-regional multilateral development banks. MDBs are 
conceived to serve very lofty goals: to promote poverty eradication, create infra-
structure critical for developing countries’ sustainable development, and provide 
assistance for social and environmental projects. Simultaneously, multilateral de-
velopment banks are capable of setting the direction of recipient countries’ devel-
opment by providing policy-based loans21 and by determining investment priori-
ties. By assuming a dominant position in MDBs, a great power attains capacity to 
pursue its expansive national interests by means of exerting influence over devel-
oping countries, of shaping international environment. This rationale explains 
why great powers are so interested in exercising control over MDBs. 
Following the 2008 global financial crisis, which brought to light the weaknesses 
of the existing global economic governance system, a new trend emerged. Nego-
tiations on the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) devel-
opment bank began, and almost simultaneously the New Development Bank 
(NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) were established. 
Initiated to improve the efficiency of global economic governance and to com-
plement existing MDBs, new financial institutions have reflected developing 
countries’ dissatisfaction over their limited roles in global economic governance 
(Ministry of External Affairs, GOI 2014). That was especially true for China 
which after the 2008 global financial crisis reassessed its foreign policy goals and 
set a course to enhance its standing in global governance, including the creation 
of new MDBs. From an ordinary member of MDBs, China has transformed into 
the initiator and creator of new financial institutions dominated and controlled by 
developing economies instead of western countries. 
This paper starts with an overview of the three waves of the MDBs’ establishment 
in order to demonstrate the common, as well as unique circumstances and drivers 
of the third wave of MDBs. It further explains the historic landscape and motiva-
tion that enabled the developing countries to establish the NDB and the AIIB. The 
author identifies three major interrelated factors underlying their creation. 
 
21 Policy-based loans can include financing in exchange for consent by the borrower country’s 
government that it will, for instance, undertake privatization of state-owned enterprises, structural 
reforms, reforms in agricultural or energy sector, etc. See Nelson (2015, 2018). 
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Viewing China as a principal driving force of the establishment of new MDBs, 
the author puts a special focus of the research on revealing national interests and 
objectives that Beijing pursues in creating and promoting these two financial in-
stitutions. The paper also discusses the reasons for the developing and developed 
countries’ support on China’s initiative to establish the AIIB. 
 
Three Waves of the Multilateral Development Banks 
The oldest and the biggest of the MDBs is the World Bank Group that comprises 
three financial structures providing loans and grants to developing countries: the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation (IFC) and the International Development Association 
(IDA).The IBRD was established at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference and was 
initially aimed at fostering economic development in European countries that had 
suffered during World War II. It is now functioning as a global financial institu-
tion comprising 189 members22 and extending non-concessional loans and other 
forms of assistance to middle income countries and creditworthy low-income 
countries. Originally focused on financing large infrastructure projects, over the 
course of time the IBRD has broadened its mandate to also include social projects, 
direct poverty alleviation and policy-based loans. 
Since the creation of the IBRD more MDBs were established, mainly in three 
waves (Wang 2016). The first wave, caused by the decolonization process and 
the appearance in the world arena of many newly-independent developing and 
poor countries, lasted from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. At that time two 
more financial institutions within the World Bank Group were established: in 
1956 the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which is focused exclusively 
on making loans to private firms in developing countries, and in 1960 the Inter-
national Development Association (IDA), which complements the IBRD and ex-
tends grants and concessional loans (long-term loans with low or no interest) to 
the world’s poorest countries. In 1958, in accordance with the Treaty of Rome, 
another large MDB was created, namely the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
That was the time when other regional and sub-regional MDBs were established, 
including the Inter-American Development Bank in 1959, the Central American 
 
22 Such countries as Cuba, North Korea, and microstates like Andorra, Monaco and the Vatican 
are non-members. 
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Bank for Economic Integration in 1960, the African Development Bank in 1964, 
the Asian Development Bank in 1966, the Andean Development Corporation in 
1970, the Caribbean Development Bank in 1970, the Islamic Development Bank 
in 1975, the OPEC Fund for International Development in 1976 and the Nordic 
Investment Bank in 1976. Focused on promoting social and economic develop-
ment in their respective regions and sub-regions, these MDBs each have unique 
characteristics, while also sharing features with the IBRD. The Inter-American 
Development Bank, the African Development Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank, for example, are very similar to the IBRD in their governance and opera-
tional functions. The Islamic Development Bank is distinct in the way that it mo-
bilizes financial resources; unlike the IBRD which raises most of its funds in pri-
vate financial markets, the Islamic Development Bank takes deposits to this end. 
The Andean Development Corporation is another example of a MDB with dis-
tinctive features since it is primarily controlled by borrower countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and in contrast to many MDBs it takes deposits and 
obtains loans from central banks, commercial banks and export credit agencies 
(Wang 2016). In some regional MDBs membership is restricted to a specific 
group of countries. For instance, since its establishment in 1964 till 1982, for 
nearly two decades the African Development Bank was an African-only institu-
tion, because African governments wanted to promote stronger unity and cooper-
ation within their region (Nelson 2018: 3). Other examples are the Islamic Devel-
opment Bank and the European Investment Bank where only members of the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation and European Union members respectively 
can join them. 
A second wave of MDBs took place in early 1990s through early 2000s, arising 
from the changes in Europe caused by the end of the cold war and the collapse of 
communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union and the formation of new independent states. In 1991, to pro-
mote the transition of the former communist countries from planned to market-
oriented economies, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) was formed. This institution is unique in its focus on the private sector 
and on projects intended to ease the transition of the former communist countries 
to multiparty democracy and a free market economy. In 1997, to support eco-
nomic development and regional cooperation in the Black Sea Region, the Black 
Sea Trade and Development Bank was created. And finally, in 2006 the Eurasian 
Development Bank was founded with a mission to facilitate economic growth in 
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member states and the expansion of trade and economic ties between them as well 
as to further the process of integration in the region through investment activity. 
Nowadays the largest and the most influential MDBs are the IBRD, the IDA, the 
EIB, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB). Each of these is controlled by western countries, either the US, western 
European countries or Japan. That means that these countries have assumed for 
themselves the role of being the major vehicles of global economic governance. 
A third wave of MDBs followed the 2008 global financial crisis and was triggered 
by the economic power shift in the international system from developed countries 
to emerging economies. Emerging economies’ dissatisfaction over their limited 
role in global economic governance and more specifically in traditional MDBs 
has resulted in the establishment of two new financial institutions: the New De-
velopment Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In 
contrast to most MDBs controlled by western countries, the NDB and the AIIB 
are led by developing countries, with China playing a prominent role. 
 
The Creation of the AIIB and the NDB as a result of the changed 
international political and economic environment 
There are three major interrelated factors underlying the creation of the AIIB and 
the NDB.  
First factor is a historic shift in global economic power from developed countries 
towards emerging ones which became obvious in the beginning of the twenty-
first century. This shift can be clearly seen while comparing the GDP distribution 
after the World War II, when a western-centred economic order was established, 
to the present. In the late 1940s, US GDP alone made up half of the global econ-
omy. Fast forward to 2013, the aggregated share of the G7 in the world GPD 
combined was 39.5 per cent. Meanwhile, the share of BRICS countries was 21.1 
per cent.23 This tendency is especially evident when comparing the change in 
BRICS and G7’ shares in world GDP starting from the beginning of the twenty-
first century: in 2000 the share of BRIC was mere 7.85 per cent against G7’ share 
accounting for 65.57 per cent, in 2008 BRICS’ share rose to 14.62 per cent, while 
the G7 dropped to 52.48 per cent.  
 
23 World Bank database. GDP (current US$). 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. 
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The rise in emerging economies’ economic and financial power stipulated the 
shift in their role in the international economic system; developing countries who 
were large borrowers from MDBs and other financial institutions for many dec-
ades in the past are becoming creditors to other developing countries. Emerging 
economies now have sufficient financial resources that they can allocate for 
providing assistance to the less prosperous economies. 
The second factor is that the existing MDBs, national development banks and 
private investors are not able to fully meet the rising demands for infrastructure 
investment in the developing world.24 As a matter of fact, the 2008 global finan-
cial crisis prompted many developing countries to press for increased financial 
assistance from the MDBs. Moreover, rapid economic growth and urbanization 
in many Asian developing countries stipulates the necessity of infrastructure de-
velopment. In the ADB’s report published in February 2017 Asia’s demand for 
infrastructure investments was estimated to be as high as $26 trillion between 
2016 and 2030, or $1.7 trillion per year. The $1.7 trillion annual estimate is more 
than double the $750 billion estimate made by the ADB in 2009 (ADB 2017). 
According to the evaluations made by the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD), in 2013 total official assistance for infrastructure 
projects reached $60 billion, out of which $11.7 billion was approved by the 
World Bank, the largest provider of infrastructure financing 
(https://data.oecd.org/). 
Yet, although MDBs remain the main source of infrastructure assistance to the 
developing world, MDB infrastructure financing has declined dramatically over 
the past several decades if one takes into consideration infrastructure financing’s 
share of total investments. Initially created to support infrastructure development, 
MDBs gradually have shifted their focus towards promoting favourable invest-
ment climates in developing countries by promoting political and economic re-
forms there. For instance, while in the 1950s and 1960s the World Bank used to 
extend 70 per cent of its loans for infrastructure projects, by 1999 infrastructure 
financing had decreased to 19 per cent of its loans (Wang 2016). The World Bank 
moved away from the priority of supporting infrastructure development and in-
stead placed increased emphasis on climate change, poverty reduction, refugees, 
and good governance. 
 
24 Private investors and national development banks are very cautious about making investments 
in infrastructure because of its long-term nature and high risks. 
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Thirdly, in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis the developing coun-
tries have become more vocal in stating their discontent with the existing system 
of global economic governance including the established MDBs. This does not 
apply to developing countries only: there is widespread perception that the tradi-
tional MDBs along with the other institutions that lay the basis for the interna-
tional system should be reformed. These reforms could include making the MDBs 
more conducive to meeting developing countries’ priorities, providing loans on 
more attractive terms to borrower countries terms, shortening the time needed to 
approve loans, reducing reporting requirements as well as loan conditionality. 
The loan conditionality that has been traditionally and widely practiced by MDBs 
while providing assistance to developing countries (such as social and environ-
mental safeguards, anticorruption measures, open and transparent procurement 
policy, etc.), has made developing countries less interested in such loans (Weiss 
2017). As a result, the demand for infrastructure investment is far greater than the 
amounts that are being provided by the MDBs and other sources. 
The AIIB and the NDB are, as claimed by their founding members, intended to 
both fill the infrastructure gap and to set a new model of development cooperation 
between MDBs and recipient countries by providing assistance that is not condi-
tional on specific reforms in the borrowing countries. 
And finally, the creation of these two new MDBs represents developing world’s 
dissatisfaction and unhappiness with the world order and related with the devel-
oping countries’ limited role in decision-making. Some developing countries and 
especially China have argued that the international financial institutions have 
failed to recognize their elevated stature in the global economy. They argue that 
for many decades the voting at the international financial institutions including 
the World Bank has not been reformed to reflect the increased weight in the world 
economy of emerging economies. Moreover, the question is not only about the 
disbursement of voting shares, it is about the governing structure. The emerging 
economies are very critical of the international practice formed since the very 
establishment of the major financial institutions where American representatives 
are appointed as the heads of the World Bank, European candidates are appointed 
as the heads of the IMF, while only Japanese nationals held the presidency of the 
ADB. 
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The creation of new MDBs is intended to increase both the representation and the 
voice of developing countries in the global economic governance system. Tradi-
tional MDBs were created at time when the global economic order was dominated 
by western European countries, the US and Japan, and they are still mainly con-
trolled and dominated by these very same countries (Shelepov 2016). In contrast, 
the AIIB and the NDB are financial institutions established and controlled by de-
veloping countries. The creation of new banks was meant to exert pressure on 
developed countries and traditional MDBs to reform their governance structure, 
operational rules and investment priorities.  
It is noteworthy that the creation of the AIIB and the NDB contributed to positive 
shifts in western countries’ approaches toward the issue of the role of developing 
economies in global economic governance and the issue of providing infrastruc-
ture financing for developing countries. There emerged an opinion amongst some 
American experts that Washington should try to enhance the attractiveness of the 
US-led World Bank and other MDBs by advocating for greater representation for 
developing countries in these financial institutions (AIIB 2017). In 2014, the 
World Bank initiated a Global Infrastructure Facility with an initial fund of $100 
million with the aim of bringing together and coordinating the efforts of MDBs, 
private investors and other institutions involved in infrastructure investment in 
developing countries. In May 2015, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe announced the 
Partnership for Quality Infrastructure initiative by which the Japanese Govern-
ment would provide $110 billion for “quality infrastructure development” in Asia 
over the next five years in collaboration with the ADB (Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs of Japan 2015). 
Yet, despite some speculation in the western media, it is wrong to see the creation 
of the AIIB and the NDB as an intentional challenge that the emerging world has 
throw to the existing US-led financial system. The major motive for many devel-
oping countries is to create a bank that would be attentive to their needs. New 
MDBs are designed to serve the interests and needs of the developing world, and 
more importantly, to be governed by the developing countries, not solely by the 
US, Japan or European countries. The largest shareholders of the AIIB are China, 
India and Russia, who are all non-western nations. 
The NDB is even more innovative institution in a sense that it is based on the 
equal distribution between the participating states of the shares in initial 
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subscribed capital and an authorized capital, and voting shares. In contrast to the 
existing financial bodies, shares of the holders in NDB capital are not contingent 
on the size, wealth and similar parameters of any nation. Moreover the NDB’s 
Articles of Agreement require no less than 55 per cent of the total voting power 
to be held by founding members: five BRICS countries (https://www.ndb.int/wp-
content/themes/ndb/pdf/Agreement-on-the-New-Development-Bank.pdf). 
Establishing the AIIB and the NDB, developing countries were also motivated to 
create new institutions that will not have those deficiencies that the traditional 
MDBs have and are usually criticized for. For example, developing countries of-
ten criticize western-led MDBs for attaching policy reforms to loans in order to 
enforce these policy reforms. The AIIB and the NDB are expected not to impose 
and enforce conditionality. New financial institutions are designed to address in-
frastructure financing gap. They are focused on infrastructure development in-
stead of budgetary, program or reform lending. These institutions work more like 
a corporation rather than traditional MDBs. 
Other demerit of the traditional MDBs that the AIIB tries to avoid is maintaining 
overstaffed bureaucratic team. While the World Bank had more than 10,000 and 
the ADB had 3,374 employees, the AIIB had 186 professional staff by the end of 
2018 (ADB 2018: 8; AIIB 2018). To lower the expenses on personnel and bu-
reaucracy the AIIB, unlike the other MDBs, is designed to have non-resident 
board of directors, who can stay in their home countries to vote and make deci-
sions, instead of residing in AIIB’s headquarter in Beijing. Critics of the current 
resident executive boards at the IMF, the World Bank, and other MDBs have long 
argued that resident boards are very expensive to maintain, costing between 3 per 
cent and 7 per cent of the institutions’ operating budgets (AIIB 2017: 11). 
Yet, it should be mentioned that for some observers these kind of innovations in 
the MDBs are not merits, but instead demerits. They argue that the AIIB’s non-
resident board of directors, meeting once or twice a year, is substantially removed 
from the day-to-day activities of the institution and may be unable to focus on 
anything but the most important strategic decisions (AIIB 2017: 11). AIIB’s small 
team may restrict the depth of its independent sector expertise, and as a conse-
quence, the AIIB might be dependent on other MDBs for comprehensive project 
assessments (Liu 2017: 9). 
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China as a driving force of the establishment of new MDBs  
The history of China’s participation in MDBs is relatively short and can be traced 
back to the era of Deng Xiaoping when in 1978 China launched deep economic 
reforms and increased engagement with the outside world. China’s increased en-
gagement with MDBs was in line with Beijing’s policy to integrate China into the 
existing international system, and to enhance its cooperation with international 
organizations. 
Engagement in MDBs has opened a window of opportunity for China to receive 
extensive financial and technical assistance that has become one of the decisive 
factors in China’s social and economic development. In close cooperation with 
the MDBs, China has managed not only to undertake multiple infrastructure pro-
jects, but also more importantly to build the whole industry of infrastructure plan-
ning and construction by adopting MDBs’ extensive experience in this sphere 
from financing methods to infrastructure project management. 
Soon after the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of China held in December 1978, where the reform and opening-up 
policy was initiated, China regained its seat in the World Bank (April 1980)25 thus 
becoming eligible for massive loans from both the IBRD and the IDA. Between 
1945 and 2015 China was the third-largest borrower from the World Bank (IBRD 
and IDA together) behind India and Brazil.26 Up to the end of 2015, China has 
received $55.828 billion in loans from the World Bank ($45.882 billion from the 
IBRD and $9.947 billion from the IDA) (World Bank 2015). 
Alongside the World Bank, China is a large borrower from the ADB, being its 
second largest borrower. After China joined the ADB in March 1986, Beijing 
rapidly enhanced the volume of loans it received from the ADB from $133 million 
in 1987 to over $1.1 billion, the minimum sum China had been receiving in loans 
annually since 2003. By December 2015, the ADB had approved $31.1 billion in 
loans for China (World Bank 2015). 
 
25 China was a founding member of the IBRD, but since the end of the civil war in China in 1949 
until 1980, the Taiwan authorities occupied China’s seat in the IBRD and other World Bank 
institutions. 
26 India is the largest recipient of loans from the World Bank, amounting to $104 billion, second 
place is occupied by Brazil ($58.8 billion). 
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In 2005, while continuing to be one of the IBRD’s and ADB’s largest borrowers, 
China started to offer donations to MDBs.27 The period from 2004–2005 was a 
turning point for China as it had by then accumulated financial resources enough 
to fully implement its “going out” strategy28 by increasing its outward invest-
ments and development aid to developing countries. For instance in March 2005, 
China established the PRC Poverty Reduction and Regional Cooperation Fund as 
a $20 million trust fund to be managed by the ADB, the first trust fund established 
by a developing-country member of the ADB. In 2014, China and the African 
Development Bank jointly established a $2 billion “Africa Growing Together 
Fund”. 
Following the 2008 global financial crisis that resulted in China’s reassessment 
of its place in the international system, Beijing has started to take efforts to estab-
lish a new level of engagement with MDBs. First, Beijing set an objective to en-
hance China’s role in the World Bank to bring it more in line with China’s in-
creased input into global economic development. Its status as the world’s second-
largest economy after 2010 obviously did not correspond to the modest role that 
China continued to play in the World Bank, where it was only the sixth-largest 
shareholder. Through great efforts and in coordination with other developing 
countries (and specifically with the BRICS countries of Brazil, Russia, India and 
South Africa in addition to China), this task was partially achieved in April 2010 
when the World Bank made a landmark decision to increase the voting power of 
emerging and developing countries at the expense of the developed ones. The 
voting power of China was set to be raised by 1.65 per cent (from 2.77 to 4.42 
per cent) (IBRD 2010). Although these changes meant some enhancement of 
China’s role in the World Bank—China moved from the sixth-largest shareholder 
position to the third—China still remains underrepresented with respect to its 
weight in the global economy and hopes to move to the second-largest share-
holder position behind the US. Needless to say that the voting power of the US 
was not affected; Washington still enjoys a veto power in the World Bank. 
 
27 Interestingly enough, despite its enhanced economic power and its newly-attained second world 
economy status, China continues to be the IBRD’s and the ADB’s large borrower. From 2013–
2016, China on average received $1.8 billion annually. In 2014, China was third-largest recipient 
of the World Bank’s assistance (behind Brazil and India),), in 2015second-largest behind India, 
and in 2016 fourth-largest behind Peru, India and Kazakhstan. 
28 The “Going out” strategy was declared in the late-1990s, and officially became a part of the 10th 
Five-Year Plan in 2001. This strategy was aimed at facilitating and supporting outward investment 
to create globally competitive Chinese firms, and encouraging outward investment that contributes 
directly to China’s development. 
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Having faced resistance from the western developed countries and their unwill-
ingness to allow China to be a part of a privileged club of countries that controls 
the leading international financial institutions, Beijing has established a new ob-
jective, namely, to create new MDBs that will act in the interests of, and be led 
by, developing countries (including China). In 2010, at the 9th SCO prime min-
isters meeting held in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) China proposed the founding of an 
SCO development bank, where according to the Chinese plan the voting share of 
the members should be linked to GDP, meaning that China would have more 
power in the bank’s activities. Although China’s proposal generated some interest 
among the SCO members a final decision on the issue has not yet been made 
(mainly due to Russia’s resistance). 
But that was just the beginning. China became extremely active in establishing 
another financial institution: the BRICS New Development Bank. Officially 
launched on India’s initiative in March 2012 during the Delhi summit, it took 
several years for members to discuss the idea and negotiate the basic principles 
of this new MDB. Among the questions that were debated were the volume of 
initial capital and its distribution among founding members (equal or share-
based), the location of its headquarters, operational currency, governance struc-
ture, client base (BRICS members only or non-members as well) and so on. Look-
ing for a dominant role in the NDB, China has insisted on a large initial capital 
and on a share distribution in accordance with each country’s economic might 
and its initial capital contribution. China also pushed for the headquarters to be in 
Shanghai and for the NDB to be able to lend on a global basis. 
Finally, after lengthy debates members have reached a consensus. In July 2014, 
at the BRICS’ 6th summit in Brazilian Fortaleza, the final documents for the cre-
ation of the New Development Bank were signed, and in July 2015 during the 7th 
BRICS summit in Ufa summit it was officially launched. The NDB was set up 
with an initial capital of $100 billion and an initial subscribed capital of $50 bil-
lion. Shares in initial subscribed capital and an authorized capital in the NDB 
were distributed between the participating states equally. The Bank’s headquar-
ters were set to be in Shanghai (China), and it was agreed that the bank would 
lend globally. 
In addition, in 2013 China initiated the creation of another new MDB, the China-
led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a large financial institution with initial 
 187 
total capital of $100 billion. After two years of preparation, in December 2015 
the AIIB was formally established with 57 founding members, among which 
China is the largest shareholder with a voting share of 26.57 per cent (as of July 
2019) (https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-
bank/index.html). 
 
China’s motivation for establishing the AIIB and the NDB  
Beijing has spent lots of time and energy for negotiating the AIIB and the NDB, 
and expects these financial institutions to serve a number of strategic goals and 
practical objectives. First and foremost, the establishment of large-scale financial 
institutions promotes the enhancement of China’s status, prestige and influence 
in the world arena, and reflects China’s aspiration for great power status and the 
role of global power or even a world leader (presumably in the economic realm). 
After the fifth generation of Chinese leaders came to power, there emerged strong 
signs that China was denouncing the basic foreign policy principles formulated 
by Deng Xiaoping back in late 1980s and early 1990s, the so-called “28-character 
formula” (Portyakov 2012). In the last few years Beijing has started to disregard 
more often its foreign policy basic principle of “taoguangyanghui, yousuo-
zuowei” (keeping a low profile while trying to accomplish something) and to 
show its determination to assume leadership functions in the world arena, if not 
to a full extent, at least selectively on certain regional and global issues. 
The creation of new MDBs has proved China’s ability to create global public 
goods, to play a leadership role in the world arena and to implement initiatives of 
not only regional, but global importance. The NDB, comprising five large coun-
tries from three continents, has become the second global MDB after the World 
Bank; other MDBs are regional or sub-regional in scope. The AIIB, which cur-
rently has 100 approved members (including five G7 developed economies)29 is 
smaller than the IBRD and IDA (consisting of 189 and 173 members respec-
tively), and larger than other MDBs. Comparing MDBs’ subscribed capital, only 
the European Investment Bank ($269.2 billion), the IBRD ($263.3 billion), the 
Inter-American Development Bank ($170.9 billion) and the ADB ($142.7 billion) 
surpass the AIIB (Engen 2018: 28). The AIIB and the NDB are also unique for 
being based in China, in Beijing and Shanghai respectively. Previously no MDB 
 
29 Between December 2015 and July 2019, the AIIB’s board of directors has approved 43 
applications for membership (in addition to the 57 founding members). Currently these 43 
countries are at different stages of the formal process to join the AIIB. 
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headquarters were located in China, and there was only one MDB with headquar-
ter in East Asia (the ADB). 
Second, in contrast to other MDBs in which China has relatively small shares of 
voting rights (in the IDRB China’s voting power represents 4.59 per cent, in the 
IDA a mere 2.21 per cent and in the ADB only 5.46 per cent) or rights equal to 
those of other founding members (as in the NDB), in the AIIB China enjoys the 
largest voting power (26.57 per cent as of September 2019), which gives China 
an upper hand in the decision-making process. India and Russia, the second and 
the third-largest shareholders of the AIIB, maintain 7.62 per cent and 5.998 per 
cent voting shares respectively (https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/govern-
ance/members-of-bank/index.html). This means that during voting by the AIIB’s 
board of directors30 over issues that are decided by a majority of votes cast, with 
China’s 26.57 per cent voting share a majority of votes can be achieved with only 
four members voting in favour. For special votes that require a 75 per cent special 
majority (such as approving membership, selection of the president, increasing 
the capital stock of the AIIB and changing the size or composition of the board 
of directors), China has an effective veto with more than a quarter of the votes 
(Weiss 2017). 
Moreover, in the long run even with more countries joining the AIIB, China will 
be capable of preserving its privileged status of the largest shareholder with the 
largest voting share. Even if the US and Japan all of a sudden decide to join the 
AIIB, they are unlikely to have enough influence over the AIIB’s decision making 
process for two major reasons: the AIIB’s Articles of Agreement caps the influ-
ence of non-regional members (which is the case for the US); and the voting 
shares are based on the size of the economy of each member country; moreover, 
each Founding Member gets additional 600 Founding Member votes (the US and 
Japan were rejected to be founding members at the time of the AIIB’s creation) 
(Liu 2017: 22). 
The creation of the AIIB is often seen by experts as reflecting China’s dissatis-
faction over the slow pace of reform in traditional MDBs regarding the enhance-
ment of China’s role. While that perception is correct, it needs to be emphasized 
that regarding reform of existing MDBs or the establishment of new ones, China 
 
30 The AIIB’s board of directors comprises nine directors elected by regional members and three 
elected by non-regional members. 
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wants to play a leadership role, not just to be elevated to the second-largest stake-
holder status. Within this context, one can assume that China enjoys a rare histor-
ical opportunity. By taking advantage of growing discontent among developing 
countries over the slow progress of reform of the Bretton Woods institutions,31 
China has managed to build support for the establishment of a new MDB: the 
China-led AIIB. As one Chinese analyst pointed out that the establishment of the 
AIIB strengthened China’s status as a major reformer in the global governance 
system (Pang 2016). 
Yet, it is safe to assume that Beijing will not abuse its veto power in the AIIB, 
even not in the long run. To have the largest voting power in MDB is more of a 
symbolic importance for the Chinese rather than a way to pursue its specific pol-
icies. A country can use its economic leverage much effectively if it opts to pro-
vide financial assistance bilaterally, when it is capable of controlling the whole 
process of to whom, when, for which projects and under what conditions to extend 
funds. The widespread fear in the US that China might use the AIIB as a tool of 
its foreign policy seems groundless. China views the AIIB as its flagship project 
aiming to prove Beijing’s ability to produce global public goods, to create new 
win-win reality, to lead the world to a fairer and more just world order. Still, it is 
very symbolic for Chinese that both the AIIB and the ADB are headquartered in 
China, it being the largest shareholder of the AIIB. Also, the AIIB is headed by 
Jin Liqun, a Chinese national.  
While analysing Xi Jinping’s grand initiatives one should bear in mind that China 
lacks the experience of exercising a leadership role in the world and more specif-
ically in large international organizations, like the MDBs. That explains the AIIB 
partnering with the established MDBs—the World Bank, the ADB, the EBRD, 
and the EIB—in co-financing and carrying out infrastructure projects. As a 
newly-established institution the AIIB relies on other MDBs’ technical expertise 
and support. Among approved 49 projects (as of September 2019), at least 26 
projects are co-financed with other MDBs, including the World Bank, the IFC, 
the ADB, the EBRD, the Islamic Development Bank, the Eurasian Development 
Bank (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.html). Partnering with 
the established MDBs also reveals the AIIB’s current stance to live up to interna-
tional standards and follow the best practices. At present the most important task 
 
31 Due to the US Congress’s long delay in approving the International Monetary Fund governance 
reforms of December 2010, this reform package came into force only five years later in 2015. 
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for China is to learn how to manage and lead such a large international organiza-
tion like the AIIB, to endorse the best practices in this MDB. 
China’s push for the establishment of the AIIB can also be viewed in light of 
Sino-Japanese rivalry for regional leadership in Asia as the AIIB’s sphere of op-
erations covers the same region like the Japan-led ADB. 
The creation of the AIIB and the NDB may also serve some Chinese specific 
needs in a number of practical ways. For instance, Beijing may use both banks to 
expand and promote the internationalization of China’s national currency, the 
Renminbi, by making it an investment currency of these banks in future 
(Zhen’min’ zhibao 2015). The first step in this direction was made in July 2016, 
when the NDB issued its first five-year Renminbi-denominated bonds worth 3 
billion Yuan (USD 450 million) in mainland China. 
Besides, since both the AIIB and the NDB are focused on infrastructure financing, 
and they are expected to provide funds for large infrastructure projects in devel-
oping countries, Beijing may expect that many of these projects will be under-
taken by Chinese contractors due to China’s vast experience in this sphere, com-
petitive advantages and international fame in infrastructure building. Billions of 
dollars of contracts are awarded yearly to private firms in order to acquire the 
goods, works, and services to carry out MDB-financed projects. The promotion 
of new infrastructure projects all over the region and beyond may create new vast 
opportunities for Chinese contractors and producers, thus partially solving the 
Chinese overcapacity problem (in steel, iron, aluminium, cement, plate glass, and 
other industries) (He 2014). 
Needless to say that infrastructure development in developing countries with as-
sistance from the AIIB and the NDB will improve regional and world infrastruc-
ture interconnectivity, ease China’s access to raw materials and domestic markets 
in these countries, creating more favourable conditions for further enhancement 
of China’s trade and economic cooperation with them. At present, the lack of 
modern maritime ports, highways, motorways, railroads, pipelines, etc., repre-
sents a significant barrier hindering the economic linkages between China and 
many developing countries. Moreover, another driver for China’s creation of new 
MDBs is the changing nature of its economy from low-value manufacturing to a 
high-value manufacturer. Going forward, Chinese economy will rely heavily on 
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import of low-value goods and inputs into its supply chains which promulgates 
the need for trade facilitation infrastructure. 
Although over the past two years Beijing has been trying to put distance between 
the AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative, in fact many of the projects approved 
by the AIIB during its first two years were along the route of this initiative.32 For 
example, two of the projects, the construction of the M-4 Motorway in the 
Shorkot-Khanewal section and extension of Tarbela 5 hydropower, are an integral 
part of the China-Pakistan Belt and Road economic corridor. Against this back-
ground it is fair to assume that the AIIB, which pool the resources of many donors, 
allows Beijing to share the cost of infrastructure projects within the Belt and Road 
Initiative. 
Broadly speaking, the AIIB is capable of promoting regional integration in Asia 
(Abalkina 2007). Channelling regional integration processes in a direction fa-
vourable to China is an important objective for China’s leadership. The absence 
of the US from the AIIB facilitates this task. Further, on a micro level the AIIB is 
aimed at deepening sub-regional integration between China and the countries of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by means of financing 
transport, telecommunication, energy and other projects in South East Asia 
(Klishin and Pavlov 2016). And finally, Beijing sees the regional infrastructure 
building and economic development as ensuring regional stability, including in 
such vulnerable places as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. 
 
Developing and developed countries: reasons for joining new financial 
institutions 
In establishing and joining to the AIIB and the NDB the developing countries 
were pursuing a number of goals, some of which were common for many of them, 
while others may vary across different countries.  
Many developing countries viewed the NDB and the AIIB very pragmatically as 
providing opportunities to get much-needed loans for their infrastructure financ-
ing. For example, at the time when China unveiled its initiative to establish the 
AIIB and lobbied hard for it, Beijing had already announced and created high 
expectations over its Belt and Road Initiative. Viewing the AIIB as a financial 
 
32 It is widely believed that the AIIB was initially conceived as a regional financing mechanism for 
China’sChina’s Belt and Road Initiative. 
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mechanism for implementing Belt and Road Initiative, countries that were inter-
ested in participation in the Belt and Road Initiative supported the creation of the 
AIIB. Many developing countries were motivated by a desire to create new finan-
cial institutions that would be more attentive to the developing countries’ needs 
and expectations, and give them more representation. 
Some countries joined the AIIB with a hope of cultivating better relations with 
Beijing by supporting Chinese signature initiative. For some countries to support 
or not support the AIIB was a test for loyalty to Beijing. 
For other countries, joining the NDB or the AIIB is a more politically comfortable 
way to receive infrastructure financing rather that to take part in China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative. The most prominent example is India which does not belong to 
the Belt and Road Initiative and even openly opposes it. During the SCO summit 
held in China’s Qingdao in June 2018 India was the only SCO member that de-
clined to endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative, whereas other six SCO mem-
bers jointly reiterated support for it in the Qingdao declaration (SCO 2018). 
Meanwhile, to date, India is the largest borrower from the AIIB; of the 49 projects 
that have been approved by the AIIB by September 2019, 12 have been granted 
to India. Nine Indian projects that have been approved by the end of 2018 involve 
investments of $2.2 billion or almost one third of the total AIIB lending of $7.5 
billion (https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.html). The NDB 
granted India 10 of the 41 approved loans with the investment totalling over $3.5 
billion, which represents one third of the aggregated NDB lending (over $12 bil-
lion) (https://www.ndb.int/projects/list-of-all-projects/). 
For those developing countries that have their reservations over expanding eco-
nomic ties with China, the AIIB is a perfect way to get Chinese loans through the 
AIIB and at the same time not becoming too dependent on Beijing’s will. Receiv-
ing financing from multilateral institutions like the AIIB and the NDB can be 
more comfortable for some developing countries rather than receiving financing 
directly from China. Providing development financing bilaterally, Beijing as a 
rule sets forth very tough conditions including procurement guarantees for Chi-
nese companies, imported Chinese workers, and high interest rates. Receiving 
financing from the AIIB and the NDB relinquishes China’s control over where, 
how, and on what terms the money is spent.  
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In addition to the developing countries, the AIIB received wide support from the 
developed countries, even though many of them do have concerns or reservations 
towards it. As for the developed countries, their support for the AIIB may have 
several possible explanations. Firstly, they plan to use their participation in the 
AIIB to ensure the adoption of and adherence to best practices and fair global 
standards in this newly-established financial institution. They may want to take 
their places in the decision-making process within the AIIB in order to exert in-
fluence on the institutional building process and to enforce it to use the best prac-
tices. Secondly, they may want to prevent the AIIB to become a China-dominated 
multilateral institution. Thirdly, some countries in their search for closer trade and 
investment relations with China voiced their support of the AIIB. Finally, the de-
veloped countries pursued pure financial and economic benefits in joining the 
AIIB. For example, countries may benefit greatly from procurement of goods and 
services for AIIB-financed projects. Incentives for UK, Germany and Luxem-
bourg to join the AIIB were to strengthen London’s, Frankfurt’s and Luxem-
bourg’s bid to manage the AIIB transactions, which would possibly solidify its 
position as a global financial centre. Consistently with London’s strategy to at-
tract Chinese banks, encourage offshore trade in the Yuan and bolster its position 
as the world’s main centre for foreign exchange trading, just a few days after its 
confirmation to join the AIIB, the London Stock Exchange launched Europe’s 
first Yuan-denominated money market fund (Bustillo and Andoni 2018). Moreo-
ver, with more and more countries joining the AIIB initiative, other countries 
could not but follow them, so as to avoid finding themselves marginalized in the 
changing regional landscape. 
 
 
Conclusion 
As it appears from the history of MDBs, the waves of new MDBs are usually 
rooted in shifts in political and economic world landscape and elevated demands 
for infrastructure financing. The third wave manifested in the establishment of 
the NDB and the AIIB is different from the two previous waves of MDBs as it 
was triggered not by the appearance in the world arena of newly-independent 
countries, but by tectonic changes in the world economic power distribution. The 
rise of a number of developing countries, known under the name “emerging econ-
omies”, had two major implications. First, these developing countries have accu-
mulated sufficient financial resources to provide infrastructure funds and to create 
new MDBs themselves. Secondly, they felt underrepresented within the existing 
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international economic system and unhappy with their limited role in decision-
making in the global economic governance. Moreover, the dynamic development 
and urbanization in many developing countries conditioned the rise in demand 
for infrastructure loans at a time when the existing global net of MDBs could not 
meet these demands and at times were ineffective. All these have shaped the en-
vironment that enabled China to take the opportunity to build the international 
support for its initiative to create new MDBs despite strong opposition from the 
global leader, the US. 
China’s initiative to create new MDBs reflects Beijing’s ambitions to enhance its 
capacity to influence world economic processes and take leading role in the global 
economic governance as a long-term goal. Although the establishment of the 
AIIB and the NDB serves Chinese interests in many practical ways, it seems to 
be more a question of prestige and moving one step closer to the aim of establish-
ing Chinese leadership in the world economy. It is a very inexpensive way to 
enhance its standing in the world arena. China is providing $29.8 billion as its 
initial subscription to the authorized capital stock of the AIIB, 20 per cent of 
which ($5.96 billion) is paid-in capital to be paid in five annual instalments of 
approximately $1.2 billion. This amount of money seems quite modest in com-
parison with extensive Chinese investments all around the globe and assistance 
that China provide to the developing countries on a bilateral basis. 
Simultaneously, the creation of new MDBs can be considered very wise thing to 
do to demonstrate China’s ability to provide global public goods and to shoulder 
international responsibilities. There are good grounds for seeing the creation of 
new MDBs as a solid step toward enhancing China’s standing in the world econ-
omy and the international system. Financial institutions of the scale of the AIIB 
and the NDB have not appeared since the 1990s. The AIIB has been gaining sup-
port from the broad international community: during its first four years, as many 
as 43 countries applied to join it. Despite speculation circulating in some western 
countries over the possibility that China will abuse its dominant position and pro-
mote low standards for the new financial institutions (for instance, in social and 
environmental protection, procurement and so forth), it seems that Beijing will 
try to do its best to make these institutions efficient and supportive of high inter-
national standards. After all, China’s leadership role depends on it. 
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 Before Us and After: Old and New Resiliencies 
Against Remaining Hegemonies 
Tuomo Melasuo 
 
Abstract 
This chapter aims at providing some light to the evolution of world economic and political 
structures and systems from the Second World War until 2019. It looks at the formation 
of different protagonists in the main phases of this evolution. The analyses start with two 
important phenomena that are decolonization and the cold war.  
During these 75 years since the Second World War we can distinguish four main phases.  
Primo, there was the main wave of decolonization when the hegemonic and dominant 
centres tried to shape the international order in new forms, but still in their own interest 
and benefit. This phase started with the creation of Bretton Woods institutions and the 
United Nations during the last months of the World War. A decade later, in spring of 
1955, the decolonization process was accelerated by the Bandung conference that resulted 
during the following ten years in emergence of main organizations acting for the inde-
pendence of the colonies. The first was the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement), which gath-
ers together countries wishing to stay outside of the cold war blocks and other ‘big pow-
ers’. Under the auspices of the UN, UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, occurred in1964 in order to support the development efforts put forward 
by the NAM. 
Secondo, the battle around the development efforts became more important when, espe-
cially, the majority of African countries had gained their independence. This battle cul-
minated around the NIEO (New International Economic Order), almost during the whole 
decade of the 1970’s. The emergence of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries), and the other organizations of the raw material producing countries together 
with “Oil crises” managed to have an impact on world economic structures. 
Terzo, during the 1980’s the hegemonic and dominant powers together with the multina-
tional companies in the northern half of the globe had managed to re-conquer the former 
colonies in such a way that they are today even more tightly under the international fi-
nancials organs they ever were during the colonialism.  
Quarto, since the end of the cold war the previous power structures have started to erode. 
At the same time the world is moving from the multinational organizations and agree-
ments towards more anarchical perspectives where some of the big players do not any 
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more respect the common agreements and the treaties they have signed themselves. This 
is the situation we are today in 2019. The newest element is the emergence of spontaneous 
socio-economic and political mass protest movements, which are obliging old and often 
corrupted power elites to give in all over the world. This might signify that, in a long run, 
there is hope for more equal and sane future. 
Keywords: hegemony, domination, colonialism, decolonization, social, economic, polit-
ical, protest movement 
 
 
Introduction: Prefaces for protesting  
The three decades after the end of the cold war have witnessed the decay of that 
international order, which emerged after the Second World War mainly through 
the Bretton Woods Agreements, consisting of organizations such as International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank and the United Nations.  
During those three decades, especially the last fifteen years, there have been many 
important observers highlighting the emergence of new actors that challenged the 
hegemony of the institutions born along the Second World War and even the 
Great Depression a decade earlier. 
These new actors are, for instance, BRICS, which consist of five countries, 
namely, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The main idea of this en-
semble is to strengthen their possibilities to influence the world economics. Their 
last summit was held in Brasília in mid-November 2019.  
Another similar structure is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO, which 
includes eight member countries. The SCO is geographically much more coherent 
than BRICS, because it consists of mostly neighbouring countries. China and 
Russia are the two leading powers of this organization.33 
In a more global context, the hegemonic position of Bretton Woods’ institutions, 
excluding the UN, reflected the heritage of European colonial empires and their 
overseas offprints, which had, grosso modo, dominated the world since the end 
of the fifteenth century. In fact, the European domination and the hegemonic 
 
33 http://brics2019.itamaraty.gov.br/en/2019-brazilian-presidency/theme-and-priorities; 
http://eng.sectsco.org/ and http://infoshos.ru/en/.   
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world order she created was never accepted as such; it has been challenged out-
side the system but also from inside since its beginning. 
One of the first Spanish conquistadors who had a critical attitude towards the co-
lonial reality was Bartolomé de las Casas, Bishop of Chiapas, México, known as 
a strong defender of the local Indian population. To free them from the forced 
labour in European owned haciendas, he had the unfortunate idea to replace the 
Indian working force by importing slaves from Africa. In the seventeenth century, 
the practices of slavery and slave trade began to be modestly criticized in many 
colonial societies.  
Thus, the anti-slavery movement was a kind of parallel phenomenon to Enlight-
enment since the eighteenth century when the European elites swore in the name 
of the “Noble Savage”, following Jean-Jacques Rousseau34 and other philoso-
phers, and having the ideas of “Ex Orient Lux” in their mind when admiring al-
most everything coming from outside of the continent.  
During all the three centuries of European slave trade, there were also some abo-
litionist movements, which tried to stop this activity, but did not have any real 
success before the nineteenth century. A non-governmental organization, the 
“Anti-Slavery International” was created in the 1830’s in order to fight the slavery 
in the whole of the British Empire. 
In the 1860’s, the role of anti-slavery ideas in the USA Civil War is a more com-
plex question. On one hand, the North fought to end the slavery in the South. On 
the other hand, northern states fought also in order to better integrate the southern 
states in the modern industrial economy, where the North was already in a domi-
nant position. Slavery and latifundium or large estates based on agricultural econ-
omy was absolutely too archaic and had started to hinder the development of the 
modern capitalist production system. In that sense, the USA Civil War was not 
really challenging the dominant economic order but advancing its progression by 
ending old-fashion slavery. 
Concerning the difficulties and contradictions the French colonial empire was 
facing, we can take into the consideration the “Arab Kingdom” of Napoleon III 
 
34 Jean-Jacques Rousseau himself did not use the term “Noble savage” but spoke about the original, 
natural societies where social life and human beings were not corrupted as in Europe. 
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in the 1850’s and 1860’s, when the emperor, inspired by Ismael Urbain, wanted 
to create an “indigenophile” content for the French colonial presence in Algeria 
(Rey-Goldzeiguer 1977). 
By the turn of the twentieth century, Paul Vigné d’Octon had a significant impact 
in formulating the resistance to colonial realities within French colonial empire. 
He played an important role in French parliamentary debates where colonial re-
alities were discussed and criticized, especially at the end of the nineteenth and 
in the beginning of the twentieth century (Mejri 2006: 249-263; Suret-Canale 
1980). 
All this is just to remind the reader that different kinds of the anti-colonial opin-
ions and movements have existed since the beginning of the European colonial 
expansion. This resistance prevails, of course, also concerning all other kind of 
attempts to establish a dominant international system. This kind of resilience 
seems to be a part of human nature both individually and collectively. Rebels 
have been individuals and leaders of more structured movements, like Spartacus 
in ancient Rome, François-Dominique Toussaint Louverture in Haiti’s independ-
ence struggle in the early nineteenth century, or working-class revolts in Europe 
in the nineteenth and twentieth century. 
 
The time of the Internationals 
The First World War was one of the main markers at the turn of a century, reach-
ing from the 1870’s to 1919. This period was important also for different kind of 
political international workers’ movements and formations, which tried to chal-
lenge the existing order. It is worth noticing that these fledging movements 
emerged before the victory of imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century, 
which culminated in the “Scramble for Africa” where the European colonial pow-
ers just divided Africa between themselves at the Congress of Berlin in 1884-
1885. 
The First International, also called “The International Workingmen's Associa-
tion” was founded in 1864 in London and it ended its activities in 1876. Its evo-
lution concentrated on working class positions in industrial Europe; the rivalry 
between the communists and the anarchists characterized its rather chaotic inter-
nal development. As a matter of fact, it did not pay almost any attention to non-
European world and colonial empires. 
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The Second International was an international cooperation organization of mostly 
European social democratic parties. It considered itself as a continuation of the 
First International and its activities covered the years from 1889 to 1916. Today, 
in 2019, Socialist International (SI), founded in 1951 by socialist and social dem-
ocratic parties, sees herself as its successor.35 
In spite of defining themselves “International”, the first and second internationals 
were in reality rather Euro-centric. Their strategy towards European colonial 
world order was rather simplistic. In the period before the First World War, they 
believed that capitalist metropoles could not apply socialism and socialist policies 
in their colonies. Thus, the only way to proceed would be to build socialism in 
the metropoles first, and then the problems of colonialism would be solved as a 
by-product. This meant that even the Second International was not in favour of 
the independence of the colonies (Koulaksis 1991). 
A kind of crisis of the European colonial system became apparent during the First 
World War, and the metropoles were obliged to reform their systems by making 
some concessions to their colonial possessions. In the British case, this concerned 
mostly to their “dominions” such as Canada, Australia, South Africa, etc. In those 
colonies, the colons of European origins were in power. In Imperial War Confer-
ences in 1917 and 1918, Britain accorded an autonomous status for Dominions 
within the British Empire for reassuring their participation to common war ef-
forts. These concessions were not really aimed at contesting the prevailing inter-
national hegemonic colonial order. On the contrary, one of their main goals was 
to maintain and to re-enforce the hegemonic colonial order: o tempora, o mores!  
The Russian Revolution, the First World War peace process, and in a lesser de-
gree, the programme of President Woodrow Wilson of the USA changed all this. 
The bolshevists of the Russian Revolution were afraid that their achievement, and 
the expected socialist revolutions in the Western Europe, would be threatened by 
the armies of the capitalist countries from their colonies.  
For these reasons, the Russian Bolshevists created the Third International. In its 
second congress of 1920, the 21 points of Vladimir Lenin were accepted as the 
adhesion criteria for the Third International, also called Comintern. The Third 
 
35 In 2019, Socialist International (SI) has about 150 member organizations in more than hundred 
countries. 
 204 
International was a serious attempt to challenge the hegemonic capitalist world 
order both in its main industrial, mostly European countries, and in their colonies. 
Point 8 in Lenin’s adhesion criteria for the Third International obliged all the 
communist parties to work for the independence of the colonies in order to 
weaken their capitalist metropolises. The communist parties in the colonies 
should cooperate with the local bourgeoisie and create an anti-colonial front aim-
ing to the independence of the colony. The worker’s movement should try to get 
a pre-eminent position in such an anti-colonial front. This requirement of Lenin 
was in contradiction with the political practises of the Second International, which 
did not prioritize the independence of the colonies. 
Even if the Third International was rather important challenger of the dominant 
world order, its achievements and performances in more general context were 
rather complex and contradictory. Until the mid-1930’s it advocated the inde-
pendence of the colonies as the primary goal of all the activities. This rather rigid 
and strict attitude somehow paralysed the development of the movement in many 
colonies because of having not taken into the consideration the local conditions.  
For instance, in many North African and Middle-Eastern countries it did not pay 
any attention to the importance of European origin socialist settlers and to their 
role as local working class members, which were in close contact with the “au-
tochthone” representatives of these movements. This attitude weakened a lot the 
performance of the Third International member parties in many colonies. 
In addition to that, from the sixth congress of the Third International in 1928 on-
wards the colonial question started to serve directly the foreign policy of the So-
viet Union. This had become one of the main handicaps of the Third International: 
instead of challenging the whole dominant system, it started to serve one single 
state actor.  
In fact, the political strategy of the Third International changed completely in the 
mid-1930s. Anti-imperialism became more important than the emancipation and 
independence of colonized societies (Melasuo1999: 282). In its seventh confer-
ence in 1935 in Moscow, the Third International gave up the class struggle be-
tween social classes in favour of constructing an antifascist front advocating the 
unity between European democracies and their colonies in the fight against fas-
cism. The Third International simply abolished its previous doctrine requiring the 
independence of the colonies. This meant that from the second (1920) to the 
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seventh (1935) conference the strategic line of the Third International had 
changed totally from the original to the opposite (Melasuo 1999: 283, n. 233 and 
234). 
This evolution was criticized by many actors in the local context as already said. 
They were in favour of more sublime political strategy that would manage to 
combine the antifascist struggle in the metropoles with the anti-colonial combat 
in the colonies. At the end, even this approach became problematic. All kind of 
separatism or independence aiming nationalist movements in the colonies started 
to be seen as defending fascism. Thus, at the end, the Third International some-
how advocated the sacrosanct alliance between democratic metropoles and their 
colonies in the fight against fascism.  
At the same time this new strategy advocated the creation of popular fronts in the 
colonies and re-enforced them in the metropoles. This strategy prevailed until the 
outbreak of the Second World War and went on long after its end (Melasuo 1999: 
283-284.).36 
After the beginning of the Second World War, the evolution of the Third Interna-
tional became even more complex. Following the German attack in June 1941, 
Soviet Union paid more attention to its relations with the Allied powers, first of 
all to cooperation with Great Britain and USA.37 Following this reasoning, the 
Soviet strong man Joseph Stalin abolished the Third International in 1943. 
A kind of side story accompanied this evolution. Already in 1938, Stalin’s dissi-
dent companion Leon Trotsky had founded his own competing organization: the 
Fourth International. This organization exists till today (2019), but it only gathers 
an important part of few Trotskyists in the world without having any impact on 
international relations or world order. On more individual level, these Trotskyists 
might have a role to play in a particular country, as in Algeria, for instance, where 
Louisa Hanoune, a Trotskyist passionaria, is very visible (Maville Newsletter, 10 
May 2019). 
 
 
 
 
 
36 We may notice that the idea of ”Popular front” prevailed long after the Second World War. 
37 https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/dissolution.htm 
 206 
 
Five glorious decades until the 1990s 
In modern times, the Second World War was probably the biggest catastrophe 
that has ever occurred in this planet because of human behaviour. The number of 
casualties was on a scale never seen before. Besides, the Second World War had 
important social and economic impacts as well. At all levels—international, re-
gional, national, local and even familial—the structures and mentalities as well 
as previous practices changed, and many new ways to proceed in national and 
international affairs emerged because of that war.  
From the late 1940’s the decolonization process, which led to formal independ-
ence of many erstwhile colonies, took place in all the continents until the 1980’s, 
and even later. 
Both these megatrends—the aftermath of the Second World War and the decolo-
nization—did also raise a lot of expectations and hopes in different countries and 
societies. These hopes and expectations for immediate better future were very 
important in Europe and in colonies too. In fact, they lasted until the 1980s when 
the continuation of the cold war managed to put them in the background slowly. 
In fact, the oil, bank and financial crisis since the 1970s started to water down the 
positive results of the decolonization processes when at the same time, the domi-
nant hegemonic powers have re-conquered the former colonies again. Today, at 
the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, it seems that the devel-
oping countries are in a much firmer way under the domination of international 
economic and financial instances such as World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund as well as multinational enterprises than they ever were during colonialism. 
Also GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)38 and the OECD (Organ-
ization for Economic Co-operation and Development) belong to this category, 
having played the same kind of role. In 1995, the WTO succeeded the GATT as 
the main regulator of the world commerce and trade. In his policy to water down 
all the multilateral practices Mr Trump, president of the USA for the time being, 
has blocked in December 2019 the performances of this organization and blamed 
it for preferring China (Bouissou 2019; Frachon 2019). 
 
38 GATT aimed to reduce the custom taxes and the other obstacles for international trade. 
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From the point of view of this essay, which wants to understand how different 
attempts to challenge the dominant hegemonic world order evolve, three avenues 
are the most interesting: primo, the emergence of new organizations, which aimed 
to restructure the international relations and cooperation; secondo, the breakout 
of the cold war between the blocs led by the Soviet Union and the USA; and, 
terzo, the decolonization. This last one might have been the most important at-
tempt as it wanted to put an end to five centuries old European or European orig-
inated domination.  
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to analyse the interplay of these three 
domains. The dominant hegemonic powers and their challengers from the Third 
World39 used the international organizations as their battlefield where they tried 
to preserve their positions or to conquest a kind of equality by hard struggle.  
The independence of India in 1947 as well as the anti-colonial wars in Madagas-
car and in Vietnam were a kind of prelude to Afro-Asian movement, which 
emerged in the Conference of Bandung in 1955 in Indonesia. This conference and 
the Afro-Asian movement brought about the inception of several international 
organizations, which followed that conference and which tried to put political 
pressure on colonial metropoles in order to ease the way of colonies towards in-
dependence. The role and activities of its member countries played an important 
role in UN, especially in its General Assembly and in many of its commissions. 
One of the results of these actions was to keep the questions of decolonization 
and its conflicts in the world political agenda and to strengthen their media visi-
bility. 
In the Bandung Conference three main themes were debated; they were colonial-
ism, neutrality and economic development. Even if the Bandung Conference took 
place in the middle of the cold war, it managed to maintain its unity by “con-
demning colonialism in all of its forms”. Concerning the issues related to neutral-
ity, Indian Prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru succeeded in gaining the support of 
the participants for the emerging Third World’s role outside the main cold war 
blocs. All the participating countries were free to organize their security policies, 
 
39 Third World, Tiers monde, is a concept first used by French geographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952. 
In 1956, Sauvy used it in his preface for Le Tiers Monde. Sous-développement et développement, 
edited by Georges Balandier. The concept refers to Tiers Etat before the 1789 Revolution, that 
Alfred Sauvy links with the Third World, and which realized the industrial revolution in the 19th 
century. See Melasuo 1988. 
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as they liked, only the engagements with the great power blocs were to be 
avoided.  
The final declaration of the Bandung Conference paid lot of attention to economic 
development and to difficulties of international economic cooperation. It put em-
phases to the role of the UN and of other international, especially economic and 
financial organizations such as World Bank (WB) and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), in contributing to solving the development issues. 
The Afro-Asian Conference of Bandung was well received almost all over the 
world. Nevertheless, its results were more symbolic than concrete. Its main im-
portance was the consolidation of the emerging Third World movement, which 
challenged the legacy of the existing bi-polar world order in the middle of the 
cold war. 
During the following twenty years, there were several new international organi-
zations and movements that all followed the main goals and lines of the Bandung 
Conference. Within the UN, especially in the General Assembly, the so-called 
“Group of 77” or “G77” became important by helping the developing countries 
to concentrate their policies and as such to strengthen their weight in the world 
organization.40 
One of the first new international organizations following the Bandung Confer-
ence was AAPSO (Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization) founded in 
1957. Even if the initiative to its foundation became from the Third World com-
munist countries and Soviet Union was one of its founders, most of the non-
aligned countries were members in AAPSO. This organization played an im-
portant role especially in the 1960’s in strengthening the reciprocal cooperation 
of the developing countries (Melasuo 1988: 943). 
However, the most important result of the Bandung Conference has been the cre-
ation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),41 by the Conference of Heads of 
State or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries, in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 1961. 
Along the process started in the Bandung Conference, the NAM was finally 
 
40 See more on the page https://www.g77.org/. 
41 https://mnoal.org/ 
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proposed by the Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and the Indian Prime Minis-
ter Jawaharlal Nehru.  
Between Bandung and Belgrade there were a series of different meetings and 
smaller conferences where almost all significant Third World leaders partici-
pated, such as Gamal Nasser from Egypt, Zhou Enlai from China, Ho Chi Minh 
from Vietnam, Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana, and many others. The Non-
Aligned Movement had two main strategic goals: primo, to strengthen the decol-
onization process by helping the remaining colonies to attain their independence; 
and, secondo, to improve the struggle for development, especially for economic 
development, by fortifying the international positions of the Third World coun-
tries in the prevailing economic structures of the world. 
The Non-Aligned Movement had an important role as one of the main represent-
atives of the Third World from the 1960s until the mid-1980s.  
Different crisis and reforms in world politics and in international economic struc-
tures have resulted that the significance of the Non-Aligned Movement is today 
no more what it used to be. The end of the cold war as well as the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Pact played a role in decreasing significance 
of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
The last conference of the Non-Aligned Countries’ Heads of State was hold in 
Baku in October 2019; following that conference, the presidency of the NAM lies 
in Azerbaijan until 2022. The Baku 2019 conference put the emphasis on the re-
spect of international law in ruling the conflicts and disputes in global scale. 
Nevertheless, when looking back to the evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement 
we can see another parallel path, which started in late 1960s and early 1970s. 
After the Tricontinental Conference in Havana that prepared the field more gen-
erally, it was in the Lusaka Summit 1970, where the NAM put the main emphasis 
on economic problems and development perspectives instead of the decoloniza-
tion. The Algiers Conference of the Heads of States of Non-Aligned Countries in 
1973 consolidated this new strategic line.  
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Already since the mid-1960s within the UN system, UNCTAD (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development),42 was as a structure, whose purpose was 
to improve the positions of the developing world in global economy. One of the 
positive characteristics of UNCTAD has been that it gets together from the North 
and the South the countries having positive approach to development issues. Nev-
ertheless, as such, it has been very close to the Non-Aligned Movement, which 
presented the idea of its creation already in 1962. Together they have been advo-
cating the NIEO (New International Economic Order), which is, maybe until to-
day, the most interesting attempt to create more balanced and sane global eco-
nomic structure. 
A kind of parenthesis in the development of the international economic system 
was the end of the Bretton Woods system as such when the USA suspended the 
link between its currency—dollar—and gold. This was the end of Bretton Woods 
system’s regulation of world monetary policies (Johnston 2019). This, of course, 
opened new avenues for Third World ambitions. 
The results of the Algiers 1973 conference gave solid perspectives on how to 
proceed in order to undertake clear program of action for changing the structures 
of world economy. In the following year 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted 
by consensus the main parts of this program presented by the Algerian President 
Houari Boumédiènne already a year before in Algiers (Mahiou 2011; Melasuo 
1988: 951). 
The decisions of the UN General Assembly consisted of the NIEO Declaration 
and of the NIEO Action Programme. The Declaration has a relatively long list of 
fundamental principles, the main idea of which was to strengthen the equality of 
partner countries, their sovereignty and the rules of fair play.  
The Action Programme was more detailed and concrete than the Declaration. It 
wanted to renew the principles of international trade, to reform the international 
monetary and financial procedures and to bring them closer to the lines of the 
developing countries. The Action Programme also aimed to strengthen the devel-
opment capacities of the Third World countries by transferring financial and tech-
nological resources to the South as well as by improving the cooperation between 
southern countries thus re-enforcing their involvement in the international trade. 
 
42 https://unctad.org/en/Pages/Home.aspx. 
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An important paragraph in this Action Programme required the strengthening the 
role of the United Nations, and its main organs such as General Assembly, in 
implementing the New International Economic Order (Mahiou 2011). 
In spite of this success in 1974, the future of the NIEO has been rather modest 
and there is no generally accepted interpretation of its results. Some countries see 
that they have benefitted from the NIEO, others not so. This depends very much 
about the individual experiences of each stakeholder.  
Among the positive acquis of the NIEO are its different actions that succeeded in 
making the rules of international trade and commerce easier and simpler to use 
and to apply. Along the NIEO, also several new organs and organizations 
emerged to improve international efforts for development of the Third World 
countries. The NIEO has also brought many important reforms in international 
law concerning world trade and commerce regulations and practices.  
From today’s point of view, the approach on international economic order has 
become now more pragmatic and tries to address the development issues by con-
crete solutions. At the same time, the actual debate on sustainable development 
sees it as linking the environment and development (Mahiou 2011). 
Besides the Non-Aligned Movement and the UNCTAD, there was a third path 
following the attempts to change the structures of the international economy by 
the NIEO that should be taken into the consideration, that are the organizations 
of raw and primary material producers. Most known and certainly the most im-
portant of them has been OPEC (The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries). This organization was created already in 1960 in Bagdad, but it took 
until the “First Oil Crisis” following the war in the Middle East in 1973 that the 
OPEC became a real player in the world economy and politics. Until 1973, it has 
been the cartel of the “Seven Sisters” formed by the most important multination-
als in the field and representing the hegemonic economies in the industrial North, 
which had had a dominant position in world oil politics.  
In 1973, the OPEC started to regulate the oil supply in order to have an impact to 
the political goals of its member countries and to the oil world market price. It 
was a success. The OPEC managed really to have an impact on world politics by 
regulating the petroleum supply volume and the price of it. Thus, it did have a 
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role in contesting the dominant hegemonic countries and in the formation of 
world economic order. 
After the first oil crisis OPEC managed to increase the oil prices during all the 
second half of the 1970s. It was partly because Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two 
most important oil producers, were able to harmonize their production quotas in 
a flexible way. The following decade witnessed several development trends that 
little by little reduced the possibilities of OPEC to determine the global crude oil 
markets.  
Among such features, let us refer to the Islamic Revolution in Iran 1979, the dev-
astating war between Iran and Iraq in 1980-1988 and the Persian Gulf War in 
1990. All these three events had a long-term impact on global oil policies and 
especially on OPEC’s capabilities to master them. In early 2000 after the USA 
aggression and occupation of Iraq, that country tried to give up the USA dollar as 
a currency for international oil trade and replace it by Euro. However, this did not 
succeed because neither other OPEC member countries, nor the markets were not 
ready for it. After the “official” end of the occupation, Iraq restarted using the 
USA dollar for her oil trade.  
OPEC continues to operate in 2019 but with much smaller capacities to affect the 
world energy policies than in the 1970 and in the early 1980s. The USA illegal 
sanctions against Iran have weakened the OPEC. The use of different kind of 
alternative energy sources and strategies that have emerged during the last two 
decades have also had their impact. In practice, this means larger shares of the 
world energy markets for shale gas in one hand, and more inventions, which allow 
reducing energy consumption in the other hand. This all makes world energy mar-
kets less dependent on oil producers and, at the same time, it is more ecological 
and climate friendly. 
All these three different actors—Non-Aligned Movement, UNCTAD and 
OPEC—were central in different attempts to make the NIEO (New International 
Economic Order) a reality. However, many different development patterns, for 
example, geopolitics, resiliencies of the dominant powers and their capacities of 
adaptation, were factors that did not allow NIEO to progress as expected. . 
Cold war was a strong geopolitical factor, which tied the developing countries so 
strongly to its main competing blocks that there were no real space for sustainable 
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and successful Third World performance in the world politics. Cold war was also 
behind those processes by which the dominant hegemonic countries managed to 
play down their acquisitions and ambitions expressed in the NIEO. Like indicated 
already, most of the achievements from the 1960s and 1970s somehow vanished 
in the 1980s. The resilience and the adaptation of dominant hegemonic economic 
system became very visible by the end of the 1980s in the so-called “Washington 
Consensus” where World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the local USA 
government produced some rather simple economic goals that would supposedly 
lead the developing world to economic and social prosperity. In reality, it paved 
the way to neo-liberalism so continuing the hegemonic dominance. The Wash-
ington Consensus was unable to form any kind of real consensus even around 
itself. It was strongly criticized by many scholars and few politicians from its 
inception. Nevertheless, it was a kind of mantra for many advocates of ultra-lib-
eralism until the financial crises in 2008. 
After the disgrace of the Washington Consensus, it seems that the dreams of the 
NIEO are slowly coming back in spite of the fact that its contents and goals were 
already almost totally forgotten. Today, the impasse of the world’s economic sys-
tem and structures seems to indicate that alternatives are really needed. Since 
2008 there have been several new development patterns that are only now becom-
ing rather visible. They are challenging many former practices and already now 
showing us serious handicaps in different economic, social and political fields. 
Thus, for already some years and through more and more debates, it has become 
apparent that international organizations need to change. It has been in that con-
text that the UN General Assembly renewed the main recommendations of the 
NIEO in 2012 (Gilman 2015). 
People’s presence since the 1990s: a hope for future 
The end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union and, definitely, the 
world financial crisis in 2008 have produced new kind of development not only 
to world economic system but also to main political structures and development 
patterns more generally. We are now for the first time in situation where very 
little remains from the heritage of the Second World War, or even from the main 
features of the decolonization. 
Within these new perspectives, we can distinguish at least four domains acting, 
in one hand, rather close to each other, but on the other hand, in complete 
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contradiction and confrontation between them. As a matter of fact, we can find 
inside of each these domains, actors that are really opposed to each other and 
trying to dominate their counterpart. As such, these domains form a real “champs 
de bataille” where there is no room for any kind of mercy. 
The first field can be called “State domain”, where individual states, state actors 
such as governments, ministries, armies or other state-connected organs holding 
political power, are central. In international level, it seems that in this field there 
are more and more states or states actors, which do not respect any more common 
rules accepted together or treaties and agreements they have themselves agreed 
upon or signed. 
A number of governments in the countries of this domain can be characterized as 
populists such as Poland and Hungary, which today are at odds with the European 
Union because of their non-respect of the basic European rules and values. The 
USA of Mr. Trump can also be counted in this group by its overall policies and 
the support the regime is trying to get from the “Redneck societies”, especially in 
the “Bible belt”. Turkey of Mr. Erdoğan is really challenging her NATO partners 
and the whole organization by its military attack of Kurds in Northern Syria. Rus-
sia of Vladimir Putin is also playing with international community and its rules 
in Ukraine, Crimea and Syria. In all of these examples, the populist right-wing 
extreme movements are the leading force of the government. 
For instance in Europe, the overall political situation is even more troublesome 
because, besides these governments, populist right-wing extreme movements are 
getting stronger and stronger, even if they are not in power. This kind of situation 
can be found in Finland with “PS”43, “SD” that is “Sverige demokrater”44 in Swe-
den, “RN”, “Rassemblement National”45 in France, “AfD”, “Alternative für 
Deutschland”46 in Germany, “Vox” in Spain, or “Lega” in Italy. The existence of 
these movements in almost all European countries and the increase of their sup-
port during last years, signify that also many centrist and conservative parties are 
moving more to right, to right-wing political discourse. Even a part of political 
left is doing so in some cases, as in Denmark, for instance. This is clearly a kind 
 
43 PS, “Perussuomalaiset”, this party translates its name as ”Finns Party” that is false, in my mind, 
more correct translation would be “Proto-Finns”, or “Basic Finns”. 
44 “Sverige Demokrater” as “Swedish Democrates”. 
45 “Rassemblement National” as “National Rally”. 
46 “Alternative für Deutschland” as “Alternative for Germany”. 
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of indicator that there might be in near future important changes in Europe’s in-
ternational relations and in its economic policies in the world scale. These “na-
tionalists” features could provoke real upheaval in European and even global 
landscape, a little bit like Brexit has done. 
When dealing with this “State domain”, we should also include new economic 
state-level groups such as BRICS47 and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion). These two organizations are dealt extensively elsewhere in this volume. 
Here we just want to pay attention to their existence emphasizing that they are 
important challengers to the hegemonic and dominant international order, even if 
some analysts argue that they have today became a part of it. 
The second domain consist of international organizations, international law and 
international treaties, where the confrontation is getting harder and harder. There 
are important international actors whose policies try to negate all kind of multi-
lateralism and to reduce the role of international organizations like the UN and 
that of international law.  
Unesco is maybe the first important international organization, which has suffered 
from these kinds of policies. About a quarter of century ago, some of its member 
countries left the organization because they disagreed with its policies and refused 
to honour their membership fees. Then they joined Unesco again hoping to be 
able to benefit more from the organization and also to influence its policies to 
better integrate their own wishes. As this was not the case, these troublemakers 
left the organization again. This kind of va-et-vient has, of course, been very prob-
lematic for the world organization like Unesco, making any kind of planning more 
difficult.  
Many other international organizations have shared the destiny of Unesco. One 
of the recent examples is the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization),48 
which has faced different kind of difficulties since the end of the cold war. The 
new members from Eastern Europe were able to give a new breath to this defence 
structure. Today, NATO faces new problems because of Turkish behaviour in 
Syria, which is not accepted, at least officially, by other members. Even more, the 
 
47 BRICS, Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa. 
48 SCO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization consist mainly of Central Asian countries where 
China and Russia have leading role. 
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new attitude of the USA with the actual president Trump blaming its European 
members as being “free riders” is adding to the uncertainties. Today this organi-
zation seems to be politically weaker than ever after the end of the cold war.  
Some of these new NATO weaknesses and particularities became visible in the 
organization’s 70 years festivities in London in early December 2019. Just before 
the celebrations, France’s President Emmanuel Macron declared NATO to have 
attained “brain death” because of USA withdrawal from Northern Syria that per-
mitted Turkey’s attack against the Kurds, the allies of the NATO in the fight 
against Islamic State. This shook seriously the basic principles and values of 
NATO that conducted the organiation in one of its most difficult crises ever since 
(Guibert and Stroobants 2019; The Economist 2019). Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
the president of Turkey for the time being, has strengthened the suspicions and 
mistrust among other member countries by continuing its military cooperation 
with Russia even after the contested acquisition of missile defence system from 
that country earlier in 2019.  
All these particular difficulties irritated the USA and president Trump asked other 
member countries to increase their financial contribution to NATO significantly, 
namely, 400 milliard USA dollars by 2024. When the other members did not im-
mediately respond positively, he left childishly the city before the end of the cer-
emonies after having insulted few of his fellow head of states like the Canadian 
prime minister Justin Trudeau (Wilson 2019; La Croix 2019). 
These new attitudes towards NATO reflect also more general tendencies of the 
USA on international policies. They consist of criticizing the globalization and 
multilateralism more in rhetorical discourses than in practice. Nevertheless, in 
fine, it is the Congress that sets the limits for the executive in foreign policy dis-
engagements (Frachon 2019). At the same time this shows the dominant influence 
the USA still has on global relations. 
Also the World Bank has been affected by these attempts to reduce the role of 
multinational organizations. The new director appointed by the USA has been 
expressing publicly the opinion that the multilateralism has gone too far and it is 
harming the economy of the USA and of the world. Thus, the World Bank has 
formulated a new approach concerning climate change and environmental issues. 
Instead of looking at these questions through multilateral policies, the World 
Bank is emphasizing on bilateral relations, which consist of individual 
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development programmes undertaken by each country. In this way it is today 
closer to the USA political priorities than almost never before (Bouissou 2019). 
This second domain contains also another branch that consists of different inter-
national treaties and agreements, which many actors, especially state actors, have 
started to interpret in such a way that they benefit the most themselves, while 
often watering down their original purposes. 
During recent years a good example of this is the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action). The JCPOA is an agreement between the five UN Security Coun-
cil member countries plus Germany under the auspices of the EU with Iran and 
concerns the regulations of Iran’s possibilities to develop nuclear technology. Its 
main purpose is to prevent Iran to develop a nuclear armament. The JCPOA was 
negotiated during more than a decade and finally signed in mid-July 2015 in Vi-
enna. 
However, the agreement includes also the reduction and finally the end of the UN 
sanctions against Iran. The agreement is monitored by IAEA (the International 
Atomic Energy Agency), which surveils that Iran respects the conditions of the 
2015 agreement. Until 2019 Iran has abided by its requirements, and the UN sanc-
tions have been gradually reduced. These sanctions have been extremely harmful 
for Iran’s economy and as such also for the living conditions of its population. 
Thus, the reduction of sanctions has been and is extremely important to Iran when 
the country is attempting to ease socially and economically the everyday life of 
its people. As such, the reduction and the end of the sanction is important also for 
the popularity of the government and even for the whole regime of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
In May 2018 the USA told the international community that it will withdraw its 
participation into the JCPOA and start to apply the economic sanctions again. The 
reasons presented by the USA for this imbroglio were the continuation of Iranian 
foreign policy to influence the nearby regions in the Middle East—in Persian Gulf 
and the Levant—as well as the Iranian programme to develop ballistic missiles 
for protecting her territory. The USA sanctions were reintroduced in November 
2018. The USA sanctions have a strange “side-effect”, this country pretends that 
their domestic laws are valid universally. Thus, they are intended to be a kind of 
extraterritorial sanctions, and they try to punish illegally every country and com-
pany that continues to trade with Iran.  
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These USA sanctions are also against international law because they are not ac-
cepted by the UN Security Council. Their primary goal is to hinder the Iranian oil 
and gas export as well as to stop the cooperation between Iran and main global 
oil companies. Besides direct cooperation with Iran, the USA tries to obstructs all 
kind of economic cooperation that is based on the use of USA dollar as trade 
currency. This is naturally something that most of the global multinational enter-
prises and other players take very seriously. 
For obvious reasons, the USA has difficulties to impose internationally its rather 
doubtful, very suspicious and even suspect rules. Already in August 2018, Euro-
pean Union started to plan how to renounce the USA dictates by finding alterna-
tive ways in order to bypass them. In this situation EU re-enforced the so-called 
a “Blocking Statute” for protecting her enterprises continuing commercial rela-
tions with Iran.49 
In January 2019 European Union developed a special tool called INSTEX (In-
strument in Support of Trade Exchanges)”, in order to overcome the USA illegal 
sanctions against Iran. Since the beginning, three European countries—Britain, 
France and Germany—had declared their intention to participate the INSTEX that 
remained open for all the EU members and also to other countries. In February 
2019 Russia, Syria and Turkey announced their interest to support the European 
initiative. The headquarters of the INSTEX have been established in Paris and in 
summer 2019 it became operational. In the end of November 2019, six more Eu-
ropean countries—Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and The Neth-
erlands—announced their participation to INSTEX in order to be able to trade 
with Iran.50 
Even if their performances remain modest, these European initiatives are ex-
tremely important because they try to re-enforce the rule of law in world economy 
and international commercial relations. Concerning the USA sanctions, 
 
49 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4805, and 
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=8E695B89-2B89-4681-A5AE-
11C92B7EF008 
50 https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/six-european-countries-join-eu-iran-
financial-trading-mechanism-instex/; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/01/six-more-
countries-join-trump-busting-iran-barter-group 
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Malaysian Prime Minister Mr. Mahathir Mohamad said recently in Doha Forum 
in Qatar that those sanctions are clearly against the international law.51 
All these three initiatives are examples how the multilateral and multipolar world 
order tries to defend its existence against those who do not respect international 
law.  
Iran itself has, of course, reacted because of the return of the USA sanctions. The 
country has started to neglect the JCPOA. In July 2019 Iran told the world of 
having stocked more low-enriched uranium than what was agreed, and later on 
Iran also bypassed the restrictions on some technical instruments such as centri-
fuges needed to enrich uranium. In the same way, Iran has created some turbu-
lence in the Persian Gulf saying that if it cannot export its petrol, why should the 
others be permitted do it. However, in general, all these acts have been more of a 
symbolic nature than a real breaking of the 2015 agreement. As the Europeans 
also the Iranians seem to prefer to keep the 2015 JCPOA in live.52 
On more global level, the evolution of the JCPOA crisis, provoked by the USA 
withdrawal, might have larger and more profound consequences for international 
relations. It might signify, in the long run, the end of the USA extraterritorial 
sanctions and laws, even the decrease of its dominant and hegemonic position. 
When three closest allies of the USA take, with the INSTEX, a rather strong stand 
against it in the economic field, and so also politically, this might create possibil-
ities for returning to more multilateralism and so also to reform the UN system, 
especially its Security Council paralyzed by the veto right of the winners of the 
Second World War.53 In the short run, this imbroglio strengthens in the global 
 
51 Doha Forum is an international gathering aiming to discuss global issues, its theme for 2019 
edition was “Reimagining Governance in a Multi-Polar World”. See more on forum and its report 
in pages https://dohaforum.org/; https://dohaforum.org/docs/default-source/default-document-
library/reimagining-governance_doha_forum-for-print.pdf; and 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/malaysia-pm-sanctions-iran-violate-international-law-
191214082529755.html 
52 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/01/eu-powers-resist-calls-for-iran-sanctions-
after-breach-of-nuclear-deal; and https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/12/uranium-
particles-detected-at-undeclared-site-in-iran-says-atomic-watchdog 
53 Franco-Algerian philosopher, Jacques Derrida expressed, after the USA wars against Iraq, that 
the UN headquarters should be removed from New York so far as possible. 
 http://remue.net/IMG/pdf/Jacques_Derrida_entretien_avec_J._Birnbaum.pdf; and Jacques 
Derrida et Le Monde diplomatique, “Une Europe de l’espoir”, Le Monde diplomatique, November 
2004, p. 3, https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2004/11/ 
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geopolitical scene China and Russia that are playing their cards rather cleverly 
for the time being; also the EU has possibilities to free itself, at least in some 
degree, from the USA dictates. 
Concerning the Middle-Eastern political landscape, the USA’s unilateral actions 
on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, such as moving the location of its embassy out 
of Tel Aviv, the failure to continue financing the UNHR taking care of the Pales-
tinian refugees, and, finally, the recognition to Israel the right to maintain its un-
lawful settler colonies in the occupied West-Bank and Jerusalem, are causing 
problems for the whole region. The last action of the actual USA administration 
concerning the settler’s right to occupy the West Bank was finally rejected by the 
USA Congress. The unprepared military withdrawal of the USA from northern 
Syria belongs to this same category that does not respect the political, military 
and moral engagements of the Atlantic superpower. It simply betrayed its Kurdish 
allies which have been crucial in gaining the fight against the IS, Islamic State in 
Syria and in Iraq.  
The list of international treaties and agreements that many “super powers” want 
to neglect is getting longer in recent years. The most crucial are those themes, 
which do not recognize the existence of the climate change and turn down the 
scientific arguments behind it. Thus, the will of the USA to pull out of “COP21, 
the Paris Agreement” co-opted under the auspices of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change has provoked lot of confused reactions all 
over the world.54 Many societies all over the world are shocked by this kind of 
behaviour and of the negligence towards the common concern. Especially young 
generations, those who are personally concerned by the negative impacts of cli-
mate change, are simply upset in front of such egoism. Young Swedish teenage 
girl Greta Thunberg has become a global icon to represent this worldwide oppo-
sition and resentment to those irresponsible players not caring about the globe and 
its environment.55 This global indignation might re-enforce the transnational sol-
idarity among younger generations and, on the long run, really have an impact on 
geopolitical power structures.  
 
54 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fi/policies/climate-change/paris-agreement/; and 
https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement/ 
55 https://climateactiontracker.org/press/effect-of-the-us-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement/; 
and https://www.facebook.com/gretathunbergsweden/ 
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There are other international treaties with a strong impact on the security in the 
global context. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the so called 
“INF Treaty” between Soviet Union / Russia and the USA has been extremely 
important to avoid the risk of nuclear confrontation in Europe. In late 2018, USA 
president Donald Trump announced his intention to withdraw his country from 
this agreement. In 2019 both of its main signatories, Russia and the USA left the 
treaty which thus opens the way to new arms race and especially to the prolifera-
tion of this kind of armament – China and Ukraine are already showing interest 
on them.56 
Another example of neglecting the multilateralism and international agreements 
is the attitude of some countries to the new Convention on the Rights of the Child 
or CRC, also known as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
or UNCRC. Since late 1950 there has been different international measures trying 
to protect the children and to recognize their basic rights. This convention has 
been signed by all the UN member countries excluding the USA, and also some 
small island territories are not applying it.57 The procedures for accepting the 
CRC has been made easier by optional protocols, last one of them has been 
adopted in December 2019.58  
The third domain to follow in our attempt to understand how the hegemonic dom-
inant powers and structures are being challenged since the end of the cold war 
concerns the INGOs (International non-governmental organizations) and, at the 
more local level, the NGOs (non-governmental organizations). In the case of the 
INGOs, let us notice two major ones that are also connected in most of their ac-
tivities. 
The first one is called ATTAC (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions 
financières et pour l'Action Citoyenne) since 2009. The ATTAC aims to increase 
the international economic and financial exchanges on global level by better re-
specting the interests especially of Third World people. The ATTAC follows crit-
ically the policies practised by the WTO and OECD as well as by the WB and the 
 
56 https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty; and 
https://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/index.html 
57 The reluctant attitude of the USA is mainly due to all kind of religious, social and political 
conservatives. See Browning and Witte (2012). 
58 https://violenceagainstchildren.un.org/content/optional-protocols-convention-rights-child 
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IMF. The ATTAC delegations participate also in the meetings of the G8 and Da-
vos in order to influence global political and economic decisions.59 
The second example in this case is the WSF (World Social Forum), originally 
called Fórum Social Mundial, which is a bi-annual gathering of the civil society 
organizations wanting to propose alternative and non-hegemonic ways to ap-
proach globalization. The World Social Forum has had various meetings in dif-
ferent parties of the world. More practically, it aims to form a real alternative, for 
instance, to the Davos World Economic Forum, by bringing forth the global civil 
society views. In March 2018, the last WSF took place in Salvador da Bahia, 
Brazil, and in spring 2020 a kind of a thematic World Social Forum on Trans-
formative Economies will be organized in Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain. Around 
these thematic WSFs, there are also many regional, national and local gatherings 
around same principles. For instance, the Finnish Social Forum 2019 concen-
trated on the theme Pathways Toward Changing the System.60 
Besides INGOs, which are rather well known at the international level, there are 
also many national and local non-governmental organizations that are important 
in their own environment in contesting hegemonic structures and traditions. As 
an example, we can refer to Finland where such movements can be found among 
the Saami people. They aim to re-enforce the cultural identity and economic per-
formances of this indigenous people in Lapland.61 
The last and fourth domain is the most exciting. It concerns local societies and 
consist of civil society organizations, which have often occurred rather spontane-
ously for expressing the opinions and the emotions of the populations. This kind 
of phenomena has somehow become more visible during last quarter of the cen-
tury. Their characteristic is that often they are without clear organizational struc-
tures if any; they might not have a leader or a spoke-person, they are non-violent 
and pacific. However, they are usually very radical aiming to profound, even rev-
olutionary changes in their respective societies. This kind of social and political 
formations can be found in all the continents.  
 
59 https://www.attac.org/node/3727.  
60 https://wsf2018.org/en/english-world-social-forum-2018/; https://sosiaalifoorumi.fi/in-english/; 
https://www.weforum.org/; and http://www.ripess.org/forum-social-mondial-economies-
transformatrices/?lang=en 
61 http://senc.hum.helsinki.fi/wiki/Saamelaisliike#tab=English 
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The oldest phenomenon of this category might be the Zapatista Movement in 
México, which is fighting for better living conditions for autochthone population 
in Chiapas. In the North American continent another similar movement emerged 
few decades later called Occupy Wall Street. Already a little bit earlier in Spain, 
there was a protest movement that culminated in the Occupation of Puerta del Sol 
in Madrid.62 All these three movements were advocating social and economic 
equality as well as protesting against the neo-liberalism in local and global level. 
As source of inspiration, they referred to and followed the ideas expressed by 
Stephan Hessel few years earlier in his Indignez-vous (2010).63 
In 2011, similar kind of mass movements took place in the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean when popular mass demonstrations managed to turn down the lo-
cal despots, first in Tunisia and then in Egypt. These two phenomena were greeted 
as Arab Spring, the appellation that is not accepted by all the stakeholders, but 
which were however seen as the beginning of democratization in those two coun-
tries. The reality has been less romantic.  
The local difficulties and the foreign interventions have led to violent internal 
crises for some of the followers of these two examples. Libya, Yemen and Syria 
are still suffering from serious civil wars. The more general difficulties in the 
Middle East have provoked new wave of mass protests in 2019. For example, in 
Algeria, where the Hirak movement compelled the president to resign in April 
2019.64 
Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Lebanon are following Algeria, in each of those countries 
there are huge mass movements that simply express the total frustration of the 
 
62 https://elordenmundial.com/el-movimiento-zapatista/; https://hemisphericinstitute.org/en/su10-
tourism/item/879-su10-brief-historical-background-zapatista-movement/; 
http://occupywallst.org/; http://www.cubadebate.cu/etiqueta/puerta-del-sol/; and, 
https://www.20minutos.es/minuteca/puerta-del-sol/;  
63 Stephen Hessel was a member of the French Resistance Movement and former prisoner in 
German concentration camp during the Second World War. This diplomat was already more than 
90 years old when he published this short story inviting the public to express their outrage because 
of increasing inequalities. https://www.millebabords.org/IMG/pdf/INDIGNEZ_VOUS.pdf 
64 In Algeria, Hirak is the name in Arabic given to the manifestations that started 22 February 2019 
and that is still going on after the ‘imposed’ presidential election in 12 December 2019. This 
pacific, non-violent and very civilized movement is also called “Smiling revolution”. See for 
instance https://www.cadtm.org/The-Hirak-Movement-in-Algeria-Against-Bouteflika-s-
Mandate-of-Shame; and, https://www.elwatan.com/edition/actualite/melissa-ziad-la-ballerine-de-
lespoir-09-03-2019. 
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population to their political elite and their corruption. While it is the lowering 
standards of social and economic conditions that are the primus motor to these 
movements, they have also a political agenda which involves the non-acceptance 
any more the previous and actual elites.  
This is very apparent in Algeria and in Lebanon. In Algeria the Algerian society 
is able to manage the post-election situation and the president was forced to resign 
(Harbi 2019). In Lebanon the demonstrators reject the confessionalism and do not 
want any more to be categorized into the religious communities. They simply 
require a laic and secular Lebanese citizenship. Unfortunately, in Egypt and in 
Iraq, there has been violent clashes between the protesters and the police forces 
with the hundreds of casualties (Bourcier 2019). 
Besides the protest movement of Puerta del Sol, we have two interesting mass 
demonstration movements in Europe. The first one is the Gilets jaunes in France 
and the second the very recent Movimento delle sardine in Italy.65 The Yellow 
Vests movement began by opposing the new gasoline tax and the increase of liv-
ing cost in general. In autumn 2019, there has been more and more often open 
clashes between some elements of the Yellow Vests and the police. Police has 
been also criticized for using unnecessary force during the demonstrations 
(Lancier 2019; Le Monde December 2019). While it seems that the Yellow Vests 
movement is not popular enough to change the political culture in France, in many 
ways it has played the role of an awakener.  
In Italy, the Sardines movement began in mid-November 2019 in Bologna when 
the campaign for the January 2020 local elections started. Originally the Sardines 
wanted to oppose all the extremisms, especially right-wing extremism of the Lega 
and personally its leader Mateo Salvini that they want to prevent from winning 
the coming elections. At the same time they are rejecting the populists, anti-mi-
grants and anti EU attitudes. The “Movimento delle sardine” advocates also the 
renewal of structures by requiring more place for younger generations. However, 
the Sardines are not a political party, but they still are in favour of more respon-
sible environment and especially climate politics.66 
 
65 “Gilets jaunes”, in English “Yellow Vests” and “Movimento delle sardine”, in English “The 
Sardines movement.” 
66 https://www.panorama.it/news/politica/sardine-storia-movimento-nome-lega-salvini/ 
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Most of these different phenomena, different movements have emerged during 
last ten years; some of them are even more recent and young. They are also prod-
ucts of today’s globalization in the sense that they have appropriated most of the 
main instruments of the modern electronic communications. The French Yellow 
Vests are encouraging their counterparts in Hong Kong by using WhatsApp and 
Facebook and vice versa. This means that there is a global community of solidar-
ity and contestation, which was not possible to imagine just two decades ago. All 
this leaves our future uncertain, but at the same time there is a new hope that the 
better future is possible. 
Having in mind the global, universal history since the end of the Second World 
War, that is during the last three quarters of the century, it is obvious that there is 
an important number of different convergent, sometimes opposite, even confront-
ing evolutions and which are also in contradiction between themselves and with 
the more general tendencies of this recent past. According to my understanding 
the decolonization process, even with all its shortcomings, was the most important 
phenomenon of the twentieth century because it inaugurated the ending of the 
five centuries old European colonial adventure. In this field there remains still a 
lot to do.  
The evolution since 1945 shows that this decolonization project has as more final 
goal of a global world system that is more equal and that is able to take into the 
consideration the needs and wishes of all parts of humankind.67 It is also under-
standable that the process is dialectic in old Aristotelian, Hegelian and Marxist 
traditions—sometimes it seems to echo Lenin’s words when dancing: “one step 
forward, two steps backward.”  
After the accomplishment of main phases of political decolonization, the attempts 
to realize the NIEO, the New International Economic Order, in the 1970s were 
certainly the most important, at least the most interesting step until now. Today, 
all the imbroglio of international relations, whether economic, political, even ge-
opolitical and cultural, might be a positive augury for new perspectives in future, 
even in near future.  
 
67 My colleague professor Jyrki Käkönen speaks also about the need to decolonize the 
international relations and world order in his text “Decolonizing the International order.” See 
Käkönen (2019). 
 226 
Let us hope that the politicians today are able to respond the challenges and re-
quirements of our young generations. Alea iacta es! This can be said even if it is 
not recommendable that a single actor takes all the power, but to propose that it 
is shared decently. 
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Shedding Light on a Changing International Order: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges examines 
the role of regional processes as we are witnessing a deepening crisis of multilateralism, a 
gradual erosion of the US leadership, and continuous global power shifts towards emergent 
economies such as China and India. In light of these changes, scholars need to reconsider their 
current disciplinary approaches. This book primarily focuses on the rising powers and some of 
their new institutional and cultural initiatives. It studies for instance how new initiatives like the 
BRICS and the New Development Bank relate to multilateral institutions, and to what extent 
and how can the concept of culture as well as indigenous traditions of the rising powers be 
conceptualized and used in scientific approaches. One of the other main aims of this book is 
to challenge reductive conceptualizations of the world’s cultural developments, notably by 
shedding light on a networked view of the development of human kind. Through challenging 
various academic concepts that reproduce power relations, this book aims to stress the more 
complex processes of the development of socio-economic premises, whether from post-
structuralist, realist, or constructivist frameworks. 
This book is the final product of the research project funded by the Kone Foundation, called 
Regional Challenges to Multilateralism (2017-2020). It includes illustrations that stress the 
popular dimension of the project, by combining art with academic outputs. 
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